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Kansainvälisten fuusioiden ja yritysostojen menestymiseen vaikuttavat kulttuuritekijät
Tutkimusongelma ja tutkimuksen tavoitteet
Vaikka useat tutkimukset ovat osoittaneet kulttuurierojen vaikutuksen tärkeyden fuusioiden ja 
yritysostojen menestymisessä, fuusioiden ja yritysostojen korkeat epäonmstumisprosentit 
viittaavat siihen, etteivät yritykset edelleenkään ymmärrä näitä asioita oikein tai ota niitä 
kunnolla huomioon. Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on tutkia mitkä kulttuuritekijät 
vaikuttavat kansainvälisten fuusioiden ja yritysostojen menestymiseen. Työ pyrkii vastaamaan 
seuraaviin tutkimuskysymyksiin: Mitkä kulttuurierot ovat olennaisia kansainvälisten 
fuusioiden ja yritysostojen lopputuloksessa, miten kulttuurierot vaikuttavat kansainvälisten 
fuusioiden ja yritysostojen lopputulokseen, ja miten kansainväliset fuusiot ja yritysostot tulisi 
hoitaa kulttuurinäkökulmasta katsoen?
Tutkimusmenetelmä ja -aineisto
Työn metodologia seuraa pääpiirteiltään Kasanen ym. (1993) esittämää konstruktiivista 
lähestymistapaa. Kiijallisuuskatselmuksen pohjalta työlle laadittiin teoreettinen kehys, jonka 
soveltuvuutta yritysmaailmaan tarkasteltiin tutkimalla suomalaisia yrityksiä. 
Tutkimusmenetelmänä käytettiin ns. monitapaustutkimusta (multiple-case study), joka 
pohjautui lähinnä Yin:in (1994) oppeihin. Tutkimukseen valitut case-yritykset olivat Stora 
Enso, Datex-Ohmeda, Outokumpu, Nordea ja Yritys A. Jokaisen yrityksen kohdalla 
tarkasteltiin myös yhtä tai useampaa yksittäistä fuusiota ja/tai yritysostoa (ns. embedded 
case:ä), johon yritys oli osallistunut.
Tutkimuksen tulokset
Kansallisten, toimiala-, liiketoiminta- ja organisaatiotason kulttuurierojen havaittiin 
vaikuttavan kansainvälisten fuusioiden ja yritysostojen lopputulokseen. Näiden 
kulttuurierotasojen välillä on selvästi päällekkäisyyksiä, ja kunkin tason vaikutus on 
tapauskohtainen. Kaikista tärkeimmät tekijät, joiden kautta kulttuurierojen nähtiin vaikuttavan 
fuusioiden ja yritysostojen lopputulokseen, olivat fuusiotyyppi, kieliongelmat, ‘me versus he’ 
-vastakkainasettelu sekä kulttuuriseen erilaistumiseen (cultural differentiation) ja 
organisaatioiden yhdistämiseen (organizational integration) liittyvien voimien välinen 
tasapaino. Tutkimuksessa esiin tulleet kulttuurierojen huomioimiseen tähtäävät 
johtamistoimenpiteet olivat kulttuurien välinen analyysi M&A -prosessin 
päätöksentekovaiheessa ja kulttuurinen due diligence -prosessi neuvotteluvaiheessa. 
Kulttuurien integroinnissa tärkeimpinä työkaluina korostuivat kulttuuritilinteon laatiminen 
(culture audit), yhteisen identiteetin kehittäminen tai siihen sulauttaminen, johdonmukainen 
viestintä, kulttuurikoulutus, konsulttien palkkaaminen sekä vahva johtamisote ja nopeus. 
Vaikka tutkimus vahvistikin, että kulttuuriasiat ovat vain yksi vaikuttava tekijä fuusioiden ja 
yritysostojen lopputuloksessa, se myös osoitti, että terveellä kulttuurijohtamisella voidaan 
osaltaan myötävaikuttaa näiden tapahtumien onnistumiseen.
Avainsanat: Akkulturaatio, fuusio, fuusiotyyppi, kansallinen kulttuuri, kulttuurien 
yhteenopivuus, liiketoimintakulttuuri, organisaatiokulttuuri, toimialakulttuuri, yritysosto
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ABSTRACT
Master’s Thesis МаУ 2003
Cultural Determinants of Performance in International Mergers and Acquisitions
Research Problem and Objectives
Although an increasing number of studies have shown the importance of coping with cultural 
differences in the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, the high failure rates reveal that these 
issues are still either widely misunderstood or ignored by the merging companies. The 
objective of this study is to explore the cultural factors, which have an effect on the outcomes 
of international mergers and acquisitions. The research questions that the study seeks to 
answer are: What are the cultural differences relevant to the outcomes of international 
mergers and acquisitions, how do cultural differences affect the outcomes of international 
mergers and acquisitions and how should international mergers and acquisitions be managed 
from a cultural perspective?
Methodology
The methodological approach applied largely resembles the constructive approach introduced 
by Kasanen et al. (1993). A theoretical framework was first constructed according to the 
findings of a literature review. The aim of the empirical part was to examine the framework in 
a real-life setting by linking it to the context of Finnish firms. The research method used was 
the multiple-case study, mainly based on the propositions of Yin (1994). The case companies 
examined were Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda, Outokumpu, Nordea and Company A. Each of 
the cases included one or several embedded cases, i.e. the examination of specific mergers 
and/or acquisitions undertaken by that company.
Results of the Study
Differences in national, industry, business and organizational cultures were all perceived to 
affect the outcomes of international mergers and acquisitions. The different levels were 
clearly seen as interconnected, and the importance of each varies depending on the case at 
hand. The most pertinent factors, through which the cultural differences were perceived to 
come to play, were the merger type, language problems, the ‘us vs. them’ antagonism and the 
balance between the forces of cultural differentiation and organizational integration. The 
cultural management efforts highlighted by the study include a cross-cultural analysis in the 
decision-making phase of the M&A process and a cultural due diligence in the negotiation 
phase. Conducting a culture audit, the development of or introduction to a common identity, 
consistent communication, cross-cultural training and the employment of consultants were 
established as the most important tools in cultural integration. Strong leadership and speed 
were also emphasized. Although the study confirms the fact that cultural issues are just one 
set of factors affecting M&A performance, it also demonstrates that a sound cultural 
management will contribute to making deals successful.
Key Words: Acculturation, acquisition, merger, business culture, cultural fit, cultural 
management, industry culture, merger type, national culture, organizational culture
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
When the two drug outfits, Swedish Pharmacia and U.S.-based Upjohn merged in 1995, it 
was supposed to be the perfect match. The companies had complementary research strengths: 
Upjohn in markets such as fighting infectious diseases and Pharmacia in areas such as cancer. 
Upjohn’s sales force in the highly profitable U.S. market was presumed to drive strong growth 
among both of the companies’ products, while cost savings from combining the companies 
were thought to strengthen profits. (Barrett 1999, 63). By 1997, however, it had become 
evident that the merger had turned out a disaster. The merged company’s earnings in 1997 
plunged an unbelievable 26% and salesforce turnover in the U.S. hit 25% (Seiden 1999, 98).
The merger was not just an attempt to blend two different national ways of doing business: it 
was actually three, since Pharmacia had not been able to integrate an earlier Italian 
acquisition. Even that multicultural challenge might have worked out if the company had 
created a clear structure of decisive command and top-down decision making from the start. 
But this “brutal” American way of implementing mergers was not befitting to the more 
socially oriented Swedes or Italians. (Seiden 1999, 98). Time was wasted on arguments about 
“American” practices, such as banning alcohol at lunch (The Economist 1999, Jan 9, 21). 
Instead of making tough decisions that could have led to cost cutting, the management’s main 
concern was to maintain good relations among the executives from the two sides, i.e. “not to 
step on anyone’s toes” (Seiden 1999, 98).
The compromises led to autonomous sites in Sweden, Italy and the U.S. and a failed effort to 
have a headquarters on “neutral soil” in England (Barrett 1999, 63). The encountered issues 
ultimately resulted in the resignation of the company’s American CEO, a plunge in the stock 
price, and a loss of investor and analyst confidence in the ability of the board of directors to 
manage the company. In May 1997, the firm moved to New Jersey and appointed an outsider, 
Fred Hassan, as the new CEO (Belcher & Nail 2000, 227,231).
After Hassan took over, the basic policies of the company changed. Hassan was given the 
power and the control needed to pull the company back from the verge of disaster. The
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headquarters was established in New Jersey, the office in London was closed, and the 
autonomous business units in Stockholm, Kalamazoo and Milan were dismantled. 
Pharmacia’s culture was successfully assimilated into the new firm’s culture, and Pharmacia 
& Upjohn is now essentially American. (Seiden 1999, 100).
The Pharmacia & Upjohn case is an excellent example of how culture clashes and poor 
management can turn a promising merger into a disaster, but also of how effective post­
merger leadership can save a challenging cross-border merger.
1.2 Research Problem
The end of the 20th century witnessed an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions. 
According to The Wall Street Journal Almanac, the number of mergers and acquisitions 
worldwide increased nearly six-fold in a ten year period, from approximately 4,100 in 1986 to 
23,600 in 1997 (Weekly Corporate Growth Report 1999, 10219). Amongst the mergers in the 
end of the 1990s were several significant deals, such as the $80 billion merger of Exxon and 
Mobil and Daimler-Benz’s takeover of Chrysler (The Economist 1999, Jan 9, 19).
Due to a slow global economy and tight credit markets, worldwide M&A activity has been 
slowing down steadily since the first quarter of 2000. The year 2002 has not seen a variation 
from this trend. The volume of worldwide mergers and acquisitions fell by 45% in the first 
quarter of 2002 to $248 billion, from $452 billion in the same period in 2001, according to 
New York-based Thomson Financial. That was the lowest volume since the second quarter of 
1995. The number of mergers and acquisitions in the first quarter fell to 5,400, which was the 
lowest since the fourth quarter of 1994. The accounting uncertainty originating from recent 
accounting troubles in the US has only added to the unwillingness of companies to engage in 
mergers and acquisitions. (Platt 2002, 18).
Despite the decrease in the number of mergers and acquisitions, there have been a number of 
major mergers in the beginning of the 21st century. Such was the biggest merger in history — 
the $165 billion merger between America Online (AOL) and Time Warner in January 2001 
(Hahn 2002, 38). Some of the largest recent Finnish cross-border mergers have been Stora 
Enso’s €4.9 billion acquisition of Consolidated Papers in the United States in 2000 (Stora
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Enso 2000) and Outokumpu’s €1.1 billion Avesta-Polarit merger, which took place in January 
2001 (Outokumpu 2002).
Although considerably high levels of financial investment are involved and despite the fact 
that companies have gained more experience in mergers and acquisitions in the past decade, 
empirical studies have repeatedly shown that more than a half of post-merger organizational 
integration processes have resulted in disappointments or outright failures (Lajoux & Weston 
1998, 34-37). For example, a Mercer Management Consulting 10-year study of 300 major 
mergers in the 1990s found that the total return to shareholders lagged behind the average for 
their industries in 57% of these newly merged companies (Daniel 1999, 19). In the same line, 
a KPMG study involving 700 deals from 1996 to 1998 found that only 17% of all mergers and 
acquisitions actually added to shareholder value. (Gitelson et al. 2001, 40).
According to Mark Sirower’s (1999) studies on mergers in both the 1980s and 1990s, the 
percentage of mergers failing to achieve their anticipated value has not changed over time. In 
other words, despite the fact that the deals in the 1990s were thought of as “more strategic”, 
the evidence shows that they were no more likely to succeed than the deals of the 1980s.
Mergers and acquisitions nowadays differ significantly from the “great conglomerate boom” 
of the 1960s, when the biggest motivation for M&A activity was diversification, which, in 
turn, presented very limited or no need for organizational integration. The merger activity is 
now dominated by combinations between companies in similar rather than unrelated business 
activities. Consequently, the integration of some or all of the human resources has become 
inevitable. Integrating previously separate and often very different organizational cultures 
presents a major managerial challenge, because mismanagement is likely to result in poor 
morale, employee stress, increased sickness absence, high labor turnover and lowered 
productivity. (Cartwright & Cooper 1993, 58).
Most studies on mergers and acquisitions, both made in the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. 
Buono et al. 1985, Morosini et al. 1994, Olie 1994) and more recently (e.g. Gitelson et al. 
2001, Krell 2001, Mazur 2001), have identified cultural differences as the main cause of post­
merger problems. In a 1999 Conference Board survey of 656 CEOs, M&A management was 
chosen among the top three management challenges (Paige 1999, 4). Evidence from both
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research and the testimony of executives at conferences and seminars have suggested that 
unrelenting problems of culture, organization, human resources and systems have caused 
deals to fall apart or lead to severe management problems (Mitchell 1999, 1).
In short, the research problem is: Although an increasing number of studies have shown the 
importance of coping with cultural differences in the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, the 
high failure rates reveal that these issues are still either widely misunderstood or ignored by 
the merging companies.
13 Research Questions and Research Objectives
The objective of the* study is to examine the cultural determinants of performance in 
international mergers and acquisitions by the means of an extensive literature review as well 
as an empirical study.
The questions that this study will seek to answer are:
(1) What are the cultural differences relevant to the outcomes of international mergers and 
acquisitions?
(2) How do cultural differences affect the outcomes of international mergers and acquisitions?
(3) How should international mergers and acquisitions be managed from a cultural 
perspective?
The aim is first to present a comprehensive overview of the cultural factors affecting the 
outcomes of mergers and acquisitions and draw a theoretical framework from these findings. 
This theoretical framework will then be explored by an empirical study and modified 
accordingly. The ultimate objective is to analyze the findings of the study in order to answer 
the research questions as well as identify possible new research gaps in the study field, which 
could then be used as a basis for further research. Although, as implied by the topic of the 
study, the emphasis is on international mergers and acquisitions, domestic mergers and 
acquisitions have been included in order to examine the differences between the two. 
Moreover, the study concentrates on exploring what the cultural factors affecting M&A 
performance (the cultural determinants of performance) are, and not the exact (e.g. financial)
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effect these factors have on the performance. In other words, the performance per se has not 
been an explicit object of this study.
1.4 Definitions and Concepts
1.4.1 International Mergers and Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions are often discussed together in the literature, but they are not, 
however, quite identical phenomena, since they result from two legally different transactions. 
A merger is “a statutory combination of two (or more) corporations, either by the transfer of 
all assets to one surviving corporation or by the joining together of the companies into a single 
new enterprise”. In principal, mergers can therefore be defined as cooperative agreements 
between equal partners. In practice, however, the partners do not necessarily have equal 
power. An acquisition, on the other hand, “takes place when a company buys enough shares to 
gain control in another”. The takeover may be termed friendly or hostile, depending on the 
way it is perceived by the shareholders and management of the acquired firm. Formal power 
relations are more clear-cut than in a merger, as the acquiring firm clearly assumes control 
over the other. (Gertsen et al. 1998, 17).
In spite of the differences, however, mergers and acquisitions share a wide range of problems 
and challenges as far as their cultural dimensions are concerned (ibid.), and will therefore be 
treated together in this study. The terms mergers and acquisitions will also be used 
interchangeably, excluding passages where either term is specifically scrutinized. The 
abbreviation “M&A” is used instead of the phrase “mergers and acquisitions” as a determiner 
of the following noun (e.g. as in M&A management or M&A process) to avoid unnecessary 
repetition and thereby as an attempt to make the text more reader-friendly.
The term ‘international’ refers to mergers and acquisitions involving companies originating 
from different countries. It differs from the term ‘cross-border’ in that it also refers to 
transactions made inside the parameters of one nation, such as a deal made between a 
business unit of a foreign company and a local company (e.g. a business unit of a Finnish firm 
located in the United Stated targeting an American company).
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1.4.2 Merger and Acquisition Performance
The assessment of the success or failure of a merger or acquisition can vary substantially 
depending on which aspect of post-merger performance is measured and whether failure is 
defined in extreme terms — such as the eventual sale of the acquired unit — or as the inability 
to meet certain financial goals. These financial goals include e.g. significant growth in net 
income or return on equity. The determinant of success or failure used in most of the articles 
referred to in this study is the post-merger or post-acquisition share value, as it has been found 
to suffer in the long run in most of the studies based on this factor (Lajoux & Weston 1998, 
34). In the empirical section, however, the concept of performance varies according to the 
perception of the interviewee, and is therefore very subjective.
1.4.3 National and Organizational Culture
The concept of culture chosen for this study is the classic concept of culture, as it represents 
the mainstream of thinking and is used by the majority of researchers in the field. It is based 
on the classic anthropological concept of culture (dating from the 1880s), which sees culture 
as “an empirical category, a system of assumptions, values and norms which can be 
objectively described”. (Gertsen et al. 1998, 21). According to one of the most famous 
advocates of the classic concept, Geert Hofstede (1991, 5), culture is always a collective 
phenomenon, as it is at least partly shared by people from within a certain social environment, 
which is where it was learned. In his words culture is “the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another”.
If we depict culture as an onion, the central layers (or the core of culture) can be thought to 
represent national culture (Olie 1990, 210). These layers are formed by values, which are 
feelings of right and wrong, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, rational and irrational. It is 
believed that these values are already acquired in early childhood and are resistant to change 
in later years. National cultural values are so deeply ingrained in us, that we cannot easily 
recognize or define them. (Hofstede 1991, 8). These values are formed in the society’s history 
and tend to be transferred from generation to generation, reinforced by social institutions 
(Schein 1987, 25).
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The outer layers of the onion can be seen as the organizational culture, which is embodied in 
symbols, rituals and heroes. Symbols are words, gestures and objects, such as manners of 
speaking and dress habits. Rituals refer to social rules and norms, while heroes are persons 
that are used as role models. (Hofstede 1991, 7-8). If culture is thought of as an iceberg, 
organizational cultures refer more to the elements that can be seen, while national cultures are 
the underlying elements (Olie 1990, 210). Examples of the manifestation of organizational 
culture other than manners of speaking and dress habits include the level of formality at the 
workplace, the way in which employees are treated, the way in which customers are treated 
and the atmosphere of the workplace in general (e.g. how visitors are greeted and what their, 
as well as the employees’, perception of the organization is) (Erkkilä 2001, 45).
In a similar way that national culture is formed in the nation’s history, so is organizational 
culture; the founders often play an important role in its creation (Schein 1987, 25). 
Malekzadeh’s and Nahavandi’s (1988, 80) definition for organizational culture is “the beliefs 
and assumptions shared by members of an organization”, while Cartwright and Cooper (1996, 
56) define it simply as “the way in which things get done within an organization”. It is 
important to note, however, that organizations are made up of numerous groups of 
individuals, each with its own unique cultural identity. A better definition for organizational 
culture could therefore be “a network of integrated subcultures” (Elsass & Veiga 1994, 433).
1.5 Limitations
As mentioned above, the concept of culture chosen for this study is the classic concept. This 
means that other concepts of culture (such as the social constructivist concept'), or theories 
based on them, are not included in the study (the only exception being the work of Larsson & 
Risberg (1998), since Larsson is thought to represent the middle ground between these two 
concepts - Gertsen et al. 1998, 29).
The study has not taken into account other than national and organizational levels of culture 
either, as these two have been perceived to be the main cultural levels affecting mergers and 
acquisitions. Although other levels, such as industry and business culture, have been 
recognized in the literature, these areas have been discussed in the context of operational
1 For an example of a theory based on the social constructivist concept of culture, see Kleppestø (1998)
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business rather than integration management (e.g. Holstius & Tömroos 1990). Different 
subcultures have also been acknowledged to affect mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh 1988), but even though they are interesting, they are beyond the scope of this 
study.
And finally, despite the fact that the essence of cultural management in mergers and 
acquisitions is change management, only factors relating to purely cultural issues per se have 
been included in this study. In other words, issues such as the natural resistance to change 
experienced by people when encountering change processes (e.g. Dichter et al. 1993, Arena 
2002), have not been dealt with in detail here.
2 Literature Review
The literature review will first concentrate on the cultural differences affecting mergers and 
acquisitions, followed by the theories explaining how these differences can have an impact on 
mergers and acquisitions. The literature concerning the management of cultural factors in 
mergers and acquisitions will be studied next, after which the section will be summarized and 
a theoretical framework, built according to the findings of this section, will be presented and 
discussed.
2.1 Cultural Differences
As can be understood from the definition of culture given above, culture is an extremely vast 
concept. We are surrounded by culture in our everyday lives. Cultural differences can 
therefore be studied from numerous different angles. For example, different languages, 
religions and demographic differences are all important factors determining what a culture is 
like and how it differs from other cultures. The cultural differences we are interested in in this 
study, however, are the ones that can clearly be related to an organizational context, and 
specifically to the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions.
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2.1.1 National Cultural Differences
The study that has probably contributed the most in the field of finding clear national patterns 
of cultural differences is that of Hofstede (1980). In the mid-1970s, he studied a large body of 
survey data about the values of people in over 50 countries around the world. These people 
worked in the local subsidiaries of one large multinational corporation - IBM. The main 
finding of Hofstede’s work was the fact that national cultures could be compared to each other 
and categorized in terms of four different dimensions -power distance, individualism versus 
collectivism, femininity versus masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. In other words, these 
dimensions form a “four-dimensional model of differences among national cultures . 
(Hofstede 1991, 14). Trompenaars (1993, 8) has later found very similar dimensions, basing 
them on the way in which members of a culture cope with relationships with other people as 
well as their perception towards time, and attitudes towards the environment. These 
dimensions will not, however, be discussed in more detail here, since they overlap so largely 
with Hofstede’s dimensions.
Country clustering studies have also attempted to describe differences between national 
cultures. Ronen and Kraut (1977), utilized a secondary analysis of data from the studies by 
Haire et al. (1966) and Sirota and Greenwood (1971) as well as a survey study of 4000 
employees of a European-based multinational electronic company in 15 countries and 
discovered nine country clusters (Anglo, Germanic, Nordic, Near Eastern, Arab, Far Eastern, 
Latin American, Latin European and Independent countries). These clusters were formed by 
using employee work values and attitudes as the critical variables. (Ronen 1988, 250-254, 
originally in Ronen & Kraut 19772).
Ronen and Kraut’s country clusters contain many exceptions and can be accused of over­
generalization and their main role therefore lies in labeling fairly similar areas of culture and 
behavior. Due to this vagueness, country clustering can be judged to have limited importance 
in the cultural management of mergers and acquisitions. The works of Hofstede can also be 
criticized, especially due to the fact that the survey only included the employees of one
2 Ronen, S. and Kraut, A. (1977) ”Similarities among countries based on employee work values and attitudes”. 
Columbia Journal of World Business 12, 89-96.
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multinational in identifying differences in national value systems. Hofstede himself defended 
this approach by saying that the data studied represented almost a perfectly matched study 
from one country to another, i.e. they were similar in all respects except nationality, which 
“made the national differences in their answers stand out unusually clearly”(Hofstede 1991, 
13). His study can also be criticized as outdated, as it was made some 20 years ago. I, 
however, feel that the results are still relevant enough to form a basis of comparison between 
national cultures - subject, of course, to certain provisos (e.g. small differences in ranking 
scores presented in the study should not be used as a basis for comparisons). Furthermore, 
because Hofstede’s work is based in an organizational context, it can be used in M&A 
management. The four cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1991), as well as examples 
illustrating their relevance to mergers and acquisitions will be presented next.
Power Distance
Hofstede’s definition for power distance is “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally” (Hofstede 1991, 28). Table 1 presents some key differences between small and 
large power distance societies as well as examples of countries at both ends of the spectrum.
Table 1: Key Differences between Small and Large Power Distance Societies
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (1991), pp. 26,37
Small power distance Large power distance
• Inequalities among people should be minimized • Inequalities among people are both expected and
desired
• Hierarchy in organizations means an inequality of • Hierarchy in organizations reflects the existential
roles, established for convenience inequality between higher-ups and lower-downs
• Decentralization is popular • Centralization is popular
• Narrow salary range between top and bottom of • Wide salary range between top and bottom of
organization organization
• Subordinates expect to be consulted • Subordinates expect to be told what to do
• The ideal boss is a resourceful democrat • The ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat or good
father
• Privileges and status symbols are frowned upon • Privileges and status symbols for managers are both 
expected and popular
E.g. Sweden, Finland, USA, Great Britain E.g. Asian, Arab and Latin countries (France, Brazil)
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The findings of Olie’s (1994) case study on a Dutch-German chemical fibre industry merger is 
a good example of national differences in power distance:
The Dutch company was considered as very congenial and informal. Leadership styles were more 
based on participative management ideas than on autocratic decision-making. Compared to the 
Dutch management, the German management tended to emphasize the blue print organization, 
practiced autocratic management styles and was not used to questioning the policy of their 
superiors, ta general the relationship between superior and subordinate was characterized by high 
formality. Use of familiar ways of address, even among colleagues, was not common practice. 
Decision-making, however, appeared to be much slower in the Dutch organization than in the 
German organization. Due to these - unexpected - contrasting attitudes towards authority and 
decision-making between the two management groups, positive attitudes towards the merger 
gradually turned into frustration and disappointment. (Olie 1994, 390).
Individualism versus Collectivism
Individualism means that everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her 
immediate family, while in collectivist societies people are integrated from birth onwards into 
strong, cohesive in-groups, which “throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede 1991, 51). See Table 2 for key differences in 
the individualism versus collectivism dimension.
Table 2: Key Differences between Collectivist and Individualist Societies
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (1991) pp. 53,67, and 73
Collectivist Individualist
• Identity is based in the social network to which one • Identity is based in the individual
belongs
• Collective interests prevail over individual interests • Individual interests prevail over collective interests
• Private life is invaded by group(s) • Everyone has a right to privacy
• Opinions are predetermined by group membership • Everyone is expected to have a private opinion
• Relationship employer-employee is perceived in • Relationship employer-employee is a contract
moral terms, like a family link supposed to be based on mutual advantage
• Hiring and promotion decisions take employees' in- • Hiring and promotion decisions are supposed to be
group into account based on skills and rules only
• Management is management of groups • Management is management of individuals
• Relationship prevails over task • Task prevails over relationship
E.g. Asian and Arab countries, Japan, Spain E.g. USA, Great Britain, Italy, Denmark
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According to Cartwright and Cooper (1996), patterns of merger and acquisition activity tend 
to reflect managerial perceptions as to the similarity and compatibility of different national 
cultures. For example, given the choice, Northern European countries such as U.K., Sweden 
and Denmark would prefer to enter in business partnerships with other North European and 
American organizations, but avoid alliances with Japan and Southern Europe (e.g. Italy and 
Spain). This may possibly reflect their cultural orientation towards “individualism” instead of 
“collectivism”, which is regarded as being characteristic of both Japanese and Spanish 
cultures. (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 98-101).
Femininity versus Masculinity
Masculine societies are societies, in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. This means 
that in these societies, men are supposed to be “assertive, tough and focused on material 
success” whereas women are supposed to be “more modest, tender and concerned with the 
quality of life”. In feminine societies, on the other hand, these gender roles overlap and both 
men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life. 
(Hofstede 1991, 82-83). Table 3 presents the key differences between feminine and masculine 
societies.
Table 3: Key Differences between Feminine and Masculine Societies 
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (1991) pp. 84,96,103
Feminine Masculine
• Dominant values in society are caring for others and 
preservation
• People and warm relationships are important
• Permissive society
• Small and slow are beautiful
• Work in order to live
• Managers use intuition and strive for consensus
• Stress on equality, solidarity and quality of work life
• Resolution of conflicts by compromise and 
negotiation
E.g. Sweden, Norway, Finland, Portugal
• Dominant values in society are material success and 
progress
• Money and things are important
• Corrective society
• Big and fast are beautiful
• Live in order to work
• Managers expected to be decisive and assertive
• Stress on equity, competition among colleagues and 
performance
• Resolution of conflicts by fighting them out
E.g. Japan, Austria, Italy, USA
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The Pharmacia-Upjohn example presented at the very beginning of this study is a good 
example of a clash that can result from differences between feminine and masculine cultures. 
The Swedes (who represent the most feminine culture according to Hofstede’s studies 1991, 
p. 84), would not accept the “brutal” American way of implementing mergers, which meant 
creating a structure that permitted “tough, decisive command and top-down decision-making”. 
Instead, they worried more about maintaining good relations among the executives from both 
sides. (Seiden 1999, 98).
Uncertainty Avoidance
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede 1991, 113). Table 4 points out the 
key differences between weak and strong uncertainty avoidance societies.
Table 4: Key Differences between Weak and Strong Uncertainty Avoidance Societies
Source: Adapted from Hofstede (1991) pp. 113,125, and 134
Weak uncertainty avoidance Strong uncertainty avoidance
• Uncertainty is a normal feature of life and each day • The uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a
is accepted as it comes continuous threat which must be fought
• Low stress; subjective feeling of well-being • High stress; subjective feeling of anxiety
• Comfortable in ambiguous situations and with * Acceptance of familiar risks; fear of ambiguous
unfamiliar risks situations and of unfamiliar risks
• Few and general laws and rules • Many and precise laws and rules
• If rules cannot be respected, they should be changed • If rules cannot be respected, we are sinners and
should repent
• Comfortable feeling when lazy; hard-working only
when needed
• Emotional need to be busy; inner urge to work hard
• Precision and punctuality have to be learned • Precision and punctuality come naturally
• Tolerance of deviant and innovative ideas and • Suppression of deviant ideas and behavior;
behavior resistance to innovation
• Motivation by achievement and esteem or
belongingness
• Motivation by security and esteem or belongingness
E.g. Singapore, Sweden, Great Britain, USA E.g. Greece, Japan, France, Spain
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An example of different practices stemming from differences in attitudes towards uncertainty 
(and therefore the need for written documents) is the 1998 merger between German car 
manufacturer Daimler-Benz and American Chrysler. This merger has been the object of 
extensive international attention, as the value of its shares has been falling dramatically since 
April 1999 and as many predict that the merger is bound to fail. Mr. Hubbert, head of 
Mercedes-Benz cars, explained how they did things differently at the board level:
We Germans would prepare a 50-page document which would then be discussed at length in the 
board meeting. The Americans, we found, would talk one to one so that when it came to board 
meetings, the chairman knew what everyone thought and there was little discussion. (The 
Economist 1999, Sep 25, 73-74).
2.1.2 Organizational Cultural Differences
According to Olie (1990), dominant values in a national culture have a profound effect upon 
organizations and organizational behavior. For example, French and Italian firms tend to have 
strong centralized hierarchical structures in which patriarchal influence is strong. In contrast, 
Northern European firms, such as Dutch and German firms, are more decentralized. (Olie 
1990, 210). The workplace-related examples of key differences presented in tables 1-4 above 
also serve to illustrate how a national culture is reflected in an organizational culture.
Organizations can, however, possess distinct cultures within the same country in terms of for 
example symbols (such as manners of speaking and dress habits) and social norms. For 
instance, IBM has a very distinct corporate identity from that of Ford or DuPont, although all 
three are American companies. (Olie 1990, 210).
Cartwright and Cooper (1996) have created a culture typology in order to measure cultural 
differences between organizations and their effects in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
Although there has been some speculation on whether the typology can be used to 
characterize the companies involved in a sufficiently precise way (Gertsen et al. 1998, 26), it 
has been included in this study because it provides a good illustration of organizational
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differences. The typology comprises of four different types of organizational culture: power 
cultures, role cultures, task cultures and person cultures (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 65).
Power cultures represent cultures, where a distinct centralization of power can be seen. These 
cultures often pertain to small companies with charismatic leaders. Decisions, which are often 
based on intuition, are made by management alone. The wage systems depend on the personal 
preferences of the managers and the employees are not presented with many challenges. There 
are two types of power cultures: patriarchal and autocratic. In patriarchal cultures, the 
employees feel that the leader’s power is legitimate and the leader is seen as kind and 
protective. The employees are treated as children and not much information is passed to them. 
In autocratic cultures, by contrast, the power of the leader is not expressly seen as legitimate 
and the leader’s personal commitment to the organization and employees is limited. Role 
cultures, in turn, are bureaucracies, where logic, rationality and efficiency are the driving 
forces. Functions are important, rather than people, and the division of labor is highly 
specialized. There are many rules and clear limits for work areas and authority and the 
prevailing hierarchy is formalized and clear to all. The primary emphasis in task cultures is on 
the actual task to be performed. The nature of the task determines how one works. An 
example could be a new high-tech company, where the organization is characterized by 
flexibility, autonomy and creativity. The tasks are challenging to the employees, but there is a 
risk that they may bum themselves out. And finally, a person culture is characterized by its 
egalitarian organization with a minimal structure. The growth and development of the 
individual is regarded as the most important factor, decisions are made collectively and all 
information is shared. These cultures often pertain to non-profit organizations. (Cartwright & 
Cooper 1996, 65).
Other studies that have attempted to measure organizational cultural differences include a 
study on cultural differences between top management teams engaged in a merger. The seven 
dimensions proposed as relevant measurements of cultural differences were: innovation and 
action orientation, risk-taking, lateral integration, top management contact, autonomy and 
decision-making, performance orientation and reward orientation. (Weber 1996, 1187). 
Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) typology is, however, perceived to provide a better basis for 
cultural comparisons as it takes into account the whole organization instead of just the top 
management level.
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2.2 Theories on the Effect of Cultural Differences on Merger and Acquisition 
Performance
Cultural differences can and do have an impact in the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions. 
This has for example been indicated by Forstmann’s (1998) empirical case study, the findings 
of which support the hypothesis that cultural differences can explain whether problems occur 
in integration or not (Forstmann 1998, 79). A recent study on the post-acquisition integration 
of 198 Finnish acquisitions also supports this statement (Sarala 2002, 86). The section will 
first go over some of the general theories in the field and then focus on the main theoretical 
frameworks identified from the literature. The last section under this topic is dedicated to 
theories illustrating the differences between the impact of cultural differences on the 
performance of domestic versus international mergers and acquisitions.
2.2.1 General Theories
According to Olie (1994), integrating two separate companies with different backgrounds into 
a single unit can often prove to be a difficult and time-consuming process. One of the reasons 
for this is that in a post-merger situation, the members of the organization “typically start 
defining the situation in antagonistic terms, of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.” This leads to power 
struggles as organizational groups engage in quarrels over scarce resources. In spite of formal 
attempts to blend or create a common culture, the original identities can be observed to persist 
long after the merger has started. (Olie 1994, 383).
Sales and Mirvis (1984) also identified this occurrence, and stated that when cultures collide, 
at first a concept of an in-group and out-group (we-they) is formed. In their studies, they 
found three cognitive processes that were often developed by this we-they antagonism: 
polarization, evaluation and ethnocentrism. Polarization means that people tend to highlight 
the contrasts between the two groups. Evaluation, in turn, refers to the situation where one’s 
own group is seen as purely good and the others as purely bad. Ethnocentrism, according to 
Sales and Mirvis, means refusing to see things from other than one’s own viewpoint. (Sales & 
Mirvis 1984, 115-116). Olie (1990), on the other hand, sees ethnocentrism as the way in 
which “we tend to regard activities that do not conform to our established views of doing 
business as abnormal and deviant” (Olie 1990, 211).
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A factor that can give an indication of the extent of culture-related problems is the type of the 
merger. Olie (1990, 208-209) has distinguished four main types of mergers and acquisitions: 
conglomerate (or unrelated/portfolio) mergers, mergers (or marriages), absorptive acquisitions 
and redesign mergers. The characteristics of each are briefly presented next.
1. Conglomerate mergers are characterized by small power differentials between the two 
parties and a low extent of integration. In these the acquiring firm leaves the acquirer 
alone, changing little or nothing of its management or operations. In other words, limited 
control is exerted by the acquiring firm.
2. Mergers or marriages are very difficult to realize since they involve two partners of more 
or less equal strength, which have decided to blend their operational and managerial 
functions. This implies that both firms are confronted with a change of corporate identity 
and organizational culture. Neither of the compames has the power to impose its own 
structure or culture on the other, and therefore a “third culture” has to be developed. Some 
international examples of this type are Unilever (Dutch-English), SAS (Scandinavian 
countries) and ABB (Swedish-Swiss).
3. The absorptive acquisition is the most frequent among acquisitions. The goal in this type 
is to create synergy, but unlike the “marriage”, there is a clear power difference between 
the two organizations.
4. The redesign merger is also characterized by a clear power differential. Although synergy 
is not the objective, the acquiring firm may still exert its influence and force its 
management methods upon the target company. This might be because the acquiring 
management believes it can transfer its management know-how and techniques to other 
(related) industries. The management of the acquired firm is often replaced. (Olie 1990, 
208-209).
The four types of mergers present a rather crude classification and not all mergers can be 
categorized according to them. However, as stated earlier, they do give an indication of the 
extent and type of post-merger integration difficulties. The role of culture-related problems
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will be minor in unrelated mergers (type 1), while significant in cases where integration needs 
are high, but power differentials low (type 2). In contrast, in mergers with high power 
differentials (types 3 and 4), there is one dominant culture and therefore only one company is 
undergoing changes. (Olie 1990, 209).
Another factor that can affect the level of conflicts resulting from cultural differences is the 
organizational performance following a merger or an acquisition. This is due to the fact that 
performance improvements are often attributed to one’s own group, while performance 
decline is attributed to the out-group. Thus, given successful post-acquisition performance, we 
would expect to see a reduction in the forces of cultural differentiation over time and thereby 
a lower level of conflicts leading to a more successful acquisition outcome. By contrast, poor 
performance might lead to increased forces of differentiation and thereby a higher level of 
tension, which may ultimately lead to acquisition failure. (Elsass & Veiga 1994, 447-448).
2.2.2 The Model of Cultural Fit
According to Cartwright and Cooper (1993), financial and strategic considerations (such as 
availability, price and potential economies of scale) dominate the selection of a suitable 
acquisition target or merger partner. Although recent studies have identified cultural issues as 
critical in merger success, these softer issues are still often ignored in target selection or 
merger planning. In other words, more emphasis is still put on the “strategic fit” rather than 
the “cultural fit” of the potential merger partner, although the latter should at least be of equal, 
if not greater, importance than the former. (Cartwright & Cooper 1993, 57).
On the basis of empirical data, Cartwright and Cooper (1996) have studied the cultural fit of a 
number of companies involved in mergers and acquisitions. They developed the culture 
typology (power, role, task & person cultures introduced in the section on organizational 
cultural differences), which in their opinion can be used to describe all organizations. They 
claim that different combinations of the types will have predictable outcomes. In order for the 
merger to succeed, the two organizational cultures do not necessarily, however, have to be 
similar, but they should be able to act together. (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 83).
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The influence of cultural distance on acquisitions and mergers is explained by Cartwright and 
Cooper (1996) in the following way:
Acquisitions: After its purchase, the acquired company is typically expected to adapt to the 
organizational culture of the acquirer, while the latter generally intends to retain its own 
culture. The important thing in this situation is not the difference between the cultures, but the 
question of the direction in which personal freedom is affected, i.e. whether the freedom of 
the individual is increased or decreased. If the employees feel that their freedom is increased, 
things will usually go well. If, on the other hand, they feel that their freedom is reduced, 
problems will occur. The outcome of the acquisition can thus be predicted by plotting the two 
companies onto a continuum that illustrates constraints on the freedom of the individual (see 
Figure 1). (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 81).
High Increased constraint Increasing autonomy------------- ►
individual
constraint
Low/no
individual
constraint
Power culture
autocratic-patriarchal
Role culture
closed-open
Task/ achievement
Culture
Person/ support
Culture
"The employee does
what she/he is told"
"The employee acts
within the parameters
of his/her job
description"
"The employee acts in
the way he/she
considers suitable for
the task"
"The employee/person
does his/her own
thing"
Figure 1: The Relation between Culture Types as regards Constraints on Individuals' Freedom
Source: Cartwright and Cooper (1996,80)
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Mergers: In the case of mergers, however, Cartwright and Cooper (1996) believe that the 
distance between the two cultures is important. This is because in mergers, both companies 
usually want to retain their own culture and therefore the organizational cultures should be 
adjoining types. (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 82). By contrast, based on their empirical 
research, e.g. Olie (1994, 402) and Vaara (1999, 128-129) have noted that in the case of 
international mergers, cultural differences between cultures that are perceived as being ‘close’ 
are often more problematic than those between ‘distant’ cultures. This is due to the fact that 
managers tend to disregard the actual cultural differences in a setting where they assume 
cultural proximity (more about international vs. domestic mergers in section 2.2.4).
The main problem with Cartwright and Cooper’s model is that it assumes that the freedom of 
the individual is always a desired element. In some cultures, however, employees do not 
appreciate increased freedom or responsibilities, because it increases the level of their anxiety 
and make them feel insecure. They expect to be told what to do, and feel comfortable in that 
setting. In Hofstede’s (1991) terms, these cultures would rank high on both the power distance 
and the uncertainty avoidance dimensions. Examples of such countries include both Latin 
American (Brazil, Chile) and Latin European (France, Portugal) countries (Hofstede 1991, 26, 
113).
2.2.3 Acculturation
Acculturation in its anthropological sense results from two autonomous cultures coming 
together and requires change in one or the other cultural group. Although, theoretically, it is 
possible that acculturation results in a balanced merging of two groups, according to 
anthropological studies, this seldom happens. Instead, members of one group often attempt to 
dominate members of the other. (Elsass and Veiga 1994, 433-434, originally in Berry 19803).
Anthropological theories of acculturation have been used to describe the blending of two 
organizational cultures (e.g. Buono et al. 1985, Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988). Nahavandi
3 Berry, J.W. (1980) ”Acculturation as varieties of adaptation”, in: A.M. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation. Theory, 
models and some new findings. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
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and Malekzadeh (1988, 81-82), however, noted differences between anthropological and 
organizational acculturation. In particular, organizational members can choose not to accept 
the culture of the other organization by simply leaving the organization, while individuals 
experiencing social acculturation do not usually have this choice.
The four modes identified by Berry (1980) through which acculturation takes place are: 
assimilation, integration, rejection and déculturation. In short, assimilation means that the 
least powerful group gives up or loses its culture and is absorbed by the dominant group. 
Integration, in turn, means that the non-dominant group maintains its cultural integrity, but 
becomes at the same time an integral part of the dominant culture. Rejection means that the 
non-dominant group withdraws from the dominant culture. And finally, déculturation occurs 
when the non-dominant group loses cultural and psychological contact with both its own 
original culture and the dominant culture. (Gertsen et al. 1998, 22, originally in Berry 1980).
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh have taken Berry’s conceptual system further to develop models 
for the types of cultural adaptation process preferred by the acquired and the acquiring 
company (i.e. the non-dominant and the dominant culture). Their work has been widely 
referred to in literature on cultural dimensions of mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Cartwright & 
Cooper 1993, Olie 1994, Elsass & Veiga 1994, Gertsen et al. 1998). Their work will now be 
presented in broad outline.
Preferred Types of Adaptation Process and the Acculturative Model
In acquisition terms, the four modes of acculturation presented above are:
• Integration: the acquired firm is being fitted into the acquiring firm, but differences are 
largely tolerated.
• Assimilation: the acquired firm conforms completely to the acquirer’s culture.
• Separation: cooperation is abandoned and a structure is found that enables the two cultures 
to live completely separately.
• Déculturation: the acquired firm is likely to disintegrate as members of the acquired firm 
do not value their own culture or want to be assimilated into the acquiring company. 
(Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988, 82-83).
21
The factors that determine the preferred mode of acculturation are:
1. In the case of the acquired company, the degree to which the members want to preserve 
their own culture and organizational practices and the degree to which they are willing to 
adopt the acquirer’s culture (see Figure 2).
2. In the case of the acquirer, the degree to which the firm is multicultural (i.e. the degree to 
which it values cultural diversity) and the diversification strategy regarding the type of 
merger (or the degree of relatedness between the acquirer and the acquired firms) (see 
Figure 3). The latter factor is closely related to Olie’s (1990) merger types discussed 
earlier.
How much do members of the 
acquired firm value 
preservation of their own 
culture?
Very much Not at all
Perception of Very
the attractive Integration Assimilation
attractiveness
of the acquirer
Not at all Separation Déculturation
attractive
Figure 2: The Acquired Firm's Preferred Adaptation Process 
Source: Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988, 83)
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Culture:
Degree of Multiculturalism
Multicultural Unicultural
Diversification
Strategy: Related Integration Assimilation
Degree of
Relatedness
of Firms Unrelated Separation Déculturation
Figure 3: The Acquiring Firm's Preferred Adaptation Process 
Source: Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988, 84)
The basic claim of Nahavandi’s and Malekzadeh’s (1988) acculturative model for the 
implementation of mergers (see Figure 4) is that given that the members of the two 
organizations may not have the same preferences for the mode of acculturation, the degree of 
agreement (or congruence) between the preferences of the acquirer and the acquired will be a 
central factor in the successful implementation of the merger. If there is congruence regarding 
the preferred mode of acculturation, minimal acculturative stress will result and the mode of 
acculturation triggered by the contact between the two firms will facilitate the implementation 
of the merger. If, on the other hand, there is incongruence, a high degree of acculturative 
stress will result, which may lead to problems. (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988, 84-87). The 
managerial implications of the model will be discussed in section 2.3.
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Congruence
Acculturative Stress
Successful Implementation 
of the Merger
Mode of Acculturation
Integration
Assimilation
Separation
Déculturation
• Culture: tolerance 
for diversity and 
multiculturalism 
• Diversification 
Strategy: degree 
of relatedness of 
the firms
Acquiring Firm
• Desire to preserve 
own culture and 
practices 
• Attractiveness 
of the acquirer
Acquired Firm
Mode of Acculturation
Integration
Assimilation
Separation
Déculturation
Figure 4: Acculturative Model for the Implementation of Mergers
Source: Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988,85)
A Force-Field Analysis of Acculturation
Elsass and Veiga (1994) have taken Nahavandi’s and Malekzadeh’s work a step further. They 
argue that organizational acculturation can be described in terms of a dynamic interaction 
between opposing forces of cultural differentiation (i.e. the desire of groups to maintain their 
separate cultural identity) and organizational integration (the organizational need for cultural 
groups to work together). Applying Lewin’s (1951) theory of quasi-stationary equilibrium to 
the acculturative process, the forces of cultural differentiation can be viewed as restraining 
forces because they prevent the blending of two separate cultural groups, while the forces of 
organizational integration are seen as driving forces because they serve to create an integrated 
whole from the two groups. (Elsass & Veiga 1994, 435).
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The interaction of these forces results in a state of equilibrium, or what Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh (1988) refer to as the acculturation mode. An equilibrium established between 
weak forces, or a “low tension” system, tends to be “more flexible and accommodating”, i.e. 
conflict levels are low. In contrast, an equilibrium between strong forces, a “high tension 
system, tends to be “rigid, unyielding and potentially more explosive”, thus conflict levels are
likely to be high (see Figure 5).
Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) descriptions of the four acculturative modes are, in brief, the 
following:
1. Déculturation: Members of the acquired firm have no desire to maintain a separate 
identity and the acquiring firm has no need to impose its culture on them. Members of 
the acquired firm no longer maintain their original cultural identity, but do not replace 
it with a new identity. Individuals are not heavily influenced by either culture. This 
mode may be defined as a low tension system.
Forces of 
Cultural 
Differentiation
4. Acculturative 
tension-
3. Separation
2. Assimilation1. Deculturatioi
Weak
Weak Strong
Forces of Organizational Integration
Figure 5: The Four Archetypal Modes of Acculturation
Source: Elsass and Veiga (1994, 436)
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2. Assimilation: Strong driving forces of organizational integration exist, interacting with 
weaker restraining forces of cultural differentiation. The acquired group is assimilated 
into the larger organization. There is a low level of conflict strongly favoring 
organizational integration and tension experienced by organizational members is 
moderate.
3. Separation: Strong restraining forces of cultural differentiation exist, interacting with 
weaker organizational integration forces. Each group retains its old cultural identity. 
The level of tension is moderate.
4. Acculturative Tension: Equally strong forces of cultural differentiation and 
organizational integration exist, and the outcome is likely to be a state of high 
acculturative tension. The two groups are stalemated and individuals caught up in this 
mode are likely to experience high levels of stress, tension and/or anger. Attempts to 
introduce cultural change may be met with strong resistance or conflict. (Elsass & 
Veiga 1994,436-437).
The model of acculturative dynamics illustrates how the forces of cultural differentiation and 
organizational integration influence, and are affected by, organizational performance (see 
Figure 6). The forces of cultural differentiation and organizational integration act upon group 
members simultaneously. The strength of the forces affects the degree of acculturative conflict 
experienced by organizational members. Over time, organizational performance will then be 
inversely related to the level of acculturative conflict following the acquisition and will 
influence the forces of cultural differentiation and organizational integration. (Elsass & Veiga 
1994,439).
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Acculturative Mode
• Déculturation
• Assimilation
• Separation
• Acculturative tension
Forces of Organizational 
Integration
e Acquisition Motive 
• Implementation Processes
Group Members OrganizationalPerformance
Forces of Cultural 
Differentiation
• Perception of Differences
• Structure of Intergroup
Relations ________
Figure 6: A Model of Acculturative Dynamics
Source: Elsass and Veiga (1994,440)
When comparing this model with Nahavandi and Malekzadeh’s (1988) acculturative model 
presented in Figure 4, one can conclude that they are very similar. The main difference, 
however, is the fact that the model of acculturative dynamics, as can be inferred from its 
name, sees acculturation as a dynamic process rather than an outcome. Due to this difference, 
the integration mode presented by Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) is not included in 
Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) model, as they see it as a process of change attempt rather than a 
mode experienced after the initial encounter between cultural groups, or at the beginning of 
the acculturation process. Instead of integration, they present acculturative tension as an early 
acculturation mode. They argue that it is a “plausible state” and that it is consistent with 
Lewin’s (1951) quasi-stationery equilibrium theory. As mentioned earlier, this theory suggests 
that acculturation modes should be viewed as dynamic balances between the opposing forces 
of cultural differentiation and organizational integration. Therefore, if the balance of the
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forces changes in some way, equilibrium in the system will shift so that conflict may increase 
or decrease, resulting in a new mode of acculturation. (Elsass & Veiga 1994,438).
Nahavandi’s and Malekzadeh’s (1988) model’s main point is that a lack of agreement 
between the preferences of the acquirer and the acquired regarding the acculturation mode 
may result in problems. Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) model, on the other hand, is a better 
illustration of the forces that influence the outcome of acculturation. Therefore, even though 
the use of the term acculturative tension is somewhat confusing and needs explanation as 
given above, it seems to be a more valid tool in predicting the outcome of mergers and 
acquisitions than Nahavandi and Malekzadeh’s (1988) model.
Comparing the two acculturation models above with Olie’s (1994) ‘us vs. them’ antagonism 
(or the in-group/out-group concept of Sales and Mirvis 1984) as well as Olie’s (1990) merger 
types, one can conclude that the latter are actually factors in the former. The ‘us vs. them’ 
antagonism can be identified as a factor affecting both the perception of differences and the 
structure of intergroup relations in the forces of cultural differentiation (Elsass & Veiga 1994), 
while the merger types are related to the dimension of the relatedness of the firms in 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh’s (1988) model as well as to the acquisition motive in the forces 
of organizational intergration (Elsass & Veiga 1994).
2.2.4 Domestic versus International Mergers and Acquisitions
The theories on the effects of cultural differences on merger and acquisition performance 
presented above have been developed primarily based on domestic mergers and acquisitions. 
Although they are, for the most part, relevant for both the domestic as well as the international 
context, some significant differences also exist. Despite the fact that mergers and acquisitions 
became the dominant mode of internationalization in the 1990’s, empirical studies on 
international mergers and acquisitions remain relatively rare. This may be due to the 
difficulties of obtaining large samples from multiple countries. (E.g. Cartwright & Cooper 
1993, Weber et al. 1996, Larsson & Risberg 1998).
In general, it is believed that international mergers are more troublesome than domestic ones, 
because national cultures are more central to a group’s identity and view of reality than
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organizational cultures, and therefore will not be given up easily (Olie 1990, 210). Another 
reason is that cross-cultural communication creates challenges of its own, because different 
cultural encoding and decoding can lead to misunderstandings between persons of different 
nationalities (Larsson & Risberg 1998, 44). The fact that it takes longer to communicate 
between people of different languages makes international merger processes longer than 
domestic ones (Solomon 1998,17).
According to Olie (1990), there is a big difference between international acquisitions and 
international mergers. In foreign takeovers, potential cultural conflicts will be solved through 
the bargaining power of the dominant partner. In international mergers, however, where the 
partners are roughly of equal size, it is more difficult to solve cultural conflicts. There is no 
“home culture” available that could provide a frame of reference and therefore a “third 
culture” has to be developed. (Olie 1990, 210). The same applies to mergers (or “marriages”) 
between domestic partners of equal strength, as was discussed earlier.
On the basis of research on national cultures (such as Hofstede s work presented earlier), it 
can be argued that some cultures can be more easily combined than others (Olie 1990, 210). 
Larsson and Risberg (1998), however, noted that the requirement of cultural similarity may be 
difficult to fulfill in cross-border mergers and acquisitions due to two factors. First of all, the 
requirement would limit potential expansion markets severely and secondly, although the two 
countries in comparison may seem culturally similar, the similarity might only be superficial. 
The actual existing differences may then create more difficulties than if the company had 
identified and understood them from the start. (Larsson & Risberg 1998, 43-44). In his study 
on Finnish-Swedish mergers, in other words mergers between supposedly ‘close’ cultures, 
Vaara (1999,128-129) also recognizes this “paradox of cultural proximity”.
In their study on national versus corporate cultural issues, Larsson and Risberg (1998) 
assumed that cross-border mergers and acquisitions would run into “dual culture clashes , i.e. 
culture clashes both at the corporate and societal levels. They were surprised, however, to find 
that cross-border mergers and acquisitions in their sample were actually more successful 
(“had higher synergy realization”) than the domestic mergers and acquisitions. They attributed 
this finding to the fact that the level of cultural awareness is higher in cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions, which, in turn, may lead to greater efforts to bring about acculturation than
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in domestic mergers and acquisitions, where the cultural issues tend to be taken more for 
granted. (Larsson & Risberg 1998, 47-49). This view is shared by the findings of Weber et 
al.’s (1996) studies. They found that in international mergers, “people expect differences and 
the changes related to those differences, and therefore are less likely to resist them” (Weber et 
al. 1996,1223).
Morosini et al.’s (1998) empirical studies on cross-border acquisitions involving Italian 
companies also found that cross-border acquisitions in more culturally distant countries have 
succeeded better than in culturally more similar countries. They attributed this finding to the 
fact that “cross-border acquisitions in more culturally distant countries might provide a 
mechanism for multinational companies to access diverse routines and repertoires, which 
have the potential to enhance the combined firm’s performance over time” (Morosini et al. 
1998, 158).
Weber et al.’s (1996) objective was also to study the differences in the impact of national 
versus organizational cultural differences on performance in international mergers and 
acquisitions. They found that in the cross-border mergers, national cultural differences 
predicted stress, negative attitudes towards the merger and actual cooperation better than 
corporate cultural differences did. The findings of their study also suggested, however, that 
both national and corporate cultures are essential factors determining merger outcomes. 
(Weber et al. 1996, 1225). Both Weber et al. (1996) and Larsson and Risberg (1998) admit 
that the findings of their studies discussed above are at an exploratory stage, and further 
research would therefore be needed to confirm them.
2.3 Management of Cultural Factors in International Mergers and Acquisitions
As M&A activity has slowed (as explained in the introduction), leading companies worldwide 
are reassessing the way they handle the management of mergers and acquisitions in order to 
improve their chances of succeeding in the deals they do make. Recent M&A trends, such as 
the global nature and the increased complexity of even small to mid-sized deals, are making 
M&A process improvement a necessity for companies if they wish to succeed in these 
ventures. (Holubec et al. 2002, 24).
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The numerous articles and books that have been written lately on mergers and acquisitions 
propose a wide range of solutions on how to cope with cultural differences in order to achieve 
positive outcomes. This section will first go through the managerial implications proposed by 
the authors of the main theories presented in the previous sections, in other words Olie, 
Cartwright & Cooper, Nahavandi & Malekzadeh and Elsass & Veiga, as well as articles either 
supporting or contradicting these proposals. It will then present the recommendations 
provided by other recent articles in a nutshell and finish off with a study on GE Capital 
Services by Ashkenas et al. (1998), which is perceived to provide a valuable example on the 
management of cultural integration.
Olie (1994) bases his propositions concerning the management of cultural diversity on 
Hofstede’s (1980) reflection that when two organizational groups merge, a viable new 
organization can only be created through the development of a strong organizational 
subculture or common identity. Identification with a new organization often takes place 
through common experiences, and therefore the management needs to remove symbols of 
previous identities and replace them by new identification symbols in order to define a new 
category in which both groups can psychologically be merged. One of these symbols is the 
appointment of leaders that can symbolize the new identity. In an international merger, such a 
person should be acceptable to both sides and preferably be bicultural. Other symbols include 
corporate names, the location of head office and board membership, which all tend to be very 
sensitive issues in international mergers since they define the perceived nationality of an 
organization. (Olie 1994, 386-387).
Other tactics aiming at reducing the conflicts resulting from the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking 
are to make the two sides aware of a common set of goals or interests as well as the “creation 
of overlapping memberships”. This latter means that people may belong to different groups, 
such as national groups, yet share common identities in other respects, such as being part of 
the same task force. Overlapping memberships can be achieved through e.g. common 
management programs or the exchange and rotation of management groups. (Olie 1994, j87).
Cartwright and Cooper (1993), the developers of the model of cultural fit, unsurprisingly 
recommend that managers should make some cultural assessment of the target acquisition 
company or merger partner in order to determine whether they are culturally compatible. They
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maintain that the results of a culture audit of a potential or recently acquired organization is 
valuable information not only for partner selection, but also for long-term management. The 
culture audit could be performed by e.g. inviting employees of the acquired company or both 
merger partners to participate in a series of focus group meetings or a questionnaire survey, 
which have been specifically designed to assess current cultural attitudes and post- 
combination expectations. (Cartwright & Cooper 1993, 64).
Weber et al. (1996, 1225) agree with Cartwright and Cooper (1993) and propose that 
management should pay at least as much attention to cultural fit during both the pre-merger 
search process and the post-merger integration as it does to strategic fit. Erkkilä (2001) agrees 
as well, and states that “if the vision of the newly merged company’s future and the strategy 
for reaching this vision contrast considerably with either organization’s culture, the change 
process to implement the strategy will be lengthy and difficult. Culture is always stronger than 
change.” (Erkkilä 2001, 53). She also presents an example of how to measure and compare 
the organizational cultures of the acquirer and the acquired (see Erkkilä 2001, 59-63). Whalen 
(2002) also stresses the importance of cultural fit, and proposes that the due diligence process 
of the deal should be broadened to look for possible cultural conflicts (Whalen 2002, 6).
By contrast, as explained earlier, Larsson and Risberg (1998) do not see the issue of cultural 
fit as critical in international mergers and acquisitions. They maintain that “instead of 
sacrificing possibly valuable strategic complementarities, such as new geographical market 
opportunities, in the search for cultural similarities, firms may benefit more from becoming 
aware of and learning to manage cultural differences”. (Larsson & Risberg 1998, 52).
The main managerial implication of Nahavandi’s and Malekzadeh’s (1988) acculturative 
model is not to focus on the acquirer’s objectives and strategies at the expense of the role of 
the acquired company, as this will most likely result in active resistance on its part. Many 
problems associated with post-merger integration could, in other words, be avoided or 
managed if the two firms involved agreed on the mode of acculturation. The model also 
implies that the similarity of the two firms does not necessarily guarantee success. So instead 
of seeking cultural similarity, managers should rather agree on the choices of acculturation. 
Another implication is the fact that because organizations typically comprise of several 
different subcultures, acculturation in the organization can vary between these subcultures.
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Managers therefore need to understand the various subcultures and the fact that each may 
need to be managed separately. (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988, 86).
The main managerial implication presented by Elsass and Veiga (1994) in their study on a 
force-field perspective of acculturation is the fact that the post-merger change can best be 
achieved through the removal of restraining forces, rather than the addition of driving forces. 
In other words, managers should “focus on minimizing the forces of cultural differentiation 
through effective organizational integration mechanisms”. (Elsass & Veiga 1994, 451).
The recommendations for the management of cultural factors found in recent merger and 
acquisition articles and books vary from the advice to hire consultants to detailed guidelines 
on how the whole culture change process should be managed (see an older, but 
comprehensive example of the latter in Table 5). The key word found in almost all of these 
articles, however, is communication (e.g. Ashkenas et al. 1998, Solomon 1998, Daniel 1999, 
Gitelson 2001, Krell 2001, Erkkilä 2001). Effective communication not only plays an 
important role in reducing employee resistance, but is also one of the most effective ways to 
gain employee acceptance (Troiano 1999, 6). After the announcement of the merger, the top 
management has often been engaged in the merger and acquisition planning process for 
months and does therefore not always realize that the employees of the company are only just 
beginning to get used to the idea of the merger (Staff Reports 1999, 1). Communication is 
essential to succeed in involving everyone in the merger process and reducing the feelings of 
uncertainty and insecurity among the employees (Solomon 1998,16-17).
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Table 5: Guidelines for the Management of Culture Change
Source: Adapted from Croft (1990,19-20)
How should culture change be managed?
1. Recognize that peer group consensus will be the major 
influence on acceptance and willingness to change. 
Consensus-building processes are a major way to induce 
change in organizations.
2. Convey and emphasize two-way trust in all matters 
(and especially communication) related to change. 
Openness and trust in the change process influence 
whether and how change occurs.
3. Think of change as skill building and concentrate on 
training as part of the change process. Even if people 
understand and accept change, the lack of skills and 
ability to carry out a new plan is a major impediment to 
successful change.
4 Allow enough time for the change to take place. People 
require a lot of time to grow accustomed to any non­
trivial change. There is no substitute for this time.
5. Encourage people to adapt the basic idea for the change 
to fit the real world around them. The most successful 
cultural change is that which is modified and adapted in 
thousands of ways by people in die organization to 
accommodate the unique circumstances affecting them 
daily. Be flexible.
Practical Ways to Manage Culture Change
1. Give cultural change as much attention as any other top 
priority task. Put culture at the center of the agenda, not 
in the "get to it as soon as possible" category. Make sure 
middle management understands the company's 
cultural objectives.
2. Look for ways to reach into the organization to establish 
the importance of culture and its chosen values. Contact 
as many people as possible in the organization to 
explain and generate support devices, such as meetings, 
contests, awards and other personal recognition, to 
focus attention on culture and key values.
Whalen (2002), however, argues that the role of communication has been overemphasized in 
mergers and acquisitions. She states that although frequent and thorough communication is 
important, it cannot overcome fundamental problems such as a poorly implemented due 
diligence process, poor initial planning or a lack of understanding of how the merger will add 
value to their customers. (Whalen 2002, 6). In other words, communication is important, but 
it is just one of the tools needed in successfully managing the merger or acquisition.
Another critical factor in the management of mergers and acquisitions that has been found in 
most articles and books is strong leadership (e.g. Hitt et al. 2001, Krell 2001, Clemente 2001, 
Erkkilä 2001). According to these articles, the CEO and the top management of the newly 
merged company should, amongst other things, stay visible after the deal has been announced, 
quickly establish the company’s vision and values, engage in interaction with the employees 
and actively shape the culture of the new company. This is in accordance with Olie’s (1994) 
arguments on identification symbols presented earlier, as well as Feldman and Spratt (1999),
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who suggest appointing role models to help in building the new culture. These role models act 
as examples of the desired behaviors and they should be given widespread recognition, so that 
it becomes clear that these behaviors are desired and rewarded in the company. They should 
be selected carefully, because as Feldman and Spratt put it, “it is difficult for employees to be 
receptive to culture change if the organization is dominated by role models who engage in 
behaviors that are inconsistent with its declared values ’. (Feldman & Spratt 1999, 158).
Example: GE Capital Services
GE Capital assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the years 1993-1998 alone and therefore 
can be recognized to have substantial experience in the area. In the melding of different 
cultures, GE Capital has identified the effectiveness of the following activities: First of all, 
after the deal has been closed, the GE Capital business leader and the acquisition manager 
organize orientation and planning sessions for the members of the management team of the 
new acquisition and their counterparts in GE Capital. The purpose of these sessions is to 
develop a 100-day plan for acquisition integration, but in addition to the plan, these sessions 
allow both sides to get acquainted and exchange information and share their feelings and 
reactions about the acquisition as a whole. Secondly, a communication plan is created during 
the due diligence and negotiation phases of the merger. The communication, which is seen as 
vital in the success of the merger, is then handled as an ongoing process. It requires not only 
the sharing of information bulletins, but also the creation of forums of dialogue and 
interaction to be able to reduce cultural conflicts between the acquirer and the acquired. 
(Askenas et al. 1998, 174-175).
In cross-border acquisitions, GE Capital has recognized the need for a more careful analysis 
on cultural differences. Therefore, with the help of a consulting firm, it has developed a 
systematic process of cross-cultural analysis, leading up to a structured three-day cultural 
workout” session between GE Capital and the newly acquired management team. Finally, GE 
Capital has taken a “work in progress” view of its acquisition activities. It has mapped out all 
of its integration processes since 1989 and identified the best integration practices and 
developed a set of model approaches, which are available to all its business leaders. 
(Ashkenas et al. 1998, 176-178).
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2.4 Summary and Theoretical Framework
This segment of the study has attempted to give the reader an overview of the literature on the 
cultural factors affecting the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions. The first section of the 
review presented the types of cultural differences that have been identified to play a role in an 
organizational context, and therefore also in the context of merger and acquisition 
performance. The main emphasis of the section on national cultural differences was on 
Hofstede’s (1991) cultural dimensions. Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) culture typology was 
presented as the main illustration of organizational cultural differences.
The second part of the review comprised of the main theories and theoretical frameworks on 
the way in which cultural differences may affect the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions. 
The general theories included thoughts presented by e.g. Olie (1994 and 1990) (‘us’ versus 
‘them’ and the different types of mergers) as well as Elsass and Veiga (1994) (the effect of 
post-merger performance on the level of conflicts). The main theoretical frameworks 
presented were Cartwright’s and Cooper’s (1996) model of cultural fit, Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh’s (1988) acculturation theories as well as Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) force-field 
perspective of acculturation. The distinctions between the effects of cultural differences on 
international and domestic mergers were also presented, mainly following the findings of 
Larsson and Risberg (1998), Weber et al. (1996) and Morosini et al (1998).
The last part of the review gave an overview of the managerial implications of the main 
theories presented previously as well as recommendations from recent articles on how to 
successfully manage cultural differences in mergers and acquisitions. The study on GE 
Capital was provided as an example of the measures taken to manage cultural integration by a 
company with extensive experience in acquisitions.
To illustrate the relationships between the main findings of the review, a framework linking 
the determinants of merger or acquisition performance with the merger or acquisition process 
will now be presented and discussed. The determinants comprise of the cultural differences 
between the merging partners, and the way in which they affect organizational performance, 
as well as the proposed measures of managing the cultural aspects of mergers and 
acquisitions. This framework will then be used as the basis for the ensuing empirical study. 
The purpose of the framework is, in other words, to organize the variables and the presumed
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relationships among them in a graphical form in order to explain what will be studied, as 
suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994,18).
The acquisition/merger process used in the framework is adapted from the acquisition 
processes presented by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1992, 12-13). Although their book is on 
acquisitions only, and not mergers, the process is basically the same for both the activities 
(practically the same phases have been listed by e.g. Gertsen et al. 1998, 18 and Daniel 1999, 
20). The typical phases of the process, or the “conventional view of acquisitions’ (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison 1992, 12-13), is depicted in Figure 7. These phases can further be combined and 
linked to organizational performance as shown in Figure 8.
Negotiation
Strategic
Objectives
Financial
Evaluation
Strategic
Evaluation
IntegrationAgreement
Search &
Screening
Figure 7: Conventional View of Acquisitions
Source: Haspeslagh and Jemison (1992,13)
Negotiation & 
Agreement
Organizational
Performance
Integration
Process
Decision-Making
Process
Figure 8: The Merger/Acquisition Process
Source: Adapted from Haspeslagh and Jemison (1992,12)
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Figure 9 on page 39 presents a framework of the cultural determinants of performance in 
mergers and acquisitions by synthesizing the findings of the review. The framework is based 
on international mergers and acquisitions, but the differences between the domestic and the 
international setting will be pointed out in the following discussion.
According to the findings of Weber et al. (1996, 1225) national cultural differences play a 
more important role in international mergers and acquisitions than organizational cultural 
differences do, as depicted by the size difference of these variables in Figure 9. By contrast, in 
domestic mergers, where the merger takes place between firms of the same nationality, 
national cultural differences do not play a major role. However, as an increasing number of 
companies are becoming multinational, the workforce of the companies is often diversified 
and different national cultural backgrounds do affect the merger process in a domestic setting 
as well.
The cultural differences impact the merger process through the different theories presented in 
this study. The theories (see pages 16-30) have not been connected to any specific phase of 
the process in the figure, as they can be thought to affect each one of the phases to some 
extent. For example, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ antagonism already plays a role in the decision­
making and negotiation phases as the managers of the two firms get together and plan the 
merger or acquisition. In the integration phase, the antagonism is usually spread wider into the 
organization to touch the workforce as a whole. Another example is the cultural fit: it can be 
an important factor in the decision-making process when determining whether or not a 
potential partner is suitable, i.e. whether the cultures are adjoining types. On the other hand, 
the actual degree of cultural fit can seriously affect the integration process if, as implied by the 
theory, the workforce perceives to be under increased constraint after an acquisition 
(Cartwright and Cooper 1996, 81-83).
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The reason the model of cultural fit is presented in parenthesis in Figure 9 is the fact that its 
importance in international mergers and acquisitions can be argued as was pointed out earlier 
(e.g. Larsson & Risberg 1998, 43-44 & Vaara 1999, 128-129). Language problems in Figure 9 
not only pertain to the problems arising from the differences between national languages 
discussed earlier (Larsson & Risberg 1998, 44 and Solomon 1998, 17), but also to problems 
from possible differences between the professional languages used by the merging partners.
The balancing side of the figure is the management of the cultural factors. As recommended 
by Cartwright and Cooper (1993, 64), the authors of the model of cultural fit, the decision­
making process should include a culture audit in order to determine the cultural fit of the two 
compames involved. In an international setting, as explained above, this can be argued and 
therefore, instead of a culture audit, a cross-cultural analysis is proposed. Although this 
recommendation has been derived from the GE Capital example (Ashkenas et al. 1998, 174- 
175), it is also in accordance with Larsson and Risberg (1998, 52), who emphasize the 
importance of cultural awareness. The merging companies should also have an understanding 
of the type of merger they are potentially creating, as it will affect the level of possible 
cultural conflicts later on, as well as give an indication on how the integration process should 
be handled (Olie 1990, 208-209).
The negotiation and agreement phase was left separate from the decision-making process in 
order to highlight the importance of the two partners agreeing on the mode of acculturation as 
implied by Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988, 84-86) as well as to reflect the proposition of 
broadening the due diligence process to include cultural considerations (Whalen 2002, 6).
The first recommendation concerning the management of the cultural integration process is 
the creation of effective integration processes, as proposed by Elsass and Veiga (1994, 451). 
They maintained that this would be the measure by which the restraining forces of cultural 
differentiation could be minimized. They did not explicitly point out what the effective 
integration processes involved, but in this framework, it is assumed that they comprise of all 
the recommendations regarding the management of the integration process identified earlier 
(such as consensus-building, openness, allocation of sufficient time and prioritization of the 
integration process - Croft 1990,19-20).
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The issues specifically listed under effective integration processes in the figure include the 
development of a common identity, which, according to Olie (1990, 386-387), is an important 
factor in reducing the conflicts resulting from the 'us versus them antagonism. 
Communication is also specifically mentioned, because its crucial role in integration 
management was emphasized in most of the recent merger and acquisition articles (e.g. 
Ashkenas et al. 1998, Solomon 1998, Daniel 1999, and Troiano 1999). Strong leadership has 
also been listed, since its significance was highlighted as well (e.g. Hitt et al. 2001, Krell 
2001, Clemente 2001, Erkkilä 2001). Cross-cultural training (as proposed by Croft 1990, 19- 
20) has been added to the figure to demonstrate its importance in the reduction of the ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ antagonism specifically in international mergers and acquisitions.
The final outcome of the merger or acquisition can be assessed after the integration process 
has taken place. The post-merger organizational performance will, in turn, influence the 
factors affecting the level of cultural conflicts in subsequent mergers or acquisitions (as 
depicted by the dashed arrows in Figure 9). As proposed by Elsass and Veiga (1994, 447- 
448), the post-merger or post-acquisition performance will have an effect on the forces of 
cultural differentiation (i.e. the perception of differences and the structure of intergroup 
relations, in this case in the acquiring party, since we are focusing on subsequent mergers and 
acquisitions concerning another acquired party) and the forces of organizational integration 
(the acquisition motive and the implementation processes of the acquirer). In other words, the 
better the performance, the weaker the restraining forces of cultural differentiation (from the 
acquirer’s side) and the stronger the driving forces of organizational integration. Olie’s (1990) 
‘us’ versus ‘them’ antagonism reflects the same issue as Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) structure 
of intergroup relations, and it can thus be said that the post-merger performance will also 
affect the level of this antagonism (the better the performance, the lower the feelings of 
antagonism in the acquiring party will become, facilitating the following acquisitions).
The outcome of the merger or acquisition will also have an effect on the acculturation mode 
preferences of the acquirer (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988, 84-86). This is because the 
performance following the merger will affect the acquirer’s tolerance for multiculturalism and 
its diversification strategy in subsequent mergers and acquisitions. Although Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh (1988) claimed that the post-merger performance will also affect the preferred
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mode of the acquired party, the organizational performance in this framework is again linked 
to subsequent mergers or acquisitions, i.e. a situation concerning a new acquired party. 
Therefore the change in the acquired party is not relevant in this framework. The only issues 
in the figure that cannot be said to be directly affected by the post-merger performance, and 
are thereby separated in Figure 9 by a double line from the issues discussed above, are the 
type of the merger and the degree of cultural fit (as the partner will be different in the 
subsequent merger or acquisition) and the possible language problems, which can only be 
solved indirectly through language training.
The reason the post-merger organizational performance has been linked to the management 
side in Figure 9 is the recommendation derived from the GE Capital example presented 
earlier. This recommendation is the fact that a merger process should be seen as a “work in 
progress”, and lessons should be drawn from each merger or acquisition, thereby affecting the 
management of future mergers or acquisitions.
3 Methodology
This section of the study will present the method of research chosen for conducting the study, 
and provide argumentation in favor of this choice. The research design of the empirical study, 
including the selection criteria for and an introduction of, the units of analysis (i.e. the case 
companies), will also be presented and justified. The attention will then be drawn to the data 
collection and analysis procedures, and the section will finish off by considering the quality 
aspects of the research.
3.1 Research Strategy
The objective of the study is to link the theoretical framework built according to the findings 
of the literature review to the context of Finnish firms, i.e. to explore whether the framework 
is relevant in a real-life setting. In other words, the data collected in the case study will be 
used to revise the framework in order to make it more precise and empirically meaningful 
(Miles & Huberman 1994, 20). More specifically, the aim is to study what the cultural 
differences relevant to the outcomes of the mergers and acquisitions of Finnish firms are
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perceived to be, how cultural differences are perceived to impact the Finnish firms M&A 
performance and how Finnish firms manage mergers and acquisitions from a cultural 
perspective. The study can therefore be classified as exploratory and descriptive.
The research approach followed in this study resembles the constructive approach introduced 
by Kasanen et al. (1993). The constructive approach involves “problem solving through the 
construction of models, diagrams, plans, and organizations”. The essence of the approach is to 
tie a managerial problem and its solution to accumulated theoretical knowledge. It can be 
characterized by the following phases (presented here in the order followed in this study):
1. Find a practically relevant problem which also has research potential.
2. Obtain a general and comprehensive understanding of the topic.
3. Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea.
4. Show the theoretical connections and the research contribution of the solution concept.
5. Examine the scope of applicability of the solution.
6. Demonstrate that the solution works. (Kasanen et al. 1993, 244-246).
The fundamental disparity between the constructive approach and the one used in this study, 
however, stems from the use of the term ‘solution’. The constructive approach was developed 
in the context of management accounting, in which the meaning of the term ‘solution differs 
considerably from the solution referred to in this study. In management accounting, a solution 
can, for example, be the development of a new analytical tool for optimizing investment 
value. Such a tool may be presented in the form of a formula, which will yield a specific result 
after the values of the variables have been inserted into it.
Studies on the effect of cultural differences, on the other hand, deal with much more 
intangible issues, mainly based on subjective perceptions, and generating such solutions is 
therefore hardly possible. The solution in this study refers to the solution to the problem 
introduced in the very beginning of the study, i.e. the fact that although cultural issues have 
been recognized as an important factor in the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, the high 
failure rates reveal that these issues are still not fully understood by the merging companies. 
The solution in this case is the framework itself: a figure, which synthesizes the cultural issues
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in mergers and acquisitions in a concise manner, and which can therefore serve in efficiently 
increasing awareness and understanding of these issues.
The first two phases of constructive research presented above (finding a relevant problem and 
obtaining a comprehensive understanding of the topic) are evident from reading the study this 
far. In this study, the third step of constructing a solution idea and the fourth of showing the 
theoretical connections and the research contribution pertain to the construction and revision 
of the framework. The fifth step of examining the scope of applicability here means ensuring 
the framework’s relevance in the context of Finnish firms. The final step of demonstrating 
that the solution works is beyond the scope of this study. In other words, it is not possible in 
this time frame to test whether the framework does, indeed, increase the awareness and the 
knowledge of the participating managers, and whether that anticipated increase in knowledge 
actually leads to improved management of mergers and acquisitions.
The research method chosen for this study is the case study, which is also typically applied 
within the constructive approach (Kasanen et al. 1993, 251). This choice can be justified for 
several reasons. First of all, the research questions of this study focus mainly on “how” 
questions, which, according to Yin (1994), is one of the three conditions supporting the use of 
the case study. The nature of the “what” question posed is exploratory, and therefore any of 
the five research strategies presented by Yin (1994) (i.e. experiments, surveys, archival 
analysis, histories or case studies) can be justified for answering this question. Furthermore, 
the researcher in this case has no control over the actual events, which complies with the 
second condition in favor of this approach. And finally, although some of the embedded cases 
included in the study date from the last decade, the focus is on contemporary events instead of 
historical ones, which therefore satisfies the third condition. As all three of the conditions are 
met, the case study strategy can, according to Yin (1994), be argued to have a distinct 
advantage over the other research strategies. (Yin 1994,4-9).
The case study approach has been criticized for lacking rigor, not providing enough basis for 
scientific generalization as well as for taking too long and resulting in “massive, unreadable 
documents” (Yin 1994, 9-10). This criticism has been kept in mind when designing and 
conducting the research in order to avoid the shortcomings, and generalizations are only made
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to theoretical propositions (and not to populations or universes), as suggested by Yin (1994,
10).
3.2 Research Design
The research design selected for the study is the multiple-case design. Multiple cases have 
been claimed to have the advantage over single-case studies of offering the researcher a 
deeper understanding of the processes and outcomes of cases, as well as presenting the 
possibility to both develop and test hypotheses. In other words, “multiple-case sampling adds 
confidence to findings”. (Miles & Huberman 1994, 26-29). Although the term ‘sampling’ is 
used above, Yin (1994) argues that the logic followed in multiple-case designs should be that 
of replication, and not sampling. Accordingly, the aim has been to choose the cases studied in 
this study so that they “predict similar results” (literal replication). (Yin 1994, 45-46). This 
replication approach is evident throughout the individual case reports presented in section 4 
(Empirical Findings) as well as the conclusions derived from those reports (section 5).
In addition to being a multiple-case study, the study follows an embedded design. In other 
words, each of the individual cases involves one or several subunits. The advantage of using 
embedded units of analysis is that they “can often add significant opportunities for extensive 
analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case”. On the other hand, the danger pertaining 
to the use of embedded designs is the fact that the study can shift into focusing on the subunit 
level only and thereby “fails to return to the larger unit of analysis”. (Yin 1994, 44).
3.2.1 Units of Analysis and Selection Criteria
The units of analysis in this study are case companies. The subunits, or the embedded units, 
are cases concerning specific mergers and/or acquisitions undertaken by these companies. The 
main purpose of the holistic cases, as explained earlier, is to provide an empirical basis for the 
revision of the theoretical framework. The purpose of the embedded cases is both to assist in 
rebuilding the framework as well as to help in testing it. The focus is therefore kept on the 
holistic level in order to avoid the pitfall connected with embedded designs.
45
The case companies selected for the study were Stora Enso, Nordea, Datex-Ohmeda, 
Outokumpu and Company A. Each of the case companies and the embedded cases will be 
introduced briefly after the following list on the selection criteria.
The criteria by which the cases were selected consisted of the following:
1. The required country of origin of the company was Finland since the study was 
conducted for a Finnish school in Finland, and any contribution of the study was 
aimed to benefit Finnish firms in particular.
2. The companies had to, for obvious reasons, have prior engagement in international 
mergers and/or acquisitions.
3. The size or position of the companies should be significant enough to be interesting 
for the readers. Although one of the case companies was studied under a pseudonym 
for reasons of confidentiality, it was not excluded from the study due to the specific 
contribution provided by its employment of a specialized M&A team.
4. Each company was chosen from a different industry, both to avoid further 
confidentiality issues (through the exclusion of competing firms from the study) and to 
assist in the task of exploring different, nationally important industries for the 
purposes of future research.
5. Competent interviewees to represent the case companies had to be both identified and 
available for the study.
6. And finally, as for the embedded cases, the aim was to achieve a reasonably wide 
representation of the different merger types. Although the study focuses on 
international mergers and acquisitions, a domestic case of each was included for 
purposes of comparison.
3.2.2 Case Companies 
Stora Enso
Stora Enso is a forest products company producing magazine papers, newsprint, fine papers, 
packaging boards and wood products. The company was formed in the 1998 merger between 
Swedish Stora (with roots all the way back in 1288) and Finnish Enso (founded in 1872). The 
company’s sales totaled €12.8 billion in 2002 and it employs around 42 500 people in more 
than 40 countries. (Stora Enso 2002).
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Growth through mergers and acquisitions has been and still is “one of the cornerstones of 
Stora Enso’s strategy. Mergers and acquisitions were also “a very important avenue for 
growth for both Stora and Enso prior to their merger”. (Ansahaiju 2002). Since 1985, Enso 
had gone through seven acquisitions, three of which were cross-border. The equivalent for 
Stora was four (two cross-border). Since the merger, the group has engaged in two more 
cross-border acquisitions. (Härmälä 2002, 8). The embedded cases chosen for the study were 
the acquisition of Tampella Forest in 1993, the Stora Enso merger in 1998 and the acquisition 
of Consolidated Papers in 2000.
The stated values of the company are customer focus (“we are the customers first choice ), 
performance (“we deliver results”), responsibility (“we comply with the principles of 
sustainable development”), emphasis on people (“motivated people create success ) and focus 
on future (“we take the first step”).
Nordea
Nordea is the largest Nordic financial services group with approximately €252 billion in total 
assets. The group operates in three business areas: Retail Banking, Corporate and Institutional 
Banking and Asset Management & Life Insurance. The group has over 10 million customers 
and 1245 offices in 22 countries. The number of employees is approximately 39 000. The 
group has been formed through numerous mergers and acquisitions, and it now incorporates 
banks originating from Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. The Finnish Union Bank of 
Finland, which is the main focus of this study, traces its history back to 1862. (Nordea 2002).
Mergers and acquisitions have been an extremely important part of the bank s growth 
strategy, especially because it is difficult to grow organically in such a mature business. 
However, now that the company has achieved the Nordic position it sought after, it is not 
expected to engage in large mergers in the near future. Instead, it will aim to reinforce its 
position partly through organic growth and partly through minor acquisitions. (Palin-Lehtinen 
2002). Since 1991, the Union Bank of Finland has gone through the acquisition of a part of 
the Savings Bank of Finland, the merger with Kansallis-Osake-Pankki (KOP) to form Merita 
in 1995 (embedded case number 1), and the merger between Merita and Swedish Nordbanken 
to form Merita-Nordbanken in 1997 (embedded case number 2). Merita-Nordbanken further
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merged with Unibank of Denmark to form Nordea in 1999, followed by the Norwegian 
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse joining the company in 2000. The company has also engaged 
in a number of smaller acquisitions. (Nordea 2002).
According to the corporate statement, the corporate values are: value creation (“we thoroughly 
understand our customers and anticipate their financial needs and we always try to generate 
added value for each customer”), innovativeness (“we explore our competencies and try out 
new ideas to improve existing services, create new solutions or meet new needs”) and 
empowerment (“we respect our customers and proactively offer financial solutions and 
services making their lives and business activities easier”).
Datex-Ohmeda
Datex-Ohmeda is the core business of Instrumentarium Corporation’s (founded in 1900) 
largest business segment, Anesthesia and Critical Care. Datex-Ohmeda was formed in the 
1998 merger between Instrumentarium’s business unit Datex (established in 1969) and 
American Ohmeda. The company’s product portfolio consists of patient monitors, networked 
systems, anesthesia machines, ventilators, drug deliveiy systems, pulse oximeters as well as 
supplies, accessories and services. (Datex-Ohmeda 2001). The company employed some 
3300 people in 2001 and had sales companies in 14 and presence in 100 countries worldwide 
(Datex-Ohmeda 2002). Instrumentarium’s net sales in 2001 totaled over €1 billion, 
approximately 70% of which originated from Datex-Ohmeda (Instrumentarium 2002).
Mergers and acquisitions are an important part of Instrumentarium’s strategy especially 
serving the anesthesia and critical care business segment. (Ritvos 2002). Starting from 1994, 
Instrumentarium has engaged in five major acquisitions concerning Datex-Ohmeda, only one 
of which has been domestic. (Datex-Ohmeda 2001). The embedded cases chosen for closer 
examination were the acquisition of Engström in 1994 and the Datex-Ohmeda merger in 
1998.
Datex-Ohmeda’s values include dedication (“to excel at we do requires hard work and 
dedication”), focus (“we focus on the essential”) and balance (“the nature of our business 
requires us to find order and rhythm in the maelstrom of technological progress; to display 
personal commitment, honesty, responsibility and humility”).
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Outokumpu
Outokumpu is a metals and technology company, whose roots can be traced back to 1908. It 
specializes both in stainless steel and non-ferrous metals, i.e. fabricated copper products, 
copper and zinc metals production and related technology. In 2001, the group’s net sales were 
about €6 billion and it employed over 19 000 people in more than 40 countries. The group 
comprises over 200 companies and more than 90% of its net sales are generated outside 
Finland. (Outokumpu 2002).
The year 2001 was the beginning of a new strategy for the company, one of growth and 
transformation. The target is to double the company’s profit and transform from “an asset- 
driven metals producer into a knowledge-driven company”, in other words to exit the mining 
business and to focus on the downstream of the value chain. The role of divestments as well 
as mergers and acquisitions has therefore become increasingly important for the company. 
(Juusela 2002). The company’s first notable acquisition of a production company occurred in 
1983 (the company had earlier acquired numerous mines), and the 1980’s was marked with 
numerous acquisitions (the company tripled its sales during this period through international 
acquisitions). (Outokumpu 2002). The new strategy has again accelerated the rate of 
acquisitions, last year the rate being in the ballpark of ten acquired companies. (Lassila 2002). 
The acquisition/merger presented as the embedded case of Outokumpu (Embedded Case One) 
cannot, for reasons of confidentiality especially due to the recent nature of the transaction, be 
studied under its real name. Despite the fact that the case was so recent, that for example its 
performance could not yet be assessed, the case was interesting and it did, nevertheless, 
provide valuable insight to the topic, and was thereby not excluded from the study.
The stated values of the corporation consist of superior knowledge (“we value knowledge 
gained from both theory and experience”), outstanding performance (“we strive for superior 
profitability in all our activities”), individual achievement (“we are responsive, resourceful 
and proud of our achievements in building the success of Outokumpu”) and creating success 
with customers (“we strive to understand our customers’ business and build long-term 
relationships with them”).
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Company A
As mentioned above, for reasons of confidentiality and non-disclosure, Company A cannot be 
presented under its real name. All that can be said is that the company is a technology 
company with presence in several countries. The actual names of the embedded cases 
(Embedded Case X and Embedded Case Y) cannot be revealed either. This, however, was not 
perceived to reduce the content value or contribution of these cases to the study to the extent 
that they should be barred from the study.
3.3 Data Collection & Analysis
3.3.1 Case Study Protocol
According to Yin (1994), having a case study protocol is not only desirable, but “it is 
essential” when using a multiple-case design. The purpose of the protocol is to act as a guide 
for the researcher in carrying out the case study as well as being a tool in increasing the 
reliability of the research. In accordance with the recommendations of Yin (1994), the case 
study protocol developed for this study included the following sections: an overview of the 
case study project, the field procedures, the case study questions and a guide for the case study 
report. (Yin 1994, 63-65). A brief account of each of these sections will be given next.
Overview of the Case Study Project
The research problem presented in section 1.2 of this study provided a clear background for 
this study and was used in explaining the rationale of the study to the potential interviewees. 
Meanwhile, the literature review and the reference list related to it, which were completed 
before planning the case study, presented, in a concise manner, the relevant readings on the 
issues in question.
Field Procedures
The field procedures included a letter sent to each interviewee introducing the topic and the 
research problem (as mentioned above) and requesting an interview. The interviews were later 
confirmed via telephone and/or e-mail. The availability of the interviewees to later answer 
possible supplementing questions was confirmed during the interviews and the interviewees’ 
preferred method of contacting them for this purpose was established. A clear schedule was
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made for carrying out the interviews. The main consideration for the resources used in the 
field was to have a back-up recorder available in case the one primarily used would break.
Case Study Questions
The case study questions were based on the preliminary research questions of the study and, 
consequently, the theoretical framework drawn from the findings of the literature review. The 
questions were initially formulated for the researcher’s benefit, and served mainly as a 
reminder of the data needed. Each topic discussed had a clear link to the framework and the 
questions concerning the embedded cases were also clearly linked to the specific theories 
presented in the literature review.
Guide for the Case Study Report
A preliminary outline for the study report was completed before entering the field. The basic 
design of the final case study report helped in ensuring that the necessary data was collected 
during a single interview, since most of the interviewees were not easily available (only one 
additional question had to be posed from three of the interviewees after the actual interviews). 
The fact that the eventual readers of the study would consist of both scholars and business 
managers was kept in mind when designing the case study report.
3.3.2 Collecting the Data
To increase the quality of the case study research as proposed by Yin (1994), the data 
collection efforts followed three principles: the use of multiple sources of evidence, building a 
case study database and maintaining a chain of evidence. (Yin 1994, 90-99). These will be 
briefly examined next.
Sources of Evidence
The тпяш source of data in this case study originated from a total of seven interviews from the 
five case companies. The interviews were focused, in-depth interviews, which lasted from 
approximately one and a half to three hours. One of the interviews was conducted via e-mail 
and a follow-up phone call due to the interviewee residing in the United States. The semi- 
structured questionnaire used in the interviews first focused on general questions and then 
proceeded to follow the structure of the theoretical framework to a large extent. Appendix A:
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Interview Questionnaire presents the broad outline of the interviews. The questionnaire 
mainly served as a prompt for the interviewee; some of the questions were not dealt with in 
each interview, whereas questions not included in the questionnaire were presented to follow 
up some of the answers of the interviewees. A pilot interview was conducted in order to test 
the questionnaire and modifications were made accordingly. A subjective scale of 1 to 5 was 
used to probe for answers to questions which were perceived to be more difficult. The 
interviews were conducted in Finnish and recorded for later transcription, with the exception 
of the e-mail and telephone affair. Field notes were also made during each interview, both to 
support the recordings and to graphically document some of the issues discussed (such as 
discussion on processes or organizational charts).
The interviewees were carefully chosen to represent the case companies. The aim was to find 
the most competent people in the topic area at hand. One of the seven interviewees 
volunteered to take part in the study, three were identified from their participation in a book 
on the subject (i.e. Erkkilä 2001), one by his participation in a seminar concerning the topic 
and two through recommendations from the previous. One of the interviewees no longer 
worked for the case company in question, which was thought of as an advantage, since the 
interviewee could express his opinions on the subject more freely. Because one of the 
interviews was conducted via e-mail, involving a second interviewee to represent that case 
was assessed as necessary. One of the embedded cases was likewise discussed with another 
interviewee, since he was named as the most experienced in that subject. (See Appendix B: 
Interviewees for a table introducing the interviewees).
The second source of evidence was documentation and archival records. The documentation 
received from the companies consisted mainly of the annual reports of the companies, earlier 
studies made on the subject and magazine & newspaper articles. Specific archival records 
were, unfortunately, mostly off-limits, but slides from presentations given on the subject were 
made available from two of the companies. The book by Erkkilä (2001), which presents 
earlier interviews with three of the interviewees on the same subject, was also used to support 
and confirm the accounts given in the context of this study. And finally, although the 
interviews were earned out in the companies in all but one of the cases, thereby making direct 
observations possible, these observations mainly consisted of the general perception of how
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important the topic seemed to be for the interviewee, and has therefore only had limited 
importance in the study.
Case Study Database
All the gathered for the case study has been collected in a database, including the tapes 
and transcripts of the interviews, the field notes, the printouts from e-mails, the documents 
and the archival records. The database also includes the individual analyses of each case, 
which were not presented in the final report. The data has been organized by case company 
and all the pieces of information included have been dated.
\
Chain of Evidence
The database described above, as well as the database containing all the references of the 
literature review (with the exception of a few books from the library), both serve in providing 
a chain of evidence from the conclusions derived from the cases to the initial research 
questions, and vice versa. For example, the individual analyses of the cases can be accessed 
for a closer look at the analysis process. The case study report has also attempted to present 
the issues in a logical order to allow for a chain of evidence throughout the report.
3.3.3 Analyzing the Data
The process followed in conducting the case study is illustrated in Figure 10 (Yin 1994, 49). 
The early stages of the process have already been examined, but the figure is presented here in 
order to help in explaining how the cases were analyzed.
As proposed by the figure, the individual case reports were written and analyzed first. The 
purpose of the individual case reports was to present the data collected from the interviews to 
the reader in an organized manner. The structure of these reports followed the structure of the 
framework. The embedded cases were presented at the end of each holistic case. The aim of 
the analysis was to link the reports to the different theories incorporated in the theoretical 
framework where possible. This analysis then served as the basis for the next section of the 
study, i.e. the cross-case analysis.
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Figure 10: Case Study Method
Source: Yin (1994, 49)
In the cross-case analysis, coding was used to help in categorizing the data from the holistic 
and embedded cases, after which the data was assembled in clusters relating to the different 
issues presented in the framework. These steps, as proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994, 
56-57), helped in organizing the data to be able to draw conclusions from it. The data from the 
embedded cases was synthesized by the means of a table (Table 10 in Appendix C: Synthesis 
of the Embedded Cases), which was also used for the purpose of a closer examination of the 
theories included in the framework. The conclusions drawn from the cross-case analysis were 
ultimately used in revising the framework.
3.4 Evaluation of Quality
According to Yin (1994), the quality of the research can be established through four different 
tests: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. The test of internal 
validity, however, does not apply to this study, which is considered exploratory and
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descriptive (as explained earlier). Internal validity, as suggested by Yin (1994), is relevant to 
explanatory and causal studies only. Table 6 presents the recommended case study tactics for 
dealing with each test (excluding internal validity) and thereby improving the quality of the 
research. The table also depicts the phases of the research where these tactics should be 
followed. (Yin 1994, 32-38).
The construct validity (defined as “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied” - Yin 1994, 33) was improved by all of the measures proposed in Table 6. In 
other words, as explained earlier, multiple sources of evidence were used to allow for data 
triangulation (e.g. interviews, annual reports, earlier studies, earlier interviews, slides, articles) 
and a chain of evidence was established (e.g. the analyses of the cases and the ensuing results 
are clearly linked to the data from the cases, the table used in synthesizing the embedded cases 
is included in the appendix, and the analyses of individual cases are available for anyone 
interested in a closer look at the analysis process). Each interviewee also reviewed their part 
of the study and corrected any possible misinterpretations and translation flaws. Possible 
misunderstandings concerning the interview questions were corrected on site, and therefore 
the issues discussed in one interview were comparable with those discussed in another.
Table 6: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests
Source: Adapted from Yin (1994, 33)
Tests Case study tactic
Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs
Construct validity - use multiple sources of 
evidence
- establish chain of 
evidence
- have key informants review 
draft case study report
Data collection
Data collection
Composition
External validity - use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies Research design
Reliability - use case study protocol Data collection
- develop case study database Data collection
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External validity (i.e. how far the conclusions can be generalized - Miles & Huberman 1994, 
279) was enhanced by using a multiple-case design and replication logic, clearly observable 
throughout the report. And finally, reliability was improved by designing and using the case 
study protocol described above and building a case study database, which allows for verifying 
all of the reference sources used, including e.g. books and articles (excluding some books, 
which are available in the library), printouts from web pages and other documentation, as well 
as the original transcribed interviews and e-mail printouts.
Even though the aim was to conduct a study of as high a quality as possible, the scope and 
relatively tight schedule of the study, as well as scarce resources, limited the research 
somewhat. The most important limitations to the case study pertained to the number of 
interviewees involved. Although all of the interviewees were competent in the field studied, 
they primarily represented top management, and the research may have benefited from 
including interviewees from other levels of the organizations as well. Moreover, the study 
only included representatives from one of the parties involved in the merger or acquisition, 
and the perception of the events can therefore be assumed to be biased at least to some extent. 
And finally, the intentional choice of studying case companies from different industries 
instead of just one industry was acknowledged to decrease the external validity of the results 
(the ability to generalize to one specific industry) somewhat. However, as explained in the 
introduction of the study, one of the main objectives of the study was to provide a basis for 
further research, and thereby the decision of limiting the number of respondents as well as 
exploring different industries at this time was deliberate, although they were recognized as 
potential shortcomings.
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4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Individual Case Reports
This section of the study will present the findings of the empirical study by separately going 
over each of the case companies introduced above. The aim of these individual case reports is 
to build up an understanding of how the compames in question take cultural issues into 
account in their M&A activity. The structure of these reports will follow the theoretical 
framework (Figure 9 on page 39), starting from whether a formal M&A process exists and 
who is involved. The section will then focus on the factors affecting the level of cultural 
conflicts (upper part of Figure 9), after which the management of cultural factors (lower part 
of Figure 9) will be examined. Finally, attention will be drawn to the perception of the effect 
of cultural management on the post-merger organizational performance. The embedded cases,
i.e. specific mergers or acquisitions undertaken by the case compames, will be presented 
briefly at the end of each report.
4.1.1 Stora Enso 
M&A Process
Mergers and acquisitions, as explained in the introduction of the company, very much pertain 
to the growth strategy of Stora Enso. The first task when engaging in mergers and acquisitions 
is to identify the suitable target companies in order to attain the strategic goal at hand. Stora 
Enso then follows a defined procedure, which generally consists of three phases: 1) analyzing 
the target prior to the decision, 2) due diligence and preparing for the final deal and 3) 
integrating the acquired company. The procedure used is not extremely standardized and 
allows for variations, as mergers and acquisitions are always unique events. The intention is to 
have two to three core persons involved in the process from the very beginning to the end. In 
addition to people from the particular business line in question, every M&A team includes 
representatives from the finance, legal and human resource departments. Representatives of 
the target company participate in the team work starting from the due diligence and 
preparation phase.
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Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
The levels of cultural differences that have been identified to affect mergers and acquisitions 
at Stora Enso are national, organizational and individual. The national cultural differences are 
thought of as obvious and they can be studied from various sources. Organizational cultural 
differences are perceived to be more complex and to have their roots from company history 
and traditions, management styles (e.g. hierarchical vs. empowered, job description driven vs. 
goal driven) and national cultural characteristics, which, according to Ansaharju, often affect 
organizational culture, e.g. decision-making procedures. Furthermore, individual cultural 
differences at high levels in the organization were perceived to have a strong impact on the 
M&A process.
In addition to national and organizational cultures as well as differences in individuals, 
Tolvanen brought up differences between people from different locations inside a nation. He 
based his arguments on Enso’s 1995-1996 acquisition of Veitsiluoto, a company with 
factories in Oulu, Kemi and Kemijärvi. All of these locations are situated relatively far north 
from the headquarters located in Helsinki, and cultural differences could be observed between 
the people from the north and those down south.
Organizational cultural differences, and especially differences in how decisions are prepared 
and made, are considered by Amsahaiju to be the most important level of cultural differences 
in mergers and acquisitions. Tolvanen, on the other hand, perceived national cultural 
differences to be more important. He maintained that in domestic acquisitions, the initial 
thinking is that the way in which things are done in the acquiring company is automatically 
adopted by the acquired company. In cross-border acquisitions, however, where national 
cultural differences come to play, the integration becomes more complex as individuals “hold 
on tightly to their national traditions” and to the way in which things are done in that specific 
culture.
When asked to contemplate on the causes behind cultural conflicts, Ansahaiju argued that the 
“biggest single obstacle” in mergers and acquisitions comes from people not understanding 
how and where important decisions are made. The other possible sources of conflicts he 
mentioned were unclear practices in promoting people and poor communication. Tolvanen
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also took up the issue of differences in decision-making, referring to his experience in the 
Stora Enso merger:
...A [Finnish] team leader can, after a short discussion, make a decision at his own risk. If it’s a 
German [team], the decision is made by whoever makes it first and the others are astonished that 
there was no discussion on the matter whatsoever.... There is something similar in the Finnish and 
German culture, we are both on the “on the spot” front and well, the decisions are made right 
away. If the decisions are wrong, we will make new ones tomorrow. But a Swede cannot decide 
with the same speed. He has to be sure that the decision is correct. And that discussion phase takes 
a long time.
In addition to differences in decision making, Tolvanen brought up the problem of having to 
cope with different languages. He referred to an article in Helsingin Sanomat (Paakkanen 
2002, D3) on how Swedes criticized the language skills of Finns and admitted that he had 
encountered the fact that Swedes did not value Finlandssvensk, i.e. the Finnish way of 
speaking Swedish. Although English is the official language in Stora Enso to allow for 
equality between Swedes and Finns in the language matter, it is not always spoken well and 
therefore Swedish is used at times. This, however, can cause frustration in both parties.
Another problem area that Tolvanen brought up was national stereotypes. According to his 
observations, relying on national stereotypes will result in the formation of different national 
teams, which then compete against each other (e.g. a “Finland vs. Sweden national contest”), 
complicating the integration further. One should therefore not forget that a person is first and 
foremost an individual.
In general, cross-border mergers or acquisitions are thought of as more demanding than 
domestic ones. Due to this perception, however, more effort is put into managing international 
ones and they have therefore been seen to succeed equally well.
Management of Cultural Factors
The management of cultural factors in the first phase of the M&A process at Stora Enso (i.e. 
the analysis of the target company), is limited to general studies made of the target company. 
This is due to the fact that in-depth analysis of cultural issues cannot be made at this stage as 
contacts between the companies are usually limited for competitive reasons. The second 
phase, the due diligence and the preparation for the final deal, is where “the cultural work 
really starts”. The first task is to carry out a “Values and Attitudes” survey among the people
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of the company to be acquired. There is a standard procedure for doing the survey and it has 
been perceived to provide Stora Enso with a lot of information on the cultural differences or 
similarities between the two parties, thereby forming a useful background for the next steps. 
The general aim in the due diligence and preparation phase is to have change of information at 
all levels.
Starting in phase 2, but going on to the third phase of integration, is the communication of 
Stora Enso’s mission, vision and values (presented in the introduction of the company) to all 
employees. Everyone is given an opportunity to discuss the values and other cultural issues 
with people from the acquiring company. Stora Enso also organizes one and a half day 
Intercultural Management courses for managers and the managers of the “new family 
member” are encouraged to participate. Other in-house training courses are also organized for 
the acquired party. The integration process is coordinated by the human resource and 
communications departments, but the responsibility of implementation lies on the line 
management.
According to Ansahaiju, communication is considered to be very important in mergers and 
acquisitions, and is handled “in hundreds of different ways”. Communication in the line, 
cascading from top down, is thought of as the most important channel, but numerous other 
ways are used as well. The tools utilized by the communications department include, among 
others, printed material, meetings and the Intranet. Discussions about Stora Enso’s mission, 
vision and values in all departments and at all levels has been perceived to be an effective way 
of communicating cultural issues. Tolvanen also emphasized the importance of 
communication and stated that as soon as an acquisition is made, “people should be 
communicated to immediately; otherwise they’re, well, in trouble”. In addition to listing the 
proposals for managing mergers, the following list presented by Ansahaiju in Erkkilä (2001) 
clearly exhibits the importance of constant communication in mergers:
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What should be done to make the road to integration less bumpy?
10 suggestions
1. Communicate.
2. Investigate and convey the organization’s atmosphere, values and attitudes - conduct a 
follow-up study. Communicate.
3. Decide on and name the organizational structures and responsibilities PROMPTLY. 
Communicate.
4. Convey the policies of the company. Communicate.
5. Make the key persons the owners of the different phases of the restructuring process. 
Communicate.
6. Agree on the principles on how the rest of the organization is built and on what basis 
the cutbacks in personnel are made. Communicate.
7. Create a mission and vision for the new company as soon as possible. Communicate.
8. Create strategies for the new company and all of its units as swiftly as possible. 
Communicate.
9. Define the values of the company and create a procéss for committing people to them. 
Communicate.
10. Communicate.
(Ansaharju in Erkkilä 2001, 215)
Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance
The goals to evaluate success in mergers and acquisitions are set for financial synergies,
strategic objectives (e.g. whether a new market was entered successfully) and cultural
performance. Although the latter is perceived to be difficult to measure, it is to some extent
accomplished through the repetitive Values and Attitudes surveys presented earlier as well as
self assessments, which are a part of Stora Enso’s established Total Quality Management
system.
According to Ansaharju, the management of cultural factors has been perceived to improve 
performance over time ‘Very much”. Learning by doing and experience, as well as 
standardized procedures, have helped in managing mergers and acquisitions. Tolvanen also 
emphasized the importance of experience. When measured by financial metrics, however, 
Ansaharju admits that it is difficult to say whether the management of cultural factors has 
enhanced performance, as economic situations are different in each case. But from a cultural 
point of view, Ansaharju maintains that the management of cultural issues has “really proven 
to improve the performance”.
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Tolvanen also acknowledges the importance of taking cultural issues into account, but he 
maintains that it does not affect all levels of the organization, but only the ones sharing 
common functions. He explains:
I visited a steel factory in Tornio today, and I still envision this guy there, wearing a blue overall 
and an old felt hat on his head, with a cigarette in one side of his mouth and driving a bicycle at a 
Vi speed forward...It really just came to my mind that on the factory floor level, nothing 
whatsoever changes. ... The overalls of the different firms [are still there], in Stora Enso some still 
wear Ahlström overalls, some Tampella Forest overalls, some Gutzeit overalls.
The same employee will have the cigarette in the same side of his mouth driving the bicycle at the 
same speed - not much will happen to that, even if the signs of the firm are changed to whatever.
Overall, cultural issues seem to be taken seriously in Stora Enso’s mergers and acquisitions. 
Ansaharju personally considers cultural issues to be equally important compared to strategic 
issues and synergies in mergers and acquisitions. As mentioned earlier, the management of 
cultural issues and the accumulated experience thereof has been perceived to improve the 
post-merger performance, which in turn motivates in allocating resources to those issues in 
the future as well. Ansaharju emphasizes, however, that every merger is unique, and that 
although preparation and standard procedures help, it is up to the team responsible for the 
implementation of the merger or acquisition to make the transaction a success.
4.1.1.1 Tampella Forest
Enso Group acquired Tampella Forest from Tampella Group in 1993. The purpose of the deal 
was to increase the size of the acquiring company. The two parties operated in the same 
industry sector, and it was considered very important that they work together in terms of 
organizational integration. The transaction was a pure acquisition and Enso was determined to 
impose its own organizational culture and systems on Tampella Forest (when prompted to 
evaluate how keen the other party was on preserving their own culture on a scale of 1, not at 
all, to 5, very much, a subjective rating of 5 was given by Tolvanen).
Although Tampella Forest was known to have a strong organizational culture (“they even had 
their own common songbook”), the differences were not thought to be significant. However, 
decision-making in Tampella Forest had been relatively unconstrained, and the involvement
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of Enso forced Tampella Forest to take into account all the parts of the acquiring company, 
thereby considerably limiting their freedom to make decisions. This, according to Tolvanen, 
might have caused some resistance to change. People in Tampella Forest also believed that 
they knew better how to operate in a small community and were quite keen on preserving 
their own systems and practices (a 4 by Tolvanen). Nevertheless, after some arguments on the 
matter, the practices applied in Enso were adopted in Tampella Forest.
The mindset of the people in Tampella Forest towards the acquisition was not seen as 
specifically enthusiastic, and accordingly, Enso was not considered a specifically attractive 
acquirer. However, the financial state of Tampella Group was relatively poor (as was the state 
of all the Finnish forest companies at that time due to the recession in Finland), and Tampella 
Group had basically no other choice but to sell Tampella Forest.
The integration mostly involved the integration of different functions, such as sales, logistics, 
accounting and computer systems. Tolvanen does not recall whether any cultural management 
took place, but says that in time, the cultural differences gave way and the Enso culture 
prevailed.
A year or two after the acquisition took place, the market conditions improved significantly, 
allowing Enso to reap the benefits of the acquisition, i.e. the cash flows initiated by Tampella 
Forest. Whether it was due to good luck or outstanding know-how in the matter, the deal 
could overall be considered a big success.
4.1.1.2 Stora Enso
The merger between the Finnish government-owned Enso and Swedish investor-owned Stora 
was confirmed in December 1998 (announced in June 1998). The purpose of the deal was to 
increase the company size. Another motivation for the deal was the Finnish government’s 
desire to reduce its ownership in the company in a controlled manner, i.e. without excessively 
disturbing the markets. The merger was thought to be a “merger among equals”. Both 
companies operated in the same industry and complete integration of the two parties was the
objective.
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According to the “merger among equals”-principle, the intention was not to impose either 
company’s existing culture. It was seen as essential to form a distinct management for the new 
company. A new culture was to be created and a program to accomplish this goal was 
developed as soon as the deal was confirmed. The objective of the program was to come up 
with the mission, vision and values of the newly-merged company. (Ansahaiju in Erkkilä 
2001,209).
What comes to integrating the ways in which things were done in the two companies, the idea 
was to look for best practices. The practice chosen was, according to Tolvanen, at times quite 
difficult to accept by the party that had to change. The fact that best practices were sought 
after did, nevertheless, help in overcoming situations where there were disagreements on 
whose practice to adopt. Generally speaking, Tolvanen rated Stora’s resistance to change as a 
4, as some disagreements did arise although it was initially clear that the best practices would 
prevail.
One of the cultural differences encountered mentioned by Tolvanen stemmed from the fact 
that Stora had a longer history than Enso. Stora had had a very important position in Sweden, 
boasted a strong organizational culture and its employees were “genuinely proud of their 
company”. The fact that the Finnish counterpart was a younger company that had grown to 
approximately the same size and power in a much shorter period of time was initially an issue 
that the Swedes did not seem to take well. The mindset of the people at Stora towards the 
merger was, however, perceived by Tolvanen to be neutral for the most part and “the higher in 
the organization, probably the more necessary the merger was thought to be”.
The other cultural difference pointed out by Tolvanen was the difference in decision-making. 
Enso had a more centralized decision-making process, and therefore the headquarters was 
strongly involved and the cooperation between the different divisions of the company was 
quite limited. Decision-making in Stora, on the other hand, was more dispersed.
In addition to the decision-making discussed above, the differences between the two parties 
listed by Ansahaiju (in Erkkilä 2001) were differences in the degree of internationalization, 
structure of ownership, organizational structure, management style as well as values and 
attitudes (to some extent). Ansahaiju also mentioned history, but he meant differences in the
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more recent history of the two firms. On the other hand, the similarities in the organizational 
cultures between the two stemmed from the fact that both compames operated in the same 
industry, had similar products and the same market, as well as the same infrastructure and a 
similar structure of fixed assets. (Ansaharju in in Erkkilä 2001, 208-209).
By the means of a comparative table, Ansaharju (in Erkkilä 2001) also depicted the 
differences they had encountered in the organizational cultures between the three most 
important countries involved in Stora Enso’s business operations: Finland, Sweden and 
Germany (see Table 7). The differences between these three cultures were thought to be 
“small, but significant”. (Ansaharju in Erkkilä 2001, 209). The national cultural differences 
brought up by Tolvanen were the ones presented above in section 4.4.2, i.e. the differences 
between Finnish, Swedish and German decision-making modes, the language issue and the 
Finland-Sweden national contest -thinking evident in some interactions.
Table 7: Comparison between Three Different Organizational Cultores
Source: Ansaharju in Erkkilä (2001,209)
Finland Sweden Germany
Rules vs. Relations Rules and processes are 
respected
A more flexible 
adaptation according to 
situation at hand
Rules and processes
Group vs. Individual Set clear objectives that 
require individual 
initiative
Consensus is respected Mutual objectives, 
individual 
achievements in
distinct order
Expression of Feelings Reserved/neutral Neutral/reserved Neutral, but feelings 
are expressed more
Participation Direct Indirect Direct, task roles 
respected
Position in Relation to Position dependent on Position based on more Position based more on
Achievements results (short/long­
term)
durable factors,
egalitarianism
important
experience and age
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According to Tolvanen, a factor which hampered the beginning of the integration process was 
the fact that it took half a year before the European Union granted Stora Enso permission to 
proceed with the merger after its announcement. The time spent waiting for the EU decision 
was thought to be difficult, because everyone planned for the future, but could not begin 
implementing the plans before the deal was confirmed. On the other hand, Tolvanen stated 
that as soon as the confirmation was received, thorough plans for the integration were ready 
and the process took place in an efficient manner.
The cultural management of the merger was handled through a cultural integration program, 
which incorporated a 100-day planning period. This project was lead by a management team 
consisting of the deputy CEO and 4 members of the board of directors, 2 from each party. The 
first task of the project was to carry out a survey to evaluate the values and attitudes of both 
parties with the help of outside experts. The results were used to plan training sessions, which 
were voluntary and open to all. The survey was renewed a year and a half later. Although the 
survey did not result in immediate changes in all problem areas, the process as a whole was 
appreciated by the personnel, because it showed that the management took these issues 
seriously. (Ansaharju in Erkkilä 2001, 209-210).
The other major task during this program was to come up with the new values of the merged 
company. The values (as well as the mission and vision) were first formed in a seminar of 100 
managers and then tested in different units of the company and modified accordingly. When 
they were completed, they, along with the new overall strategy of the company, were 
presented at a Top-200 seminar (involving 200 people), which took place approximately five 
months after the confirmation of the deal. The process by which the new values would be 
driven into the company was named “walk the talk” and the responsibility of its 
implementation was given to line management. The central part of this process consisted of 
one-day workshops (organized with the help of consultants) open to all 40 000 Stora Enso 
employees and those who participated received a memo card with the new values printed on 
it. Overall, the project was thought to be a success and it was perceived to be helpful in 
accelerating the integration. (Ansahaiju in Erkkilä 2001, 210-212).
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Communication was an integral part of the integration process and it was, according to 
Tolvanen, very well taken care of. The communication material was ready from day one, and 
everyone was kept informed on how things were proceeding.
According to Ansaharju, the assessment of the existing values and attitudes of the company, 
the creation of new values by the top management together with the organization, and 
committing people to these values can have a significant impact on the success of the 
acquisition. All in all, the lessons learned on the cultural management of mergers and 
acquisitions were the following:
■ Speed is decisive.
■ Integration processes should be planned, logical and earned out without delay.
■ The organization must be kept informed at all times.
■ The new company should have a clear governance.
■ The personality and style of the CEO matters.
- The example of executives and top managers matters.
(Ansaharju in Erkkilä 2001, 214).
The long term objective of the deal was to obtain the size and market position needed to allow 
Stora Enso to become one of the five or so leading companies foreseen to remain in this 
industry in the world in the next 10 or 20 years. The short term objectives included several 
financial goals. Stora Enso, according to Tolvanen, performed quite well in meeting the short 
term financial goals at least until the slowdown of the economy in 2001. According to 
Tolvanen, the deal was “the right thing to do”.
4.1.1.3 Consolidated Papers
Consolidated Papers was an American producer of coated papers, which Stora Enso acquired 
in 2000. The purpose of the deal was to “gain a foothold” (a 10-15 % market share) in the 
world’s largest markets, i.e. in the United States. The transaction was a pure acquisition - 
Consolidated Papers was in a rather poor financial state and the need to be acquired was 
obvious. The companies were very much related (operating with the same product portfolio), 
but it was not seen as important that the two companies work together in terms of 
organizational integration. Stora Enso’s desire to impose its own culture was rated by
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Ansahaiju as a 4 or 5. He explained that they applied an umbrella model, where the top 
consisted of the values, vision and mission of the company, but under which the acquired 
party was allowed to carry on some of its own practices. It was also important that most of the 
local managers were retained.
The anticipated cultural differences stemmed from differences in management styles. Stora 
Enso had a more dispersed management, based on empowerment, while Consolidated Papers 
applied a more hierarchical and centralized management. The Consolidated Papers employees 
had less freedom in decision-making than their Stora Enso counterparts.
Consolidated Papers was perceived by Ansahaiju to be “terribly enthusiastic” about the 
acquisition. As mentioned above, they knew that the company was for sale, and they wished 
that the acquirer would be European because an American acquirer would probably have 
restructured the company more vigorously, resulting in more lay-offs. Although Stora Enso 
was not that well known at the factory floor level, the management knew it well and perceived 
it to be an attractive choice for an acquirer.
There was not too much resistance to change (a 3 by Ansahaiju), although the people at 
Consolidated Papers were perceived to be very committed to the firm. The need to change had 
to be well presented and explanations on what the change process would mean on the 
individual level had to be given in order to overcome the resistance.
The cultural management of the acquisition took place according to the process described in 
the general section (4.4.3) concerning Stora Enso’s cultural management. In other words, the 
values and attitudes survey was carried out and the communication of Stora Enso’s mission, 
vision and values took place. Intercultural management courses were also arranged, as well as 
other in-house training sessions. Numerous methods and channels of communication were 
used.
As mentioned above, the main objective of the deal was to gain foothold in the US market, in 
other words to build a platform there for later expansion. According to Ansahaiju, the goals 
pertaining to cultural integration and synergies were met, but the financial goals were not, 
which was attributed to a dismal market situation specifically in the coated papers. Tolvanen
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also pointed out that Stora Enso has openly admitted that it simply paid €1 billion too much 
for the company. The deal can therefore not be considered a success in the short term, but the 
anticipation is that it will turn out to be one in the long term.
4.1.2 Nordea 
M&A Process
Nordea does not utilize a documented process in its mergers and acquisitions nor does it have 
a department specifically in charge of the company’s M&A activity. Instead, mergers and 
acquisitions are handled in project teams and the team members are chosen depending on the 
target and situation at hand. The team is usually led by a corporate level manager of the 
business area in question (retail banking, investment banking etc.), who shares the 
responsibility of the transaction together with a person from the company s strategic planning 
department. The other members of the team include people from taxation, accounting and 
legal matters. External consultants are generally also employed. The human resource 
department becomes strongly involved in the process in the integration phase.
Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
Both national and organizational cultural differences have been acknowledged to exist, and 
both, according to Palin-Lehtinen, have to be taken into account when engaging in mergers 
and acquisitions. Although it is often very difficult to separate these two levels of cultural 
differences, the effect of organizational cultural differences has been perceived to be stronger 
than that of national culture. Other levels of cultural differences, such as industry and business 
culture, have not been seen to affect mergers and acquisitions a great deal, as Nordea’s M&A 
activity largely pertains to the same industry, i.e. banking. The trade is very established and 
controlled, and the international players all abide to the same rules, thereby resulting in a 
relatively low level of differences in business culture.
According to Palin-Lehtinen, the reasons why cultural conflicts can arise include the fact that 
the change process involved in all mergers is always difficult and contains a lot of emotion. 
Another reason is the lack of knowledge, such as making decisions concerning the accounting 
practices of the corporation without taking into account the fact that different countries have 
different accounting laws. Language issues have also been perceived to cause problems,
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specifically problems coming from thinking in one language and speaking in another. Palin- 
Lehtinen explains:
Everyone speaks English. But we nevertheless think in our so called home language. And we 
translate from that home language to English. Let’s take a matter as simple as “utmärket”. In 
Danish it is by no means “utmärkt” [excellent in Swedish], but it is “ok”... I recall explaining 
something to my current superior, and he looked obviously sour and did not like what I was saying. 
But he repeatedly said ‘bitmärket, utmärket”, until I understood that it wasn’t [excellent]... And yet 
a Dane himself would translate it as “excellent”. ..And although we all speak good English, when it 
sounds like we [Finns] are being extremely impolite or stupid, it is not necessarily so, but we’re 
translating from our own language. And that is quite a dangerous point.
Finally, Palin-Lehtinen pointed out that growing through mergers rather than acquisitions, as 
Nordea (or its predecessors) has done, is more demanding. Especially mergers between equals 
are seen as very difficult and time-consuming. As Palin-Lehtinen stated, “If Citybank were to 
acquire us, we would receive a manual. But here we have always created that manual, which 
naturally makes [the process] slower.”
Whether domestic mergers have succeeded better than cross-border mergers is difficult to say, 
since Nordea has only recently engaged in the latter. Cross-border mergers have, however, 
been perceived to be easier than domestic ones. This is due to the reason that the nature of the 
cross-border mergers has been more positive than that of the domestic mergers. Domestic 
mergers in banking have been and still are largely “restructuring cases”, which can result in 
significant numbers of lay-offs and which therefore entail a lot of emotion. Cross-border 
mergers, on the other hand, involve growth and the “building of something new”, thereby 
constituting an easier situation.
Management of Cultural Factors
Although no official cultural analysis is made in the early stages of the merger, the people 
involved at that stage are, according to Palin-Lehtinen, experienced enough to take cultural 
issues into consideration. At the early stages, a “matter as small as the CEOs of the firms not 
liking each other” can prevent the deal from proceeding.
In the beginning of the negotiations leading to a merger, the representatives of the two parties 
together develop the vision for the new company, and this vision is then often referred to later 
in the negotiation phase. The rough draft of the vision is typically written on two or three
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sheets of paper, and it contains thoughts on what the new bank will look like and what its 
purpose and areas of emphasis will be. Although consultants will transform the rough draft 
into a more “flamboyant” final version and although the vision may be modified later as well, 
the basic ideas that come up during the vision building session serve as an important tool in 
creating the organizational culture for the newly merged company. In other words, the 
negotiators and the top management of both parties have a good idea, before the 
announcement of the deal, of where the deal will be taking them and what the new culture 
should be built on.
As soon as the deal has been announced, teams are formed to begin assessing the type and 
magnitude of cultural management needed. The management depends largely on the situation 
at hand. In the merger between SYP and KOP, for example, the whole personnel went through 
a 3-4 day culture seminar, while the culture seminar process in the Merita-Nordbanken merger 
only involved those that would later be in contact together, i.e. mainly people working at the 
corporate level. These seminars are organized by the human resource and the human 
development departments together with the top management of the company, whose 
participation is seen as imperative. In Erkkilä (2001), Palin-Lehtinen specifically stressed the 
importance of the behavior of, and the example set by, the managers in charge of the merger 
or acquisition (Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001, 250).
Although company-wide communication can only take place after the announcement of the 
deal, the planning of the communication efforts begins earlier. Internal communication is 
thought to be crucial especially in cases, where restructuring and cost reduction is expected, 
and it is thus important that the communication is carefully planned and carried out.
All in all, Palin-Lehtinen sees cultural management as “terribly useful” if it is well 
incorporated in the overall management process. Palin-Lehtinen believes that it is possible to 
convey organizational culture change through the mission, vision and values of the company, 
even if this change “will, of course, not happen over night”. What comes to national cultural 
differences, however, it is seen as useless to try and change them, instead “you just have to 
understand them”.
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Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance 
In order to assess whether its mergers or acquisitions have met their objectives, Nordea draws 
up business cases against which it can then compare the actual performance. The business 
cases relate to each business area in question, and the different business areas are responsible 
for their own performance. The business case comparisons are made for two or three years, 
although it has been acknowledged that the more time passes, the more the environment will 
change, and the benefit from these comparisons will become quite vague.
The management of cultural factors has been perceived to improve the post-merger 
organizational performance. Cultural management, according to Palin-Lehtinen, allows the 
two parties to get to know each other and to set mutual objectives together, and this, in turn, 
has been perceived to reduce conflicts. Also, as Palin-Lehtinen stated from her own personal 
experience: “If you perform [the cultural management] well, the [M&A] process becomes 
easier. It doesn’t become a whole lot quicker, but it becomes easier”.
A sound cultural management will also help in the long run - if, for example, the cultural 
integration has been well managed in one merger, the cultural integration of subsequent 
mergers will become much easier. This has, for example, been evident from Nordea’s 
employee satisfaction indexes, which are partly based on cultural survey questions. The 
departments, where the earlier cultural integration has been successful (“where people already 
happily function in a Nordic way”) have higher indexes than the departments that have not 
been as active in the earlier cultural integration processes.
Generally speaking, the mindset towards cultural differences in mergers and acquisitions in 
Nordea, according to Palin-Lehtinen, is that they have to be taken into account. The whole 
strategy of building a Nordic platform through which to achieve an important European 
foothold has been based on cultural considerations. The expansion begun with a Swedish 
partner “for the simple reason that although differences were known to exist, they were 
smaller than they would have been for example with the Dutch”. In that sense, cultural issues 
in Nordea are very much thought to go hand in hand with strategic considerations and 
separating the two is not always perceived to be possible.
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4.1.2.1 Merita
Merita was bom from the 1995 merger between Union Bank of Finland (SYP) and 
Kansallisosakepankki (KOP). The purpose of the deal was to restructure the banking industry, 
as there was too much banking capacity in Finland. The other reason for the merger was the 
fact that “KOP was simply running out of options”. SYP itself was not in a great state 
financially due to the recent banking crisis, but it was much better off than KOP. Therefore, 
although the two banks were approximately of the same size and the merger was dubbed a 
merger of equals, SYP held the stronger position. The two compames were very much related 
and it was essential, both psychologically and financially, that the two parties start working 
together without delay.
Although SYP was the stronger party, its intention, according to Palin-Lehtinen, was not to 
impose its own culture, but to “sincerely” try and develop the new Merita culture. The central 
tool for achieving this new culture was to create a new, common value base. The method used 
in integration was either to apply the best practice found in either party or to create an entirely 
new practice. (Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001, 247-248). The result was that the SYP way of 
doing things prevailed in areas, where it had been stronger, i.e. the international and the large 
corporate sectors, while KOP had more influence in the retail banking sector. This, Palin- 
Lehtinen pointed out, had its effect on how the cultures in these sectors turned out to be. In 
some issues SYP was, however, keen on holding on to its own culture (a 3 by Palin-Lehtinen). 
One of these issues was the fact that SYP was more scrupulous in for example its accounting 
habits.
The main difference between SYP and KOP came up in the study conducted after the 
announcement of the deal concerning each party’s perception of the other party. SYP was 
thought to be “cooler and more correct” (“SYP people give dry kisses on the cheek”), while 
KOP was thought as “more aggressive” (“KOP people swear”). Decision-making was very 
much alike in the two banks largely due to the rules and regulations of the trade. The board of 
directors in SYP was, however, as Palin-Lehtinen had learned, more “collegial and 
collectively responsible” than that in KOP, where the thinking was more of the line that “the 
boy does, if he succeeds, he will get a raise, if not, he will get the boot”.
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The merger was, according to Palin-Lehtinen, a “total shock” for the KOP employees. They 
had made a huge effort in order to save their company and suddenly were faced with a merger 
with their “worse enemy”. The two banks had been each other’s most important competitors 
for almost 150 years, and both the employees as well as the customers of each bank were 
strongly, sometimes even emotionally, committed to their own bank. The two parties were 
often perceived to form separate camps. (Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001,245). The SYP party 
initially had a positive mindset towards the merger, until they realized that the lay-offs 
actually involved themselves as well. The fact that the personnel of 18 000 had to be cut back 
by over 30% did not improve the mindset of either party. What comes to the attractiveness of 
the acquirer — “both parties despised each other”. When inquired how keen KOP was on 
preserving its culture, Palin-Lehtinen rated it “absolutely a 5”, implying that they held on 
tightly to their own practices.
The cultural management began with the analysis of the perception of differences mentioned 
above, conducted with the help of external consultants. The role of external consultants was 
perceived to be extremely important throughout the whole integration. The process with 
which the value base for the new company was to be created was called the KIDE process. 
The process began approximately three months after the announcement of the deal, i.e. after 
the decisions concerning the restructuring had been finalized (“because it is difficult for 
people to become motivated to a common organizational culture, if they don’t know if they 
have a job”). The process was implemented in a “waterfall system”, i.e. the top management 
participated first, which then conducted the discussions at the area manager level, which then 
took care of the task at the next level and so forth. The role and example of the leaders was 
very important. The meetings were held in groups of about 20, half of the participants coming 
from SYP and half from KOP. The groups were also mixed in terms of business area 
backgrounds to prevent the discussion from becoming too technical in nature. The sessions 
lasted for about two days, the first day concentrating on the perceived differences and the 
prejudices of each party and ending in the values, vision and mission of Merita. The second 
day was consecrated to building the new company. The sessions were repeated in the same 
groups about six months later. The process was thought to be time-consuming and exhausting, 
but it helped in speeding up the overall integration process.
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The major goal of the merger was, in addition to restructuring the banking industry, to 
increase the company’s volume, which is essential in the international banking business. The 
goal was met and the deal could be considered a success. Although the cultural integration 
was extremely difficult, it too, was considered a success. When Merita merged with 
Nordbanken in 1998, “it was truly a merger between Merita and a Swedish bank instead of a 
merger between two separate Finnish banks and a Swedish bank” (Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 
2001, 248).
4.1.2.2 Merita-Nordbanken
The merger between Merita and Swedish Nordbanken took place in January 1998 (announced 
in 1997). The purpose of the deal was to begin building a platform for Nordic expansion, 
which was in accordance with the strategy of both companies. The merger was thought to be a 
merger of equals - both parties were in a sound financial state, the Swedish party being just 
marginally stronger at that stage. The companies were very much related, operating in the 
same industry, i.e. banking, with involvement in life insurance. The only difference in the 
general operations in addition to the different home markets was Merita s fairly large 
involvement in real estate.
Merita, according to Palin-Lehtinen, was somewhat keen on preserving its own culture in this 
case (a rating of 3), but the main idea was to be equal and try to find and apply the best 
practices. In contrast with the SYP-KOP case, the intention was not to fully integrate the two 
companies. Retail banking, which is very local in nature, was not perceived to benefit from 
organizational integration (“branches in Odense and Kuopio have very little synergies to be 
found”), and therefore these operations continued in both countries at the customer interface 
level as they had prior to the merger. Organizational integration was, however, seen as very 
important in corporate functions and areas such as the large corporate customer sector, the 
international sector, the treasury and centralized production and support units (including the 
units supporting retail banking). In other words, integration took place in areas where 
synergies could be found at a Nordic or global level (e.g. merging the Singapore offices) or 
units which supported or intended to support business units at a Nordic level.
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Furthermore, since the objective from the beginning of the deal was to create a Nordic bank, 
Merita-Nordbanken was seen as a step toward this objective rather than a final outcome. The 
intention was therefore not to create a new name or image for the newly merged company, and 
the local banks continued to operate with their old names, while a combination of the names 
was used at the corporate level. (Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001, 249).
Cultural differences were anticipated both because of the different corporate histories and 
corporate cultures as well as the different nationalities of the two companies. Examples of 
differences encountered in the national cultures were differences in decision-making and the 
concept of time. A Swede tends to want to discuss matters beforehand and prepare, while a 
Finn acts and thinks later. Swedes become committed to the plans during the planning phase, 
Finns during the implementation. These matters have to be taken into account when for 
example setting timetables. In other words, if a decision is expected by a certain date, the 
Swedish party must be given more time to prepare than their Finnish counterparts. (Palin- 
Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001, 251). Another difference encountered stemmed from speaking one 
language and thinking in another. Even small differences in expressions could cause grave 
misunderstandings and lead to problems.
According to Palin-Lehtinen, everyone at the management level involved in the merger was 
quite enthusiastic about it, as it was perceived to be a clear step towards the implementation 
of a Nordic strategy. The Swedish party would probably have preferred a merger with one of 
the other large Swedish banks, and it was concerned about the Finnish party’s real estate 
holdings, but Merita was thought of as the “next best alternative”. A rating of 3 was given to 
the question of how keen Nordbanken was on retaining its culture, since the equality and best 
practice -principles were again the driving forces.
The cultural management concerning the whole organization consisted of communicating the 
mission, vision and values of the newly merged company. Culture seminars were organized 
for senior management as well as for those working cross-border. Culture seminars were also 
arranged in different business areas, and specifically in the units that were organizationally 
integrated. The KIDE process developed in the SYP-KOP case was applied to some extent in 
the areas where cultural integration took place. These efforts were managed by the group
76
executive management, the business area management (where the business areas were 
involved) and the human resource department.
The main goal of the deal was to begin building a Nordic financial services group. Other 
objectives included synergies such as larger production units (and thereby smaller cost per 
unit) and cross selling. The goals were met, and are still being met “increasingly every day”. 
The deal could “definitely” be considered a success in the sense that it gave a good platform 
for new growth, but in accordance with the Nordic strategy, the deal has been followed by two 
other mergers among equals (with the Danish Unibank and the Norwegian Christiania Banken 
to form Nordea), and therefore “the total picture of the Merita-Nordbanken deal has become a 
little blurred”.
4.1.3 Datex-Ohmeda 
M&A Process
Mergers and acquisitions in Datex-Ohmeda (D-О) support the implementation of the 
company’s strategy. The strategy, which is debated continuously at different internal forums, 
is not usually to achieve growth, but rather pertains to the core businesses of the company. If a 
gap has been perceived to exist or a section of the business needs to be accelerated, D-0 will 
wait for an opportunity to arise, and seize it. In other words, the company does not proactively 
seek for target companies, and an “opportunistic dimension” is therefore involved.
D-0 does not apply a documented process for managing mergers and acquisitions at a general 
level, including specific instructions on what to do. Instead, the company has created an 
“acquisition culture”, in other words it employs a number of people with acquisition-specific 
know-how. When a new acquisition is planned, both people who possess prior experience in 
acquisitions, as well as new people are involved in order to maintain the pool of knowledge. 
Instrumentarium’s global HR-director, along with a network of HR-people, takes part in the 
M&A activity from the start.
In addition to utilizing people with know-how when engaging in new acquisitions, D-0 is 
assisted by several “internal benchmarking cases”, i.e. the documented processes of previous 
acquisitions. These cases include the extensively documented post-merger management
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process of the Ohmeda acquisition, which is considered to be a sort of a “reference standard”. 
And finally, D-0 has built strong relationships with leading banks (such as Credit Suisse), law 
firms (e.g. Schermann-Sterling) and consulting firms (e.g. McKinsey and Mercer), whose 
services they rely on on a case-to-case basis.
What comes to consultants, in Erkkilä (2001) Ritvos pointed out that the need is not so much 
for the know-how of these experts, but to ensure that the process involves people who are not 
emotionally committed to the company. It is easier for these people to question issues and 
make more objective observations than for those physically and emotionally closer to the 
firm. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001,217).
Although D-0 does not follow a documented process on how to handle mergers and 
acquisitions in general, the guidelines on how to proceed are clear. According to Ritvos, D-0 
is very quick in its M&A activities compared to most of its competitors, which in turn is 
perceived to be an obvious advantage.
Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
The cultural levels that have been identified to affect mergers and acquisitions are national, 
industry and organizational culture. All of them have to be taken into account, specifically 
from the point of view of “what to do with these people or with us” in order to make the 
transaction as successful as possible. Although Ritvos stated that the importance of 
differences at each of these cultural levels varied from case to case and could therefore not say 
which affected mergers and acquisitions the most, he actually emphasized the differences in 
business culture in his examples, such as the one below.
In the Ohmeda acquisition, for example, Datex and Ohmeda operated in the same industry and 
had mutual customers, but as the former was focused in a business concentrating on 
ventilators and the latter in monitors, the difference between the two parties’ way of thinking 
was considerable. “More considerable than the difference between Americans and 
Europeans.” Meanwhile, they were surprised to perceive that there was a very small cultural 
difference between the R&D units of D-0 and the American monitor technology firm Space 
Labs, which they acquired in 2002. The integration of the latter has been “surprisingly easy”; 
it has been “very easy to communicate, which comes in a way from the [mutual]
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understanding of the industry...”. Some of this easiness can, however, be attributed to the fact 
that D-0 learned to “understand America” during the Ohmeda acquisition.
When inquired about what actually causes cultural conflicts, Ritvos pointed out that a conflict 
is an extreme situation and that cultural differences rather emerge as miscommunication than 
conflicts. One of the factors brought up, however, was the issue of differing paradigms as 
presented by the following example:
...When an ant is in a mug and someone is on the outside and a detail of the mug is being 
discussed, there may the perception that the color of the mug is such and such, and they may come 
to terms about it But if the size of the mug or the size of the world in relation to the mug is being 
discussed, one doesn’t ask questions but makes all sorts of assumptions. If the ant builds an 
airplane inside the mug, it turns out to be very different from the one built by the one outside, 
although they are both talking about making a journey around the world. These are the most 
difficult issues that can be seen for years...If the industries are even remotely different, then these 
are dominating [issues].
In addition to identifying the problematic behind differing paradigms, D-0 has studied how 
differences in national cultures can affect performance. In order to do so, D-0 has for example 
utilized the services of a consulting firm (owned by Richard Lewis), which specializes in 
cultural differences (e.g. the analysis of different national characteristics). Examples of 
differences in communication styles that can cause problems if they are not understood to 
stem from cultural differences were evident in the following account given by Ritvos:
...When you listen to an American and what he has done and a Finn, you can easily get, as an 
external observer, a feeling that the American has accomplished a significant amount of things 
while the Finn hasn’t done anything. But then, when you look at the results, you may notice that it 
was the other way around. ...Or a Frenchman thinks that everybody’s an idiot and that everything 
has either collapsed or is the other extreme, fantastic, nothing [in between]. And when you listen to 
a Frenchman fuss and abuse everything, when in the mood, then in engineering terms this signal 
has bias and static.. .and one has to learn to filter them in order to get to the core.
According to Ritvos, however, more important than the cultural background is the 
sociological profile (or the social behavior) and the personality of the individual. In other 
words, the same type of individual can be found in all nationalities, among the Japanese, 
Americans and Finns alike”.
And finally, in Erkkilä (2001), Ritvos stated that if the two parties in a merger or acquisition 
are similar in size or if the acquisition is otherwise significant in size or unusually
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complicated, understanding the other party’s differences becomes increasingly important. 
(Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001,216).
Management of Cultural Factors
The management of cultural factors in D-0 very much pertains to the integration phase. The 
company follows an established and very structured integration process, which includes 
cultural considerations. The process begins right after the announcement of the deal by a 100- 
day integration planning process. This planning process involves a number of integration 
teams and regular meetings between team leaders and management.
External consultants are also employed after the announcement of the deal in order to assess 
the cultural differences between the two parties. Cross-cultural training sessions may then be 
arranged according to the findings of the consultants.
According to Ritvos, the most important tools in managing cultural factors are 1) A “very 
transparent” communication of the issues that can generally be communicated and 2) The fact 
that all decisions are made very clear and simple and that they are based on concrete facts. 
These facts should be such that they are understood in the same manner by all (e.g. arithmetic 
numbers, universal units of measurement or specific customers).
In Erkkilä (2001), Ritvos claimed that the role and the personality of the integration leader are 
significant in mergers and acquisitions. He also maintained that the integration should be 
carried out swiftly, although he acknowledged the fact that the creation of common values can 
in practice usually only take place after the operational matters and the organizational 
structure have been attended to. Furthermore, he pointed out that if the acquired company is 
clearly smaller than the acquirer, a discussion on values does not normally take place as such, 
since the acquirer’s values tend to be adopted by the acquired party. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 
218-219).
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Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance 
The objectives of mergers and acquisitions in D-0 include financial goals such as synergies 
pertaining to growth in sales and reduction in costs. Objectives associated to the integration 
management include objectives concerning the headcount of the company. The assessment of 
whether the acquisition process has succeeded is an on/off issue - whether the acquisition was 
made or not. The measurements of the implementation of the integration consist of different 
operational objectives, such as whether salaries are paid without disruption and whether 
accounting practices are integrated efficiently and so that they comply with all local laws.
According to Ritvos, the management of cultural factors has absolutely improved the 
performance of mergers and acquisitions over tune. Cultural issues are generally given a lot of 
attention in D-О, and the personal opinion of Ritvos is that it is “a dominating factor” in 
mergers and acquisitions along with the strategic fit. Cultural differences are also perceived to 
be “a central reason that may screw up the post-merger management” and cause very 
expensive mistakes, the other central reason being unclear objectives. Cultural differences 
have, at some point, even been the reason to abandon a deal.
As a point of interest to conclude the general section on Datex-Ohmeda, the company is about 
to face a new challenge in the context of mergers and acquisitions. General Electric (GE), 
which is one of the largest corporations in the United States (310 000 employees, net sales 
€123 billion in 2001), has offered to acquire Instrumentarium for €2 billion (Raeste & Rossi 
2002, Dl). The deal will be realized as long as at least 80% of Instrumentarium’s shareholders 
consent by the 11th of April 2003 (subject also to the authorities’ approval) (Raeste 2003, D3). 
What the American giant will do with its acquisition, once the deal is realized, remains to be 
seen.
4.1.3.1 Engström
Engström was one of the business units of the Swedish multinational Gambro Ab. Engström 
was focused in anesthesia and critical care, a business area in which Gambro no longer 
wanted to operate. At the same time Datex had, after strategic deliberations, come to the 
conclusion that expanding its operations from anesthesia to critical care was desirable. And
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therefore, as Engström was up for sale, Datex seized the opportunity to begin its expansion in 
this field by making the acquisition in 1994.
The deal was considered a pure acquisition — Engström was clearly smaller than 
Instrumentarium, and also smaller than the Datex unit, the number of employees being around 
500 compared to Datex’s 700. They were also in a considerably poorer financial state 
(approximately at break-even) than Datex. The two parties operated in the same industry and 
in a very similar manner, in other words they both independently engaged in production, R&D 
and global marketing. Their products were partly overlapping and partly supplementing.
The Datex culture was very much thought to be the dominant culture of the combination, and 
when inquired how keen Datex was on imposing its own culture on a scale of 1, not at all, to 
5, very much, Ahjopalo rated it a 4. It was also considered very important that the two parties 
work together in terms of organizational integration, as for example the aim was to have a 
mutual sales channel so that from the customer’s point of view, there would be no difference 
between the two.
Engström’s headquarters and factory were located in Sweden, and although national cultural 
differences between Sweden and Finland were acknowledged to exist, they were perceived to 
be such that “one could live with them”. A more important difference was perceived to stem 
from the fact that Engström had not been one of Gambro’s core businesses, and had not been 
invested in for a long time. It was therefore believed that a certain ambition and “dynamic 
grip” on things, which Datex was thought to possess, would be missing. On the other hand, as 
Engström’s products were more critical (life-supporting) in nature than those of Datex, it was 
believed that Engström would have a strongly established quality- or safety-oriented culture, 
more so than Datex. And finally, the acquisition incorporated a production and subcontracting 
unit in Italy, which they only had very vague information on and which was known to have 
strong local bonds. They therefore assumed that they would encounter problems in its 
integration.
Because of the fact that Engström had been “a sort of an orphan” in Gambro, they were quite 
enthusiastic about being acquired by a company that focused in their line of business. They 
also knew Datex beforehand, and perceived it to be an attractive company. Because Engström
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had previously had to operate on scarce resources, the decision making had been more 
financially oriented, but otherwise Ahjopalo did not believe that the level of freedom to make 
decisions at Engström changed much after the acquisition.
There was some desire by the Engström people to preserve their own culture (rated a 3 on the 
subjective scale by Ahjopalo), but the need to impose Datex’s culture became evident 
especially from two issues: First of all, the Swedish decision-making mode of discussion, 
negotiation and consensus could not be applied in some of the painful decisions , such as the 
termination of certain projects, but a more direct way of management was required. And 
secondly, the expectation that Engström would have a stronger quality culture than Datex 
turned out to be false. Instead, Datex had to actively drive the culture of quality and listening 
to the customer into the acquired unit. Engström also needed help from Datex in solving some 
of the major issues it had with some of its products.
No process as such was followed in the implementation of the acquisition, but instead it was, 
“if not improvised, pretty much planned as we went”. Right after the announcement of the 
deal, a consultant was hired to assess the cultural differences between the two firms. But since 
the findings of the consultant were that despite some historical considerations, the cores of the 
two cultures were quite similar, not much cultural management was needed. Some cross- 
cultural training was utilized, but in a very small extent.
The most important goal of the deal was to achieve supplementing product know-how, a 
stronger sales channel and an installed base of equipment (i.e. customers, who already owned 
these products). Another motivation for the deal was the fact that the Engström name was 
perceived to have a certain value as a brand. The goals pertaining to building the sales channel 
were attained, but the products and the level of product know-how turned out to be a 
disappointment. They had not been as valuable as Datex had anticipated. The deal did 
therefore not financially meet all the expectations, but it took Datex strategically a big step 
forward in the right direction. If the same resources had been invested in for example organic 
growth, Datex may have been able to get quite far as well, but how far, is hard to say.
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4.1.3.2 Datex-Ohmeda
The Ohmeda acquisition took place in 1998, the closing taking place on April 4th. Ohmeda 
was the medical business unit of the British industrial gas company BOC Group Ltd, which 
actually sold Ohmeda to a consortium of three different acquirers. Ohmeda was therefore split 
into three, Instrumentarium obtaining the Ohmeda Medical Systems Division (MSD) and 
Specialty Products Division (SPD). SPD continued operating as an independent unit, while 
MSD (which will simply be referred to as Ohmeda from now on) merged with the Datex- 
Engström (Datex) unit. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 200).
The fundamental, and strongly strategic, purpose of the deal was to assure the acquiring 
company’s position on the US market. Ohmeda and Datex operated in the same industry and 
customer sector and had different, but supplementing technologies. The organizational 
integration of the two parties was perceived to be crucial, as the distribution channels were 
united.
The transaction was considered to be a merger amongst equals - Ohmeda was clearly not 
financially as well off as Datex, but it was almost twice the size. Following the merger 
amongst equals -philosophy, the management, and especially the integration management, did 
not intend to impose the Datex-culture on the acquired company, but rather look for best 
practices from both cultures and allow some sort of a cultural variation to live. The general 
opinion, however, as well as the gut feeling of the Datex managers, was that even though 
Datex was the smaller party, as the owner and the driver in this case, its culture would prevail 
(a rating of 4 was given by Ritvos in how keen the acquiring firm was on imposing its 
culture).
The central difference between the two parties was that the Ohmeda people were thought of as 
“farmers” while the Datex counterparts were “hunters and inventors”. In other words, 
Ohmeda was in more of “an on-going, installed base -business”, while Datex was more 
concerned with finding new customers. Differences in the way of thinking also came from the 
differences in ventilator versus monitor businesses, as discussed earlier. The level of freedom 
in decision making in Ohmeda was perceived to be similar to that in Datex, although it, along 
with the level of responsibility, was increased in some areas after the acquisition.
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In addition to operating in the same industry and having the same customer base, the 
similarity between the two that facilitated the implementation of the deal was the fact that 
both parties shared the value of operating in an ethical manner, appreciating the customer and 
emphasizing the importance of patient security. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 219). This ethical 
reputation made Datex attractive and helped in building a positive response among the 
Ohmeda employees towards the acquisition. The Ohmeda top management, however, 
somewhat resisted the acquisition, because they lost a great deal of their power as the 
company was split into three (as explained above). When inquired about how keen Ohmeda 
was on preserving its culture, Ritvos responded that it was at least a 4, in other words they 
*: were quite determined to do so.
To manage the integration, D-0 applied a structured 100-day integration planning process, 
involving over 20 integration teams. The team leaders and the management had a “massive 
coalition meeting” once a month. The aim was to have a 50-50 balance of personnel from 
both sides present in these meetings. The responsibility of implementing the plan was given to 
the line organization. The follow-up was the responsibility of a Datex-Ohmeda management 
group that consisted of 6 or 7 people, two of whom came from Ohmeda. Consultants were 
employed and the role of strong leadership was emphasized (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 216- 
217).
Communication was an integral part of the integration efforts. It was perceived to be very 
challenging and was therefore carefully planned from the very beginning. The objectives set 
for the communication efforts included openness, speed and consistency between internal and 
external communication. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 201). The initial similarity between the 
value bases of the two companies helped in the decisions concerning integration in the 
beginning of the process, but a deeper discussion on values is still an on-going issue in 
different levels of the company. (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001, 219).
The objective of the deal was to gain an increase in market share, but also included a number 
of specific, mostly financial objectives. These objectives were attained at 75%. The 
acquisition, according to Ritvos, could be considered a success. The integration was perceived 
to have proceeded quite nicely, but it did, nevertheless, take three years instead of the two
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allocated to it, in other words a year of efficient work was lost. The fact that the integration 
did not go as smoothly as had been planned was attributed to poor operational management 
and the underestimation of the challenge.
4.1.4 Outokumpu 
M&A Process
Most of Outokumpu’s M&A activity is handled by the business units of the company, which 
are supported in this activity by the business support unit (BSU) of the corporation. The BSU 
offers for example services in matters pertaining to law and human resource management. The 
corporate management only becomes involved in mergers and acquisitions if the deal is 
important enough to affect the business portfolio of the corporation.
As was mentioned in the introduction of the case company, mergers and acquisitions are an 
important part of the company’s strategy of growth and transformation. The acquisitions have 
to reflect and be in accordance with the objectives described in the strategies of the business 
units in order to be approved by the corporation.
Outokumpu employs an investment manual that describes how different issues should be 
handled when engaging in mergers and acquisitions. A documented integration process 
consisting of a checklist of things that have to be considered in integration is at the moment in 
the final stage of being documented and added to the investment manual. It incorporates 
mostly the integration processes of different functions, such as IT and accounting, but cultural 
issues have also been included.
Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
Although the fact that all companies have their own distinct culture has been acknowledged 
(“if we are located in Olari and acquire a company in Matinkylä, we already succeed in 
encountering cultural differences”), national cultural differences, and specifically the local 
habits or way of doing things, are perceived by Lassila to affect mergers and acquisitions the 
most. An example of how organizational cultural differences can, however, come to play, 
involves the acquisition of small companies. Lassila stated that a problem large corporations 
have is that they “kill successful small companies” by acquiring them. These firms (which
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employ less than 100 people)' often operate in a very entrepreneurial manner, and once they 
are incorporated and obliged to operate according to the habits of the corporation, the whole 
essence of the acquired firm is lost. Unless there is a well-determined need for a specific 
know-how, the acquisition of very small units should, according to Lassila, be avoided all 
together.
Even though Outokumpu has operations in over 40 countries (Outokumpu 2002), the largest 
“culture shocks” involving national cultural differences have originated from Sweden. The 
initial expectation when dealing with Swedes is that Finns and Swedes are very much alike. 
But as Outokumpu learned from its 1985 acquisition of a Swedish manufacturer of copper 
products which was much larger than the equivalent unit of Outokumpu, this is not always so. 
Lassila describes:
When we started to put these [two companies] together, we went in there in this Finnish way and 
told them that this is how reporting is done and this is the way in which things are done, and they 
listened and nodded and everything, but nothing happened. They kept sending us their old reports 
and attached were some Outokumpu ‘blanketter’, but it didn’t get through, this [message]. Nobody 
said no, but nothing happened... .And we have also learned that they do not make decisions in the 
way that “this will be decided in this meeting”...but, well everybody knows this ‘diskutering’ 
...which requires a different approach and well, time. So even this close, and the differences are 
gigantic.
Another cultural factor that has perceived to affect mergers and acquisitions is language. 
English is the official corporate language, which is used even when dealing with Swedes. The 
threshold to acquire companies in countries where English is not widely spoken is much 
higher than in countries where it is. In the former, there may only be a few people in the 
acquired firm with whom one can communicate, and who can be relied on to “forward the 
message”.
Management of Cultural Factors
The attitude towards cultural management has changed significantly from what it was 20 
years ago. At that time, Outokumpu thought itself to be the party that always knew what to do 
and the thinking was that “the acquired be humble”. Nowadays, the sincere intention is to 
look for and apply the best practices found in either party.
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Along with the change in attitudes, the integration management has changed considerably in 
the last few years. Earlier, the organizational structure of the corporation was such that the 
different business units operated independently, each in their own way. When a company was 
acquired, “business continued as usual” in the acquired company. Nowadays, largely due to 
advances in information technology, the corporation has been restructured in order to benefit 
from the synergies that can be obtained by integrating different functions. This means that 
integration processes have been harmonized and the aim is to find one or a few ways of doing 
things, and variations are not accepted unless they are clearly justified.
The due diligence process in Outokumpu includes some questions on cultural matters, but the 
main cultural management pertains to the integration phase. The tools to manage cultural 
differences in integration include enhancing communication skills as well as other training 
programs, where cultural issues are taken up among other things. Timely communication is 
also perceived to be an important tool. It is exercised through e.g. internal magazines, the 
intranet (such as the Q&A section) and different kinds of meetings.
Cultural management is the responsibility of the acquiring business units, but as stated earlier, 
they are supported in their activities by the BSU, in this task especially in human resource 
management issues.
Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance 
The objectives set for mergers and acquisitions are mostly financial in nature. A follow-up is 
performed after each merger or acquisition in order to assess its outcome. The fact that a large 
proportion of these transactions are failures or disappointments (“you pay too much for them 
and they never produce quite as much as was anticipated”) has been acknowledged by Lassila. 
It is, however, very difficult to determine the actual percentage of failures or disappointments, 
as the acquired companies are often split apart and dispersed and do therefore not continue 
operating as they did before. The role of cultural issues in these disappointments is especially 
hard to determine.
The management of cultural factors has been perceived to improve the performance in 
mergers and acquisitions over time, which has been attributed to the experience gained in this 
area over the years. Whether it has been proven to improve performance is not so clear. As
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Lassila stated: “When you manage to avoid one problem, you then of course bang your head 
against another”. But generally speaking, Lassila is strongly of the opinion that mergers and 
acquisitions are now managed much better than they were 20 years ago.
4.1.4.1 Embedded Case One
Case One was the outcome of the 2001 merger (announced in September 2000) between 
Outokumpu’s business unit Outokumpu Steel Oy, located in Tornio, and a stainless steel 
company, which had been formed in the earlier merger between a Swedish and a British steel 
company. The British owner later merged with a Dutch company. Initially, Outokumpu 
obtained a 55% ownership of the newly-merged company, but was able to acquire the shares 
kept by the selling party (i.e. the 23 % of the shares of the next largest owner) in June 2002. 
Since then, Outokumpu has been obligated by legislation to redeem the minority shares and 
by November 2002, had claimed a 99.8% ownership of the newly-merged company.
The purpose of the deal was to obtain growth, which is in accordance with the overall strategy 
of growth and transformation of the company. The background to the deal was the 
consolidation trend in the world’s steel industry. There have been approximately 20 stainless 
steel companies in Europe compared to the four significant ones now, which together produce 
50% of the world’s stainless steel. In order to achieve this position in the stainless steel 
business, Outokumpu had to engage in this merger to obtain the growth in size needed. In 
addition to the strategic aspect, another motivation for the deal was that the acquired party had 
a wide customer base and was perceived to be efficient in marketing. Outokumpu Steel, in 
turn, focused on the beginning of the production process, in other words was efficient in the 
production itself. The two were therefore considered to be a “perfect fit”.
The deal, as described above, was considered to be a merger. Outokumpu Steel was, along 
with the Spanish Acerinox, the most profitable stainless steel producer in Europe. The 
acquired party, on the other hand, was twice the size in terms of volume, but it was not as 
profitable.
Now that Outokumpu is in charge with a near 100% ownership, it has decided that the 
management of the newly-merged company, which has been performing well since it was
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founded in 2001, will continue as is and the company will maintain its own brand. The 
Outokumpu name is visible only as a small text underneath the newly-merged company’s 
logo. The newly-merged company has also been perceived to have built a strong 
organizational culture in the past year and a half, and therefore, what comes to business 
operations, Outokumpu does not want to impose its own culture. The company is, however, 
now in the midst of integration to the corporation and ‘total integration” is intended for all the 
areas in which it can be justified (such as systems and the linking of the firm to the corporate 
service centers).
The comments given by the Outokumpu CEO Jyrki Juusela in a press release following the 
acquisition of the full ownership corroborate the facts above:
I am very pleased that we have this opportunity to go for the full ownership of [the newly-merged 
company]. The development and integration within [the newly-merged company] has been carried 
out in a very professional and successful way - the company is certainly going to be the best in 
stainless. As one of the core business areas within the Outokumpu Group, [the newly-merged 
company] will continue to pursue its business as usual. It will under its current management 
continue to operate in the market and will also retain its own brand name.... (Outokumpu 2002).
According to Lassila, the cultural differences encountered so far involve the Swedish 
counterparts, while no major issues have come up with the British. One of the great surprises 
was the way in which Sweden reacted to the lay-off of 200 people in a small industrial 
locality. The lay-offs were based on clear rational considerations, but nevertheless 
Outokumpu had to justify this decision in television programs in Sweden and even the 
Swedish prime minister became involved in the matter. Outokumpu had not anticipated what 
an important issue this could become.
Another cultural challenge has been encountered in creating corporate values that will be in 
accordance with the cultures of all the parties involved. Outokumpu has recently undergone a 
large process involving 3000 people to determine what the values of the corporation are 
(presented in the introduction of the company). The merged company employs nearly 9000 
employees compared to the total of 19 000 or so (Outokumpu 2002) employed by the 
corporation. Out of these 9000, a large part consists of Swedes. One of the values discovered 
from the survey mentioned above was the emphasis on the achievement of the individual 
inside a team. This value has been perceived to be unacceptable for the Swedes. The
90
challenge now lies in rephrasing the values so that they do not clash with any of the parties 
involved.
Outokumpu was perceived to be an attractive acquirer, and the fact that it was Outokumpu 
that the newly-merged company was affiliated to was not seen as a problem. However, since 
the newly-merged company is losing its status as a company listed on the stock exchange 
(both in Stockholm and Helsinki) in the near future, the challenge in this matter is to maintain 
the motivation of its management and employees as one of the business units of a corporation. 
The degree of freedom in decision making in the newly-merged company will, for example, 
decrease somewhat after it has been unlisted. There has been some resistance to change, but it 
has been attributed more to jealousy between different units than the actions of Outokumpu (a 
3 was given by Lassila on the question of preservation of one’s own culture).
The integration process has only recently begun, and as was explained earlier, the intention is 
to allow the newly-merged company to continue its business as usual to a large extent. The 
cultural issues that have come up so far include the discussion on the new corporate values 
that would suit all parties involved presented above as well as the question of how the 
decision to close the newly-merged company’s headquarters in Stockholm will affect the 
morale of the Swedes.
The goal of the deal was and is to double the size and profit of the stainless steel business. 
Whether this goal will be attained, is too early to say. Outokumpu is now number one or two 
in stainless steel in the world what comes to both size and profitability. But whether the 
newly-merged company will perform as well as Outokumpu anticipates after the investment 
program of another €1 billion, depends both on the markets (the business is super cyclical in 
nature, in other words it fluctuates considerably even in a short period of time) and the way in 
which the new technology involved will perform, as it has not been in use before.
4.1.5 Case Company A 
M&A Process
Mergers and acquisitions are not generally a corporate level exercise in Company A, but 
rather an activity undertaken by the different business units of the company. The business
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units are supported in their M&A activity by an in-house M&A team, which may be described 
as an internal M&A consultant. The M&A team operates at the corporate level.
The company has a documented M&A process, which the acquiring units may refer to when 
engaging in M&A. This documented process is written at a relatively general level as mergers 
and acquisitions are perceived to be somewhat unique events, the object of the acquisition 
being different each time. The documented process incorporates issues such as what should be 
thought of and done before the acquisition, how to proceed in negotiations and where and 
how to have decisions approved. There is also a separate process description for the 
integration phase, with instructions on e.g. how to start integration and when to begin 
planning, but again with few details, as every operation is different from each other. The 
actual documented process is confidential, and therefore cannot be presented here, but 
generally speaking it includes the following phases: strategy, search & screening, negotiation 
& due diligence and integration.
Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
Cultural differences have been perceived to exist at various levels, and the challenge, 
according to the interviewee, lies in taking all of these levels into account. The levels 
discussed by the interviewee were national, industry, business and organizational culture. 
National cultural differences come across first and foremost as differences in attitudes and 
values. Industry-specific cultural differences come to play when the goal of the merger or 
acquisition is diversification into an entirely different industry sector. Differences in business 
culture, on the other hand, are separate from national and industry culture. They are
differences that come for example from moving from retail business to infrastructure
1
business, even if both of these businesses were in the same country and even the same 
industry sector. Cultural differences at the micro level, i.e. organizational level, include 
differences in decision making modes, organizational structure, the way in which things get 
done in the company, the daily conduct of the employees, relationships in superior- 
subordinate teams, and the company’s values.
The level of cultural differences that has been perceived to affect mergers and acquisitions the 
most is the organizational culture. This is because the people working in the acquired 
company represent their own national, industry and business culture in the way in which they
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operate in that specific company. In other words, organizational culture is “the nucleus” of the 
cultural differences. Organizational culture is also thought of as the most difficult level of 
cultural differences that the company encounters, compared to for example national culture, 
on which a lot of written material is available (on e.g. the issue of stereotypes, although a note 
was made that one should be careful not to rely on them). Furthermore, differences in industry 
culture, such as differences in the cyclical nature of the two industries, are more evident than 
differences in organizational culture. This is so especially at the onset of the deal, when very 
little contact with the target company has been established and it is “extremely difficult and 
challenging” to analyze and determine what the organizational culture is like and whether 
there is a cultural fit.
Quite a lot of thought has been given to the factors that can turn cultural differences into 
cultural conflicts in Company A. The most important ones, as explained above, are perceived 
to come from organizational cultural differences. If, for example, the acquired organization is 
used to functioning in a very hierarchical and authoritarian way, it may be difficult for the 
employees to adapt to a network organization with virtual teams that are very “self driven”. 
Due to the fact that orders are not handed down to them as they were before, the efficiency of 
the new employees may seriously be reduced leading to for example a prolonged time to 
market of products.
Another issue that was brought up that had often been come across was “a matter as simple 
as” meeting habits. Some people are used to very structured meetings, where the agenda is 
handed out before the meeting, and everyone can prepare their presentations beforehand and 
“the meeting is over in an hour”, while others do it in a more “spontaneous” manner, by 
“meeting in the morning and spending the day together discussing the matters and turning 
them over ten times”.
The perception of the attractiveness of the acquirer was also identified as an important factor 
affecting the level of cultural conflicts. The interviewee explained this with a nice analogue:
It is said that a company has a certain value as an employer. Much in the same way as a product 
has a brand. In that sense, if you were... the owner of a small chain of stores and you were acquired 
by Valintatalo or Stockmann, your employees would certainly be more proud if they had been 
acquired by Stockmann instead of Valintatalo.
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Furthermore, according to the interviewee, one should remember that in acquisitions, the 
employees of the acquired firm do not become a part of the acquiring company voluntarily. 
They may like the acquiring company, and might have liked to apply for a job there under 
different circumstances, but in this specific situation they have not. Therefore one can always 
expect some resistance to change, as people are “forced” into doing something.
The company language in Company A is English, and as to yet they have not acquired a 
company where this has not been so. National languages have therefore not been perceived to 
cause problems in mergers and acquisitions. However, the use of professional language, and 
more specifically the widespread use of abbreviations of Company A, has been found to be 
challenging for the acquired party, and therefore Company A has a “dictionary” available for 
its employees on the intranet.
A comment was also made on the fact that integrating acquired units that are much smaller 
than the acquirer is easier than units or companies of equal or larger size, merely because the 
initial expectation of the smaller units is to be completely integrated. In bigger cases, a new 
organizational culture should be created, because it is difficult to rationalize “why we should 
become a part of you, although we are bigger than you?”.
Finally, attention was drawn to the issue of whether it is easier to enter culturally distant 
versus culturally close countries. The perception was that when acquiring a company in a 
country that initially seems strange, more attention is paid to cultural issues and they are then 
managed more carefully. When entering a culturally closer country, such as Sweden, it is very 
easy to think that the cultures are alike and these issues are easily “brushed aside”, which will 
cause problems. But in the long run, the integration is easier if the cultures are similar in the 
first place, as long as it is kept in mind that differences do exist. When comparing the success 
of cross-border acquisitions to that of domestic acquisitions, however, the interviewee could 
not say that either had been more successful.
Management of Cultural Factors
The management of cultural factors in mergers and acquisitions in Company A normally 
begins in the search & screening phase of the M&A process. The strategy phase could 
incorporate some cultural speculation in situations, where the company was acquiring
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geographic presence, but the company has not traditionally been involved in such 
acquisitions.
In the search and screening, cultural issues do not affect the “short list” of target compames. 
However, if the analysis shows that the candidates are equally attractive, a desk study 
including cultural issues is conducted (to the extent in which one can be conducted at such an 
early stage of the process), in order to compare the cultural environments of each.
At the stage where the company engages in negotiation with one of the target companies, the 
contact surface is much wider and it is easier to determine what the company is truly like. At 
this stage, all the representatives of Company A involved in the acquisition have been 
instructed to pay attention to cultural issues, and based on these perceptions, a synthesis on 
the organizational culture of the acquired company is made.
Cultural differences per se that have come up in the due diligence process have not as yet been 
the reason to abandon a deal. The primary reason for cultural evaluation at this stage is to 
prepare for integration. However, if the preferred target company would turn out to be one 
that simply represents values so different or conducts business in such a different way from 
Company A, culture could become a deal breaker. Or, if this company was perceived to be 
genuinely attractive otherwise, another type of deal could be considered, such as a holding- 
company strategy, where the other company could be held at “arm’s length”.
The integration phase is where the cultural change process begins. The level of integration 
desired is dependent on the case at hand. If, for example, the purpose of the deal has been to 
acquire a company with a well established customer base, the aim is to integrate that company 
internally only, to the point where it can operate together with Company A, while keeping its 
external activities intact.
The first cultural management activity performed in integration is a “current state -analysis”. 
As soon as access to all the employees of the acquired company has been established, a 
company-wide study is conducted and analyzed. The integration process is then tailored to 
suit the needs of the case at hand.
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One of the tools used in cultural management is a variety of meetings, where the new people 
can come in contact with the “old” people - meetings in small groups, big groups, meetings 
with management, with HR-people, “welcome to the house” -sessions and other training 
sessions (including cross-cultural training). The “welcome to the house” -sessions include 
issues such as learning how things are done in the company, where one can find help and 
instructions, what it is like to work in a matrix organization, what is expected of the new 
employees and how they are expected to conduct themselves. The cultural training sessions 
can be divided into two types: some are based purely on stereotypes, “those Hofstede things”, 
and some are derived from the cultural comparisons made between the two parties. Both 
parties also participate in the latter sessions. Finnish culture is always a part of the sessions, 
because of the fact that a large number of the work force is located in Finland.
Another tool is the so called “buddy-system”. Normally the aim is to transfer “old” employees 
to the newly acquired firm so that approximately 10% of the new population consists of 
people, who already know how to operate in Company A. They can then act as tutors to the 
new employees. This is often done so that one Company A counterpart is assigned to a group 
of new employees (e.g. 5 people per tutor), who can then explain and show how things are 
done in practice.
The importance of speed in the integration management was also highlighted. The interviewee 
claimed that “a burning platform” should be created in order to build motivation for the 
change process and effectively utilize the initial enthusiasm often experienced at the onset of 
an acquisition.
And finally, one of the most important tools is communication. As the interviewee put it, 
“communication can never be overemphasized”. Communication is practiced in both a top- 
down and a bottom-up manner, as feedback from the employees is also considered important. 
The communication methods and channels used vary from the face-to-face meetings discussed 
above to video conferences and written material. The aim is to have constant communication:
The most important thing is to regularly and consistently communicate with those people... so that 
they do not feel left alone. Even if you don’t have anything new to say to them for a week, it is 
important to tell them that “nothing special is going on, but how are you” the next week, because 
otherwise people start wondering what’s happening now.
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Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance 
Every merger and acquisition has to have clear goals from the start in order to be approved by 
the company. These goals, whether they are financial, market-related or other, should also be 
quantifiable so that one can actually verify to what extent they were attained. Furthermore, the 
integration process itself should have certain measurable goals as well. The measurements 
used to determine the success of the integration include issues such as whether a certain 
product was launched on a certain date or whether it was done earlier/later, how many “good” 
people were retained and how many days it took to integrate the accounting practices.
Over time, the management of cultural factors in the M&A process has “without doubt” been 
perceived to improve the post acquisition organizational performance. Earlier, when Company 
A did not have a centralized M&A team, the experiences and know-how obtained from these 
transactions stayed behind in the acquiring business unit and could only be utilized to a very 
small extent in future mergers and acquisitions. Now, the level of know-how in the M&A 
team is increased with each new transaction, making the next merger or acquisition that much 
easier. This positive development has been evident from for example HR-figures, such as the 
better post acquisition retaining of personnel, as well as the increased effectiveness of the 
acquired units (e.g. how well the production timetables are met).
All in all, the importance of the effect of cultural differences on the success of mergers and 
acquisitions has been acknowledged in Company A and especially in the M&A team. 
However, as the acquisitions are always implemented by the acquiring units, the degree to 
which the suggestions of the M&A team are heeded depends largely on how receptive the 
leader of that unit is to human resource issues. Furthermore, cultural issues are not perceived 
to be the primary reason behind failures in mergers and acquisitions, but they are important:
If you manage [cultural differences] badly, then...you may lose people etc., but if you manage 
them well, the whole acquisition or even the integration may still be a failure. You cannot save [the 
acquisition by managing culture] if something is wrong with the foundations [of the deal]. But you 
can destroy a lot [by mismanagement] even if the foundations are fine.
4.1.5.1 Embedded Case X
Case X was an acquisition that took place in the United States. The purpose of the deal was to 
supplement the product portfolio of Company A.
97
The intention of Company A was to integrate the acquired company so that the acquired firm 
would adopt the internal practices exercised by Company A. However, because one of the 
main reasons for the acquisition was the acquired company’s competence in a different 
customer sector, the idea was to keep the organizational culture pertaining to the external 
practices of the firm intact. In terms of organizational integration, it was not seen as important 
for the companies to work together initially, because of the complementary nature of the two 
businesses. The plan for the long run, however, was that the two firms would start working 
closer together in the future, and therefore the need for future organizational integration was 
acknowledged from the start.
The anticipated cultural differences were more prominent than the ones actually encountered. 
The acquired company was an American company that was predominantly Indian, and that 
had a subsidiary in India. National cultural differences were therefore expected. The major 
cultural difference came from the fact that the company employed a number of people from 
the same extended family, and was therefore a very tight community. The level of 
commitment and the way in which the job was done, however, was similar to that in Company 
A. The organizational culture in the acquired company was more controlled and hierarchical 
than that of Company A, especially in the Indian subsidiary.
The mindset of the people in the acquired company towards the acquisition was generally 
speaking very enthusiastic and Company A was a firm they appreciated. According to 
Company A’s press release on the acquisition, the president and CEO of the acquired 
company stated:
As a recognized leader and truly global organization, [Company A] has proven themselves as
technology leaders and innovators. We are very pleased to be joining forces with [them]...
Although there were some practices that the people in the acquired firm did not find 
appealing, there was not too much resistance to change in general. When asked how keen the 
other party was on preserving their own culture on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), 
the interviewee chose 2, and explained that it was quite an easy target to integrate, but that 
they had earlier experienced 1 ’s as well as 5’s.
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For the implementation of the acquisition, an M&A process was followed. Exactly what was 
done and by whom is confidential, but the management of cultural factors included the 
following: After the announcement of the deal, the acquired company was included in the 
planning process to ensure their commitment to the plan as well as to learn to know them and 
their practices and to exchange information. These planning sessions resulted in a detailed 
action plan including responsibilities, timetables and milestones as well as the tools with 
which to measure how the goals would be attained. The implementation of the plan began as 
soon as it was ready.
In addition to getting to know the people in the acquired company through mutual planning, a 
study was conducted to evaluate what the other party thought and what were the practices they 
were used to. An issue that came up in this study, for example, was that they were dissatisfied 
with some of their own practices and wanted help in solving these problems. Training 
sessions were then constructed in accordance with the findings of the study. Other sessions 
included a change management training course, explaining e.g. how people normally respond 
to change, and a “multicultural awareness” course, including issues such as Finnish culture, 
Company A’s way of doing things as well as working in a network organization. The 
acquiring business unit, the M&A team, Company A’s training center and the HR-department 
all participated in organizing these sessions. After 6 months, a new survey was conducted to 
see how things had changed and how the results correlated with the results of employee 
satisfaction surveys conducted (once a year) elsewhere in the company.
The specific goals of the acquisition are, once again, confidential, but it can be said that some 
of the goals were not met, while others, such as integration objectives, were both met and 
exceeded. The fact that some of the goals were not met could not be blamed on cultural issues 
or problems with integration, but rather on unpredictable changes in the markets. Due to this 
market situation, the deal could not be considered one of Company A’s “flagship deals”, but it 
was a success in the sense that Company A did obtain the competences it had set out to 
acquire.
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4.1.5.2 Embedded Case Y
Case Y was also an acquisition of a company in the United States. The purpose of the deal 
was to acquire new technology, a sort of an add-on to company A’s product.
On a subjective scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), 5 was said to represent how keen 
company A was on imposing its own culture on the acquired company in this case. It was also 
seen as crucial that the acquired company and the acquiring unit work together in terms of 
organizational integration.
Company A did not expect to encounter large cultural differences due to the fact that the 
acquired company was located only about 80 kilometers from the acquiring unit. It was 
anticipated that the transaction would be quite easy. Although the acquired company was in a 
sound financial state, and was therefore not forced to sell, the people in the acquired firm were 
nevertheless at first “extremely enthusiastic” about the acquisition. They also perceived 
Company A to be very attractive. The acquired party was actually more enthusiastic (they 
were ready to “join forces to compete with a mutual competitor”) about the acquisition than 
the acquiring unit. The major cultural difference became evident from this very way of 
reacting to the acquisition. The interviewee explains:
...It was a group of people, who were very much extroverts and propeller cap engineer types, a 
little eccentric, and really, if they became excited about something, it was really then at 200%. 
Even more over the top than the normal American. And on the other hand, in addition to [the firm] 
being full of these Gyro Gearlooses [Pelle Peloton], meaning these very individualistic individuals, 
they were, one can’t say exactly childish, but in the sense that if something did not go exactly as 
they had thought, they would then stomp their feet, in the line of throwing a tantrum. And of 
course, because grown ups were in question, threats about involving lawyers in the game were 
made and very small things became senselessly big things. In the line of: someone would lose their 
office chair, or, I don’t recall that office chairs were discussed, but issues of this degree.
The attitude started changing from “over-enthusiasm” to frustration quite early, about two 
months from the closing. According to the interviewee, this may easily take place if 
expectations are unrealistic in the beginning. In this case, the early “hype” led to frustration 
when people realized that things did not happen as quickly as what they had been used to and 
that their “wonderful ideas” were not implemented as readily in the larger entity. Earlier, they 
had been freer to make decisions by themselves.
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When it comes to the other party’s willingness to preserve their own culture, at first it did not 
seem as if it was important to them. The acquired company’s employees had been involved in 
several acquisitions, and knew to some extent what to expect. In general, the interviewee 
would rate this issue as a 3 on the scale presented earlier, saying that there was some 
willingness on their part to preserve their own culture. However, what comes to the eccentric 
people in the group, the real leaders or influencers in the organization, the degree at which 
they wanted to hold on to their own practices was “5 +”.
For the implementation of the acquisition, the M&A process was followed and it was actually 
also developed quite a bit during this process. Because this was perceived to be a difficult 
case, an extra effort was made to manage the cultural differences. An external consultant was 
employed to allow people to talk freely about how they felt and how they were used to 
working and a lot of time was spent on determining what the problems were. The objectives 
of the acquisition were discussed with both parties separately to see whether they matched and 
group discussion sessions were arranged to talk the differences over and to “unload the 
frustration”. Face-to-face meetings were also arranged so that people would simply get to 
know each other. The idea was for the two parties to begin developing products together “at 
the same table physically”, so that communication (e.g. by phone or e-mail) would be easier 
once they returned to their own work places to continue the projects. The normal cross- 
cultural training sessions were also arranged.
A factor making the integration even more complex was the simultaneous acquisition of a unit 
in Finland, which was also meant to be integrated with the two parties presented above. The 
cultural differences between the acquiring unit and the Finnish unit were, however, much 
smaller than the differences between the two units located in the United States. This deal did 
nevertheless cause more frustration within the acquired unit in the US, as they had not 
anticipated this move.
The ultimate goal of the deal was to develop an enhanced product. According to the 
interviewee, Company A has never, or not recently anyway, engaged in an acquisition 
involving merely a product. In other words, the aim has always been to acquire the know-how 
of the people in the target company and whether this know-how is then utilized according to 
the original plan or in another useful way, the acquisition can still be considered a success.
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Integration-wise, this acquisition process was challenging due to the strong and somewhat 
antagonistic personalities involved in the process. In fact, one of the lessons learned from the 
experience is the question of whether one should attempt to keep all the “good people”, i.e. 
the competent people with a solid level of know-how, even if they do not desire to be 
integrated. Another lesson learned is not to underestimate the cultural differences even if one 
is acquiring a company next door, as the organizational culture is different in each case. 
Finally, making simultaneous or many consecutive acquisitions is challenging, because the 
acquiring organization’s ability to tolerate change is limited.
4.2 Cross-Case Analysis
The aim of this section is to synthesize the observations concerning both the holistic and the 
embedded case studies in order to explore the theoretical framework. The table compiled to 
assist in the synthesis of the embedded cases (Table 10) is included in Appendix C: Synthesis 
of the Embedded Cases. The structure of this section will follow the structure of the 
framework. In other words, the M&A process will be studied first, followed by the levels of 
cultural differences and the theories by which they have been perceived to affect mergers and 
acquisitions. The cultural management will be examined next and attention will then be drawn 
to the question of post-merger organizational performance.
4.2.1 M&A Process
The reason the M&A process of the case companies was examined was to determine whether 
they followed the general process presented in the framework, which indeed they did. More 
interesting, however, was the following observation:
All 5 of the cases, at some point, reflected the fact that experience was perceived to be the 
single most important factor facilitating the management of cultural factors in mergers and 
acquisitions and thereby affecting post-merger performance. Documented process descriptions 
with general guidelines on handling mergers and acquisitions (including cultural issues), 
however, had only so far been utilized by Stora Enso and Company A. Outokumpu was in the
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process of adding one to its investment manual, while Datex-Ohmeda relied on the 
documented cases of earlier transactions as well as maintaining a pool of experience on the 
subject. Nordea relied primarily on earlier experience. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions 
were mainly a corporate level activity in Datex-Ohmeda (Instrumentarium) and Nordea, while 
in the remaining 3, it was mostly an activity undertaken by the business units of the company.
The use of documented cases of previous transactions can definitely assist in handling the 
cultural management of subsequent transactions, but a data source, such as a documented 
process description, which synthesizes the most important lessons learned from all previous 
transactions, may be an even more efficient way of utilizing the accumulated experience. The 
use of experienced people in new ventures can also help in the task, but in companies, where 
mergers and acquisitions are undertaken by small and sometimes geographically distant 
subunits, experienced people may only be available in the role of support, and not as the 
central decision-makers in the area. The subunits may therefore also in this perspective benefit 
from a set of general guidelines on how to proceed with the cultural management, even 
though every merger or acquisition is unique.
4.2.2 Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts 
Levels of Cultural Differences
The examination of the different levels of culture affecting mergers and acquisitions can be 
summarized in the following way: the levels brought up in the cases (either explicitly or 
implicitly) were national (by all 5), organizational (5), industry (3) and business (3). National 
cultural differences were thought of as obvious, and studies on the topic were perceived to be 
readily available from numerous sources (such as studies on national stereotypes). Examples 
of national cultural differences included differences in attitudes and values as well as local or 
traditional ways of doing things. Organizational cultural differences, which were seen as 
more complex, included differences in management styles, organizational structures, the 
companies’ values, relationships in superior-subordinate teams and the way in which things 
get done in the companies. An example of organizational cultural differences listed in all 5 
cases was differences in decision-making.
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As to the embedded cases, national cultural differences were not observed to play a part in the 
two domestic cases, as could be expected, but they were perceived to affect all but one of the 
eight international cases, namely Company A’s Embedded Case Y. The reason national 
cultural differences were not perceived to affect this international acquisition was the fact that 
the acquiring unit was actually located in the same country as, and only about 80 kilometers 
from, the acquired company, making the transaction local in nature. Organizational cultural 
differences, on the other hand, were identified in all of the 10 embedded cases.
Industry and business cultures were brought up in Datex-Ohmeda, Nordea and Company A. 
The extract on differing paradigms presented in the Datex-Ohmeda case on page 78 (the ant in 
a mug building an airplane, which turns out to be very different from the one built outside the 
mug) exemplifies how different the perspective on things can be between different industries. 
The fact that the cultural difference between the Datex and the Ohmeda party was “more 
considerable than the difference between Americans and Europeans” although the two 
operated in the same industry, would emphasize differences in business cultures over national 
cultures. Company A had also come across industry and business levels of cultural differences 
and acknowledged that they had an impact on mergers and acquisitions, e.g. either when 
diversifying into a different industry or moving from retail to infrastructure business. At 
Nordea, by contrast, these levels had not been perceived to have an important effect, but this 
could be attributed to the established and controlled nature of the banking trade.
Although differences in industry and business culture have not traditionally been discussed in 
the M&A literature, and were therefore initially excluded from this study (as was explained in 
the limitations of the study), the discussion above shows that they can play an important part 
in certain situations, such as the merger between Datex and Ohmeda. Stora Enso and 
Outokumpu may have encountered differences at these levels as well, but since these levels 
have not generally been as widely discussed as national and organizational cultures, the 
interviewees may simply not be familiar with the terms ‘industry culture or ‘business 
culture’, and did therefore not mention them. Industry culture was actually not mentioned as a 
factor in any of the embedded cases, but this could be because none of these cases were 
motivated by diversification into an entirely different industry, a situation where differences in 
industry culture would be highlighted. Even though such diversification nowadays occurs less
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often than before (as was explained in the introduction of the study), these transactions cannot 
be ruled out completely.
Another level of cultural differences, individual cultural differences, was mentioned in the 
Stora Enso case. However, by the definition of culture presented in the introduction of this 
study, culture is always considered to be a collective phenomenon. Differences at the 
individual level (or differences in e.g. personalities) are therefore not taken into consideration 
in this study, although they, as the interviewed manager pointed out, can significantly affect 
the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions, especially in the higher levels of the organization.
Moreover, an observation was made in the Stora Enso case on the cultural differences 
between people in different locations inside a nation. This observation clearly exemplifies the 
importance of subcultures. Finland is a relatively small country, and the fact that subcultures 
have been perceived to affect mergers and acquisitions here suggests that in larger countries 
(e.g. USA), where geographical distances are greater and subcultures between different areas 
are more distinct, subcultures can play an important role in the outcomes of mergers and 
acquisitions. This can be assumed to be especially so if it is taken for granted that the merging 
parties originating from different parts of the same country share the same culture, and the 
existing subcultures are overlooked. This assumption is based on the proposition of Larsson 
and Risberg (1998) and Vaara (1999) concerning supposedly close cultures in a cross-border 
context discussed in section 2.2.4. However, even though their importance in mergers and 
acquisitions has been acknowledged, subcultures are beyond the scope of this study (as 
explained in the limitations), and were therefore not examined further.
Comparisons between the Levels of Cultural Differences
National cultural differences were perceived to be the level of cultural differences which has 
the largest effect on international mergers and acquisitions by one of the Stora Enso 
respondents and Outokumpu, while organizational cultural differences were thought to play a 
more important role by the other Stora Enso respondent, Nordea and Company A. In Datex- 
Ohmeda, differences in business cultures were implicated as the most important level in this 
perspective, although the importance of national cultural differences was also acknowledged, 
as could be derived from the fact that learning to cope with the national culture in the Ohmeda
105
acquisition (learning to “understand America”) had been perceived to facilitate the integration 
of the later Space Labs acquisition.
The discussion above on the levels of cultural differences does not clearly support 
emphasizing any one level over another. The importance of each level varies depending on the 
case at hand, regardless of whether the transaction is domestic or international (although e.g. 
national differences can evidently not be assumed to play a major role in the former). The 
argument of Weber et al. (1996) that national cultural differences play a more important role 
than organizational ones in international mergers and acquisitions could therefore not be 
supported based on these cases.
Furthermore, as implied in all 5 of the cases, the different cultural levels are very difficult to 
separate from each other. For example, a cultural difference encountered and specifically 
brought up in 4 of the 5 case companies was the difference in decision-making habits between 
Finns and Swedes. Swedes were perceived to resort to lengthier discussions on the issues at 
hand, strive for consensus and thereby take more time in decision-making than their Finnish 
counterparts. According to the Engström case, this type of decision-making was not befitting 
to the more “painful decisions” needed concerning e.g. layoffs. The difference in decision­
making is clearly a difference in the national cultures of the two countries and is in 
accordance with Hofstede’s (1991) dimensions. For example, at Stora Enso, the discussion on 
the topic related to the dimension of uncertainty avoidance (the Swedes “had to be sure the 
decision is correct”), while at Outokumpu it reflected the dimension of individualism vs. 
collectivism (the Swedes had to discuss and make the decision together, in consensus). On the 
other hand, this national cultural element is obviously present in the organizational cultures 
of companies originating from these two countries, exemplifying the interconnectedness of 
the cultural levels.
Based on the preceding discussion, a more suitable way of presenting the levels of cultural 
differences in the framework would be to include the industry and business culture, and 
interconnect all the levels as illustrated in Figure 11. The figure is similar to the idea of 
depicting culture as an onion (as presented in the definitions, Olie 1994). But instead of 
depicting national culture as the center, it is portrayed as an outer level, as the foundation 
which encompasses all the other levels.
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Differences in:
National Culture
Industry Culture
Business Culture
Organizational
Culture
Figure 11: The Levels of Cultural Differences Affecting Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger Type
The merger type (introduced by Olie 1990) was identified and understood in all 5 cases to be a 
factor affecting the level of cultural conflicts, especially when comparing mergers between 
equals with clear-cut acquisitions. For example, Palin-Lehtinen from Nordea described the 
difference between acquisitions and mergers in the following way: “If Citybank were to 
acquire us, we would receive a manual. But here [referring to their expansion through mergers 
between equals] we have always created that manual, which naturally makes [the process] 
slower”.
As explained in the introduction of Olie’s (1990) merger types, these types present a rather 
crude classification and not all mergers can be categorized according to them. Some of the 
embedded cases included in this study were, indeed, somewhat difficult to fit into these 
categories, but Table 8, which is based on Olie’s (1990) merger type classification (see pages 
16-18), presents the types they closest conformed with. The categorization of the cases 
presented in parenthesis will be explained in the following passages.
None of the embedded cases were of merger type 1 (conglomerate mergers), in other words 
the only merger type predicting a low level of culture-related problems. This could be 
expected since, as mentioned earlier, the number of transactions motivated by diversification 
into an entirely unrelated industry has decreased considerably in the near past.
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Table 8: Merger Types of the Embedded Cases
Merger Type 1. Conglomerate 
Mergers
2. Mergers/ 
Marriages
3. Absorptive 
Acquisitions
4. Redesign
Mergers
Power Differential Unrelated Low High High
Integration
Needs
Unrelated High High Low
The role of culture- 
related problems
Minor Significant Moderate Moderate
Embedded Cases • Stora Enso
• Merita
• Merita-
Nordbanken
• (Datex-Ohmeda)
• Tampella Forest
• Engström
• Case Y
• (Case X)2
• Consolidated 
Papers
• (Case One)
• (Case X)i
Note: Classification of cases in parenthesis was subject to further explanation
Embedded Case X could initially be classified as a redesign merger, referring to the early, 
limited integration required by the acquiring company, Company A. In the long run, however, 
the deal could be considered an absorptive acquisition, reflecting the future intension of 
Company A to assimilate the acquired company.
The initial deal behind Outokumpu’s Case One was a merger/marriage, since the two parties 
were of approximately equal power (profitability vs. size) and the desire to obtain synergies 
was clear. The more recent transaction, Outokumpu’s acquisition of the full ownership of the 
company, however, could be classified as a redesign merger. The corporation is obviously 
more powerful than the acquired company, which is now one of its business units, and 
although the acquired company will mostly be allowed to carry on as usual, some functions 
will be integrated. The redesign merger case was actually the one focused on in this study, 
although the initial merger was acknowledged to have had an impact on it.
The mergers between Stora and Enso, Datex and Ohmeda, SYP and KOP to form Merita, and 
Merita and Nordbanken could be classified as mergers/marriages. Although Ohmeda was 
clearly the acquired party in the Datex-Ohmeda case, the fact that it was merged with the 
Datex unit, which was only half its size, made the transaction a merger/mamage by nature. 
Despite the fact that genuine mergers among equals are seldom encountered, the principles 
applied in the integration of such mergers (e.g. best practices) seemed to be applied especially 
in the Stora Enso, Merita and Merita-Nordbanken cases, even if some power differential was
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evident. In the Datex-Ohmeda case, by contrast, the gut-feeling of the Datex party was that its 
culture would prevail, since it was the driver in the deal.
The merger type, based on the examination of the embedded cases, does not seem to be a very 
convincing factor in predicting the level of cultural conflicts. For instance, Company A s 
embedded Case Y turned out to be very challenging despite the fact that it was an absorptive 
acquisition. Meanwhile, the mergers between Stora and Enso, Datex and Ohmeda as well as 
Merita and Nordbanken were perceived to encounter a moderate level of difficulties despite 
the fact that they were rather complex mergers among equals. However, because the initial 
expectation usually seems to be that a merger is more difficult than an acquisition, the parties 
may be better prepared for the upcoming difficulties in mergers, and may therefore be able to 
subdue them through management efforts, resulting in a lower level of problems actually 
encountered. Although mergers between equals generally do create a more demanding 
situation, since a new, mutual culture needs to be created, one should not underestimate the 
challenges presented by acquisitions either.
Language Problems
Language problems were also identified in all 5 cases, although from a slightly different 
perspective in each. At Stora Enso, the language discussion pertained to the frustration 
stemming from the other party’s inability to speak another’s language correctly, in this case 
the Swedes referring to the use of Finlandssvensk. At Datex-Ohmeda, the differences in 
communication styles between Americans, Finns and Frenchmen were well portrayed (see 
page 78). These differences were in accordance with Hofstede’s (1991) dimensions, especially 
the dimensions of femininity vs. masculinity (the American being more assertive than the 
Firm) and uncertainty avoidance (the Finn giving a more pessimistic view of things than the 
American) as well as Larsson and Risberg (1998), who claimed that different cultural 
encoding and decoding can lead to misunderstandings between persons of different 
nationalities. At Outokumpu, the language issue was related to the threshold of acquiring 
companies in countries, where English is not widely spoken and at Nordea, to the challenges 
presented by speaking other than one’s own home language, which is again in accordance 
with Larsson and Risberg (1998). And finally, at Company A, the use of professional 
languages had been identified as an issue in mergers and acquisitions.
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In the embedded cases, however, language problems were specifically mentioned as an issue 
in only two of the cases, despite the fact that 8 of them were international. Both of these cases 
(Stora Enso and Merita-Nordbanken) had to do with a Swedish partner. This may again be a 
reflection of the dilemma of cultural proximity (Larsson & Risberg 1998 and Vaara 1999), 
since Finns tend to be familiar with Swedish and may therefore not have anticipated language 
problems. Although English is the corporate language of both these companies, Swedish is 
often used as well. The fact that English is the corporate language in all the other case 
companies as well, may account for language issues not having been perceived to arise in the 
other international cases.
The Model of Cultural Fit
The essence of the model of cultural fit (Cartwright & Cooper 1996) in acquisitions was taken 
up in 2 of the cases. At Outokumpu, large corporations were perceived to “kill successful 
small companies” by acquiring them, since the obligation to operate according to the habits of 
the large corporation would hurt the entrepreneurial touch of the small firms. This is clearly in 
accordance with the assumption of Cartwright and Cooper (1996) that a decrease in the 
decision-making freedom in the acquired units will cause problems. Outokumpu’s Case One 
(where the status of the acquired company changed from an independent company to being a 
unit of a corporation) and Company A’s Case Y (where the ideas of individuals of the small 
acquired company were not implemented as quickly in the large company) also clearly 
demonstrated this occurrence.
On the other hand, Company A had perceived that if the acquired organization was used to 
functioning in a hierarchical and authoritarian way, adapting to a network organization with 
virtual teams could lead to a serious decrease in employee efficiency. In other words, an 
increase in an individual’s freedom was perceived to cause problems. This would contradict 
Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) assumption that an increase in an individual’s freedom is 
always a desired element and a change in the individuals’ freedom in an acquired company 
does therefore not necessarily predict the level of cultural conflicts correctly, even though the 
embedded cases in this study did not represent such a situation.
The interviewees were asked to compare cross-border with domestic mergers for the purpose 
of examining the role of cultural fit in mergers, i.e. the need for an initial cultural fit between
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the merging parties. The discussion on this topic at Nordea was not related to the issue of 
cultural fit, but on the nature of domestic versus cross-border mergers (due to the banking 
industry, the former had consisted of restructuring cases entailing a lot of emotion and the 
latter involved growth and a more positive mindset).
Stora Enso, Outokumpu and Company A, however, manifested that engaging in mergers with 
parties from seemingly culturally close countries were, or had turned out to be, more 
problematic than with parties from more distant countries. For example, even though 
Outokumpu has operations in over 40 countries, the largest culture shocks involving 
national cultural differences had been perceived to originate from Sweden. The reason given 
for the occurrence by all three of the respondents was the fact that the similarities of closer 
parties were taken for granted and differences were not anticipated, which is strongly in 
accordance with the findings of Larsson and Risberg (1998) and Vaara (1999) on the dilemma 
of culturally close countries. Therefore, particularly in the context of international mergers, 
the idea of ensuring an initial cultural fit proposed by the model of cultural fit can be argued. 
However, the fundamental idea behind the model, i.e. the larger the cultural differences 
between the two parties, the more difficult the integration in the long run will be, complies 
with common sense (and was specifically noted in Company A). And vice versa, as could be 
deduced from the merger between Datex and Ohmeda, a relatively complicated merger can be 
facilitated by the fact that the merging partners share a common cultural element (in this case 
the customer oriented value base).
‘Us vs. Them’ Antagonism
The ‘us vs. them’ antagonism introduced by Sales and Mirvis (1984) and Olie (1994), which 
has been claimed to result in 1) highlighting of differences between the two merging parties, 
2) seeing one’s own party as purely good and the others as purely bad, and 3) refusing to see 
things from other than one’s own viewpoint, was recognized in all 5 cases. For example, in 
the Stora Enso case, Tolvanen observed that relying on national stereotypes will result in the 
formation of competing national teams, or in other words will lead to or strengthen the 
antagonism. One of Nordea’s embedded cases, the merger between SYP and KOP to form 
Merita, was an excellent example of an exceptionally strong ‘us vs. them’ antagonism, which 
stemmed from the long history of fierce competition and emotional commitment of both the 
employees and the customers to their own company. Table 9 presents a synthesis of the
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perceived level of antagonism in the embedded cases, as well as the main factors, which can 
be assumed to have been the main reason behind the level of antagonism in each case.
Although the level of antagonism is largely related to the perceived level of cultural 
differences, the two do not match entirely. In the Tampella Forest case, for example, the 
sensation of being forced into the deal can be assumed to have been a more important cause 
behind the antagonism than cultural differences. In the Consolidated Papers and Datex- 
Ohmeda cases, on the other hand, the enthusiasm and general positive mindset towards the 
acquisition can be assumed to have weakened the antagonism, although moderate 
organizational cultural differences were perceived to exist in both.
Table 9: Perceived Level of 'Us vs. Them' Antagonism in Embedded Cases
Perceived Level of
TJs vs. Them' Antagonism
Embedded Case Explanatory Factors
LOW Consolidated Papers • Enthusiastic response towards the acquisition • 
Stora Enso not an American acquirer that may 
have required more radical restructuring
Datex-Ohmeda • Enthusiastic response towards the acquisition 
(excluding the top management of Ohmeda)
• Shared value of customer-orientation
Case X • Very positive mindset towards the acquisition
• Surprisingly similar organizational cultures
MODERATE Stora Enso • "Sweden vs. Finland National Contests"
• A rather neutral mindset towards the merger
Engström • Relatively positive mindset, but large 
differences encountered in quality-cultures 
between Engström and Datex
Case One • Loss of status from a company listed on the 
stock-exchange to a business unit of a corporation
Merita-Nordbanken • Relatively positive mindset, but some "Swedes 
vs. Finns" national cultural differences 
encountered
HIGH Tampella Forest • Tampella Forest being forced into the deal due
to its poor financial state
Merita • Long history of fierce competition
• Emotional commitment to one's "own"
company
Case Y • Initial unrealistic expectations of the acquired 
party turning into disappointments
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Acculturation
The effect of the two acculturation theories presented in the framework, the preferred 
acculturation modes introduced by Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) and the force-field 
analysis of acculturation of Elsass and Veiga (1994) (see pages 20-28), was not explicitly 
taken up with the interviewees. Both of these theories incorporate several factors, which affect 
the level of cultural conflicts simultaneously, making these theories more complex and more 
difficult to identify than the more general theories discussed above. The interviews concerning 
the embedded cases were therefore designed to allow for making some assessment concerning 
the relevance and applicability of these theories. Many of the factors behind the theories were, 
however, also brought up proactively by the interviewees, which would point to the fact that 
the theories are relevant in this context. The factors brought up by the interviewees included 
the attractiveness of the acquirer (Company A’s Valintatalo vs. Stockmann example on page 
93), the perception of cultural differences and the acquisition motive, which affects the 
merger type (particularly dwelled on in the embedded cases), as well as the structure of 
intergroup relations, which reflects the ‘us vs. them’ antagonism discussed above.
The analysis of the preferred acculturation modes (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988) in the 
embedded cases (based on the dimensions of the attractiveness of the acquirer, the desire to 
preserve one’s own culture, the relatedness of the firms and the degree of multiculturalism) 
revealed the fact that especially in the case of mergers, trying to assess the predicted level of 
conflicts through the application of this theory was, at times, quite ambiguous.
First of all, especially in the merger between Stora and Enso and Nordea’s embedded case on 
the merger between SYP and KOP to form Merita, it was difficult to identify which party was 
actually ‘the acquirer’ (even though e.g. SYP was obviously financially better off than KOP). 
The acculturative model of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) might therefore be more 
suitable for acquisitions and mergers with clear power differentials than genuine mergers 
among equals.
And secondly, it was often difficult to determine what the preferred acculturation modes 
actually were, since the dimensions used would have indicated something in-between the 
different modes, further impeding the evaluation of the level of congruence. To sum up, 
however, clear congruence, and thereby a predicted low level of acculturative stress was
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thought to be found in 2 cases (Merita-Nordbanken and Company A s Case X), some 
congruence in 4 (i.e. moderate stress in Stora Enso, Consolidated Papers, Engström and 
Outokumpu’s Case One), and incongruence in 4 (high stress in Tampella Forest, Merita, 
Datex-Ohmeda and Company A’s Case Y). (See Appendix D: Preferred Modes of 
Acculturation for a table presenting the case-by-case analysis of the preferred acculturation 
modes based on the four dimensions listed above).
None of the embedded cases were perceived to explicitly point to déculturation, i.e. to both 
weak forces of cultural differentiation as well as weak forces of organizational integration, 
which would have predicted a low tension system in the Force-Field Analysis of 
Acculturation (Elsass & Veiga 1994). A moderate level of tension was predicted by 6 of the 
embedded cases, in other words cases purporting either strong forces of cultural 
differentiation and weak forces of organizational integration (separation) or vice versa 
(assimilation) ), or a moderate level of either or both of the forces. A high level of tension 
could be predicted by 4 cases, where both of the forces were identified as being strong (i.e. 
Tampella Forest, Merita, Datex-Ohmeda and Case Y). (See Appendix E: Force-Field Analysis 
of Acculturation for a table on the force-field analysis concerning the embedded cases).
Although the two acculturation models are related since the latter is derived from the former, 
the level of tension predicted by each differed somewhat in the embedded cases. This is 
largely due to the fact that unlike the acculturative model of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 
(1988), the force-field analysis did not yield a predicted low level in any of the cases. On the 
cases predicting a high level of tension (i.e. Tampella Forest, Datex-Ohmeda, Merita and Case 
Y), however, the two models were congruent. All in all, when comparing the two 
acculturation models, the force-field analysis seemed to be more pertinent based on the 
examination of the embedded cases in this study. This was so especially since unlike the 
acculturative model of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988), in-between modes were an 
acceptable element in this model due to its dynamic nature. However, further and more 
elaborate studies concentrating specifically on these models would be needed in order to 
compare them and make conclusions on their validity.
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Other Influencing Factors
Other issues that were presented by the interviewees as factors affecting mergers and 
acquisitions were for example the uncertainty of where and how promotions are made, which 
Ansaharju from Stora Enso listed as the “biggest single obstacle” in mergers and acquisitions. 
It has, indeed, been acknowledged as a major problem in mergers and acquisitions. According 
to Kay and Shelton (2000), for example, the employees’ uncertainty of how they will fit into 
the new company’s structure, what their pay will be or how their performance will be 
measured can all lead to an increased number of employees leaving the company. (Kay & 
Shelton 2000, 1). Although this issue can partly be attributed to differences in the 
organizational cultures of the merging companies, it mostly fits into the category of general 
change management (introduced in the limitations of this study) and has therefore not been 
dealt with in more detail in this study.
Palin-Lehtinen from Nordea pointed out that cultural conflicts can arise because the change 
process involved in all mergers is always difficult and contains a lot of emotion. This 
comment points to the natural resistance to change, and is therefore again an example of 
change management in general (see e.g. Dichter et al. 1993 and Arena 2002) rather than 
cultural issues per se. Palin-Lehtinen also mentioned the lack of knowledge as a factor, for 
example making decisions concerning the accounting practices of a corporation based in 
different countries without taking into account the accounting laws of all the countries 
involved. This issue can be related both to socio-environmental issues, as in the example 
above, or to more clear-cut cultural issues (e.g. not knowing the appropriate manners 
appreciated in different cultures, as explained by Palin-Lehtinen in Erkkilä 2001, 251). The 
comment in the cultural sense can be linked to Larsson and Risberg’s (1998) proposal of 
increasing cultural awareness, in other words increasing knowledge on the other party’s habits 
and ways of doing things in order to avoid mishaps.
And finally, Ritvos from Datex-Ohmeda stated that more important than the cultural 
background is the sociological profile (or the social behavior) and the personality of the 
individual, and that the same type of individual could be found regardless of the nationality. 
This may be so, but as this study concentrates on the cultural factors affecting mergers and 
acquisitions, individuals per se have not been dealt with in more detail here. According to the 
definition of culture applied in this study, culture is always considered a collective
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phenomenon. If excluding the top management of the merging companies, the number of 
people who are affected by a merger is often so large, that the management of such a 
collective phenomenon can be assumed to be more efficient than the management at a more 
individual level, such as the management of different personality types. These personality 
types should, of course, be taken into account wherever possible (e.g. in the acquisition of 
small units involving a small number of people, or in the choice of communication channels, 
since different types respond differently to different means of communication). And as 
mentioned earlier, one should not forget that a person is first and foremost an individual, and 
that e.g. national stereotypes should not be relied upon.
Evaluation of the Overall Validity of the Factors Affecting the Level of Cultural Conflicts
The embedded cases were examined further to be able to provide some indication on how 
well the factors affecting the level of cultural conflicts presented in the framework actually 
reflect the level of conflicts encountered in mergers and acquisitions. Each factor (such as the 
levels of cultural differences, the merger type, the ‘us vs. them’ antagonism etc.) was assessed 
to portray either a low, moderate or high level of cultural conflicts. The overall level of 
cultural conflicts predicted in each embedded case was derived from the mode of the values 
assigned to each factor, in other words the value that most of the separate factors would 
predict. This overall predicted level of cultural conflicts was then compared with the level of 
difficulties that had been perceived to take place in the cultural integration of the embedded 
cases. (See Table 10 in Appendix C: Synthesis of the Embedded Cases for a closer 
examination of the different variables).
Overall, the level of cultural conflicts predicted by the cultural factors included in the 
framework reflected the perceived level of difficulties encountered in the cultural integration 
of these cases quite consistently (the two variables matched in 8 of the 10 embedded cases). 
This would suggest that the cultural factors do reflect the level of cultural difficulties and that 
the theoretical framework does, therefore, make sense in this matter. However, the evaluation 
is based on the subjective accounts of the interviewees and it is therefore acknowledged that 
the framework could benefit from further studies confirming this finding.
The only cases where the two variables did not correspond were Tampella Forest (a high level 
of predicted cultural conflicts, but a low level of difficulties actually encountered in the
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cultural integration) and Consolidated Papers (a moderate level of predicted conflicts, but a 
low level of encountered difficulties). Although most of the factors in the Tampella Forest 
case would have indicated a high level of problems in integration, the high power differential 
between Enso and Tampella Forest can be assumed to have made the integration relatively 
uncomplicated. The culture of the acquiring party was imposed on the acquired without much 
discussion on the subject. Stora Enso’s integration of Consolidated Papers case may, in turn, 
have been rendered less complicated than the cultural factors would have predicted simply 
because not much integration was needed, since the deal was a redesign merger.
4.2.3 Management of Cultural Factors
Figure 12 synthesizes the empirical findings concerning the management of cultural factors. 
The number of cases, where the management effort in question was mentioned is presented in 
parenthesis. The differences in relation to the original framework (Figure 9 on page 39) are 
marked in bold. The efforts pertaining to the different phases of the M&A process will be 
examined in the following passages.
Decision-Making Process
Only 2 of the cases, Stora Enso and Company A, revealed some cultural management in the 
early stages of the M&A process, i.e. the decision-making phase. However, due to the limited 
contacts with representatives from the other party, conducting an in-depth culture audit (as 
proposed by Cartwright and Cooper 1993) at this stage, i.e. before the announcement of the 
deal, was not perceived possible. The general studies conducted by Stora Enso and Company 
A are in accordance with Larsson and Risberg (1998), who recommend building cultural 
awareness. This cross-cultural analysis of the target companies may assist in either choosing 
the target company or companies with which to proceed to the next phase (as suggested by 
Company A), or in building a preliminary idea of the level of resources needed in the eventual 
integration efforts. Datex’s acquisition of Engström was a good example of the difficulties 
that may arise from initially making an incorrect assessment of the organizational culture of 
the other party (in this case the assumption that Engström had a strong quality-culture, which 
turned out to be false).
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• Role Models (1)
• Communication
Figure 12: Synthesis of the Cultural Management Efforts
Note: The differences in relation to the original framework (Figure 9 on page 39) are marked in bold.
The effect of the merger type (Olie 1990), in other words the other issue linked to the 
decision-making phase in this framework, could be assumed to be quite well understood in all 
5 cases based on the discussion on this issue in the context of the previous section on the 
factors affecting the level of cultural conflicts.
Negotiation and Agreement
The cultural management pertaining to the negotiation and agreement phase consisted of a 
due diligence process involving cultural questions (a cultural due diligence as proposed by 
Whalen 2002) in 3 cases; Stora Enso, Outokumpu and Company A.
In the Nordea case, the vision-building process together with the other party in the beginning 
of the negotiations of a merger is an example of the development of a common identity (as 
proposed by Olie 1990 to reduce the ‘us vs. them antagonism’). The task of developing a
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common identity had been undertaken in all the other case companies as well, but only after 
the deal had been finalized, i.e. in the integration phase of the process. The dissimilarity in the 
timing of the task may come from the nature of the mergers in the banking trade. For example, 
in the merger between SYP and KOP, the situation in the industry was such that there really 
was no choice for the two but to merge, and therefore the common vision-building could 
already begin in the negotiations and was, without doubt, a powerful tool in the proceedings. 
In other cases, the common vision-building may not begin until after the agreement has been 
signed, although assessments on whether the separate visions of the two parties are similar 
enough to support the deal are, naturally, made before finalizing the deal. The manager from 
Datex-Ohmeda even pointed out that the discussion on common values can in practice usually 
only take place after the operational matters and the organizational structures have been 
attended to (Ritvos in Erkkilä 2001,218-219).
The efforts at Nordea in developing a common identity in the negotiations could be assumed 
to include some discussion concerning the future acculturation of the two parties involved, but 
other than that, the agreement on the acculturation mode included in the original framework 
was not undertaken in any of the cases. This may partly be because, as explained by the 
interviewee at Company A, in the case of absorptive acquisitions, the mode of acculturation is 
self-evidently assimilation and does therefore not require an explicit agreement on the matter.
The management efforts undertaken in the embedded cases (as identified from the accounts of 
the interviewees) did not include any cultural management pertaining to the decision-making 
or negotiation & agreement phase of the M&A process (excluding the understanding of the 
merger type, which is not thought of as an effort, but an underlying element). This may not 
mean that none were performed, but since the interviews were designed so that the 
respondents were allowed to list the issues proactively, without being predisposed by the 
interviewer (although the question on this matter did specifically ask to list what was done in 
each phase of the process, see Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire), it may reveal the fact 
that the management of cultural issues is traditionally only thought to pertain to the 
integration phase.
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Integration Process
The management efforts in integration included the following, listed in the order of most 
mentions: Development of, or introduction to, a common identity (5), consultants (5), cross- 
cultural training (5), culture audit (4), speed (4), strong leadership (3), and role models (1). 
Communication was taken up in all 5 of the cases, but it is not listed above, since its role was 
studied by using an explicit question on the subject (see Appendix A: Interview 
Questionnaire), automatically resulting in 5 mentions. The initial, and logical, assumption was 
that communication is exercised in all integration efforts at least to some extent, and as could 
be derived from all 5 cases, its crucial role was confirmed. The list of 10 management 
proposals for handling mergers given in the Stora Enso case (see page 61) was an especially 
explicit portrayal of the issue.
The development of a common identity (Olie 1990) in the integration phase was handled in 
many different ways in all 5 case companies, endorsing its importance in the integration 
efforts. The term ‘development’ of a common identity, however, rather pertains to mergers 
than acquisitions, because in the latter, the identity is not necessarily developed, but instead, 
the acquired party is ‘introduced’ to the corporate identity of the acquirer. In all of the 
embedded cases concerning clear-cut acquisitions (except the domestic Tampella Forest case, 
where not much cultural management whatsoever seemed to take place), for example, the 
cultural management included the communication of the mission, vision and values of the 
acquired company to the acquired party (e.g. the “welcome to the house” sessions at Company 
A). The ‘introduction’ to a common identity might therefore be a better term in the case of 
acquisitions.
The embedded cases concerning mergers, on the other hand, truly manifested the 
‘development’ of a common identity. A good example of the development process is the 
mission, vision and value seminars involving 100 managers and the testing of the results in 
the different units of the company (see page 66) in the Stora Enso merger. As could be 
inferred from this process as well as e.g. the KIDE process (see page 74) utilized at Nordea, 
the development of the common identity not only involves researching and developing the 
identity, but also committing the new company to it (“walking the talk”, as the process was 
called at Stora Enso - Ansahaiju in Erkkilä 2001,211).
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The employment of consultants was also mentioned at some point in all 5 case companies. As 
was emphasized in the Datex-Ohmeda case, their role in the integration is especially 
important as a neutral party that can distance itself emotionally from the proceedings. Cross- 
cultural training had also been applied in all 5 case companies.
As explained earlier, conducting an actual culture audit was not perceived possible before the 
announcement of the deal. In the context of the integration phase, however, a culture audit 
(such as the Values and Attitudes surveys at Stora Enso, the analysis of the different parties’ 
perception of differences in the Merita case and the “current state —analysis” at Company A) 
was mentioned in all case compames except Outokumpu. The task was usually undertaken as 
a first step in planning the later integration efforts, e.g. in assessing how a common identity 
should be developed or what type of cross-cultural training is needed (in all of the embedded 
cases, where a culture audit was conducted, the results of the audit had been utilized for this 
purpose). The culture audit as a part of the integration phase is actually partly in accordance 
with Cartwright and Cooper (1993), who emphasized the value of a culture audit in the pre­
merger search process and partner selection, but also perceived it to produce important 
information for long-term management and did therefore not exclude conducting one after the 
closing of the deal.
The reason a culture audit was not mentioned as a task undertaken in Outokumpu’s cultural 
management could be the following. As could be deduced from the case description, the type 
of mergers or acquisitions undertaken by Outokumpu has, in the last few years, changed to a 
large extent from Olie’s (1990) conglomerate mergers (type 1) to mergers/marriages (type 2) 
and absorptive acquisitions (type 3), meaning that the role of culture-related problems can be 
assumed to now have become more significant (as proposed by Olie 1990). The company has 
therefore only recently begun confronting cultural issues in terms of integration management 
and may not as to yet have an established way of handling them (which is evident from e.g. 
the recent intention of adding an M&A process, including cultural considerations, to the 
investment manual).
Speed, or the swift, decisive and efficient manner of proceeding in the integration in order to 
make the integration as painless as possible, was identified as an important element in the 
integration management in 4 of the cases (again with the exception of Outokumpu). The need
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for speed was well illustrated by Company A’s “burning platform”. According to the 
interviewee, such a platform should be created to build motivation for the change process and 
effectively utilize the initial enthusiasm often experienced at the onset of an acquisition. The 
frustration which ensued due to the delay in the Stora Enso merger caused by the EU 
regulations supports this suggestion.
And finally, the importance of strong leadership was emphasized in Stora Enso (the role of 
the CEO and the need for clear governance), Datex-Ohmeda (the role and the personality of 
the integration leader) and Nordea (the behavior of and example set by the managers in 
charge). The “buddy-system” used at Company A, or the fact that “old” employees are 
transferred to the acquired companies, is in accordance with Olie’s (1994, 387) “creation of 
overlapping memberships” aimed at reducing the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking, but it also 
reflects the ideas presented by Feldman and Spratt (1999) of using role models to facilitate 
integration. The use of role models could actually be incorporated in the element of strong 
leadership, as leaders can be found in all organizational levels, i.e. the term does not 
exclusively refer to managers.
4.2.4 Effect of Cultural Management on Post-Merger Organizational Performance
In all 5 cases, the management of cultural factors in mergers and acquisitions had been 
perceived to positively affect the post-merger organizational performance. In Stora Enso, 
Nordea and Company A, different measurements had been used to assess the performance of 
cultural management. These measurements included HR-figures, such as the post-merger 
retention of personnel and the time elapsed in integrating different functions, comparisons to 
business cases and the results of different employee surveys, such as the self-assessments at 
Stora Enso and the employee satisfaction index at Nordea. The assessment method shared by 
all 3 of these case companies was the use of repetitive surveys, in other words assessing the 
values and attitudes of the acquired unit at the onset of the deal and repeating that survey later 
(typically after six months to a year and a half) to see how things had progressed.
The reason to study whether any measurements for assessing the effect of cultural 
management were used was to be able to profess that the management of cultural factors had 
really proven to be worthwhile, and not just been perceived to be so. Based on this study, this
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really was so, which would thereby justify the use of resources in managing cultural issues. 
However, as was for example pointed out by Ansaharju from Stora Enso, appointing a 
financial figure to assess the effects of cultural management would be too arbitrary to be of 
any use, since there are too many variables, which can ultimately affect the financial 
performance.
The specific goals of the embedded cases and measurements for assessing whether those goals 
were met could not be studied for reasons of non-disclosure. Furthermore, since the extent 
and quality of the separate management efforts undertaken in each embedded case were not 
studied (such research would have been beyond the scope of this study), it is difficult to 
accurately assess how well the factors predicting cultural difficulties were balanced by 
management activities to affect the overall performance of the deals. Based on the analysis of 
the embedded cases, however, the cultural management in the Stora Enso and Datex-Ohmeda 
mergers, Nordea’s Merita merger as well as Company A’s Case X could be assessed to have 
been especially thorough and effective.
The three former were all large and complicated mergers involving complete integration, 
which could explain the notable allocation of resources to the cultural management in these 
cases. The Merita case, i.e. the merger between SYP and KOP, was a particularly valuable 
example of how resolute cultural management can turn a very challenging integration process 
into a success. The cultural factors in Case X, on the other hand, could also be perceived to 
have been handled effectively (in proportion to the efforts needed) despite the fact that the 
transaction was a relatively small acquisition. This could be a reflection of the fact that 
Company A employs a specialized M&A team, which actively seeks to develop its know-how 
in the area of mergers and acquisitions, and is therefore well aware of the importance of 
cultural management and familiar with the available management tools.
Neither the level of cultural conflicts predicted by the cultural factors in each of the embedded 
cases, nor the level of difficulties encountered in the cultural integration in these cases 
correlated with the financial or the overall outcome of the deals (see Table 10 in Appendix C: 
Synthesis of the Embedded Cases). In other words, the cultural factors in the embedded cases 
did not predict what the outcome of these deals would be. This could be expected, and merely 
confirms the fact that cultural issues are just one set of factors affecting the outcome of
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mergers and acquisitions, and e.g. economic situations (as mentioned in most of the 
embedded cases) can ultimately make or break the deal. However, as has been clearly 
indicated by both the holistic and the embedded cases, a sound cultural management will help 
in overcoming difficulties, and will thereby contribute to making deals successful.
What comes to the success of domestic vs. international mergers and acquisitions, the 
embedded cases did not confirm that domestic ones are less complicated or more successful 
than international ones. For instance, Nordea’s Merita case was very difficult even though it 
was domestic (although the difficulties could largely be attributed to industry-specific reasons,
i.e. the restructuring of the banking industry). The fact that Enso’s integration of Tampella 
Forest turned out to be rather straight-forward despite the potential cultural conflicts, could in 
part be attributed to the fact that it was a domestic case, since the power differential between 
the parties could be used to impose the culture of the acquirer without hesitation. If national 
cultural differences had been at play, such a clear-cut assimilation may not have been 
possible. However, further studies comparing domestic and international mergers and 
acquisitions would be required for more reliable conclusions on the matter.
As mentioned in the beginning of the cross-case analysis, experience was perceived in all 5 
cases to be the most important element assisting in handling subsequent mergers or 
acquisitions. For example, the successful merger between SYP and KOP was professed to 
have facilitated the cultural management of the subsequent Merita-Nordbanken merger (e.g. 
the KIDE process developed in the former merger could be utilized in the latter). Thereby 
linking the organizational performance back to the management side of the framework figure 
to reflect the accumulated experience through a learning experience can be justified.
The fact that the management of mergers and acquisitions had been perceived to succeed 
better over time in all 5 cases, would suggest that the post-merger performance has also 
affected the upper side of the framework. In other words, it can be assumed that through 
experience, the company has become more effective in its implementation processes, thereby 
strengthening the forces of cultural integration, and more tolerant of differences, thereby 
weakening the forces of cultural differentiation and the level of possible antagonism. This was 
for example the case in the merger between Datex and Ohmeda, where Datex learned to cope 
with the American culture, which, in turn, was perceived to make the later acquisition of
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another American company, Space Labs, that much easier. The link from the post-merger 
organizational performance to these issues in the upper part of the framework can therefore 
also be justified.
When asked about the effect of cultural management on the post-merger organizational 
performance, Tolvanen from Stora Enso also acknowledged the importance of taking cultural 
issues into account, but maintained that cultural issues do not affect all levels of the 
organization. He explained with the following account (presented earlier, but repeated here for 
the purposes of the ensuing analysis):
I visited a steel factory in Tornio today, and I still envision this guy there, wearing a blue overall 
and an old felt hat on his head, with a cigarette in one side of his mouth and driving a bicycle at a 
V* speed forward...It really just came to my mind that on the factory floor level, nothing 
whatsoever changes. ... The overalls of the different firms [are still there], in Stora Enso some still 
wear Ahlström overalls, some Tampella Forest overalls, some Gutzeit overalls.
The same employee will have the cigarette in the same side of his mouth driving the bicycle at the 
same speed - not much will happen to that, even if the signs of the firm are changed to whatever.
The extract illustrates how different organizational levels can face different levels of 
acculturation, an occurrence possible when complete organizational integration is not 
required. Moreover, the account provides grounds for speculation on how successful the 
management of the merger or acquisition in question has been. The development of a 
common identity even in the parts of the organization where organizational integration is not 
required can be assumed to build commitment to the firm and enhance work motivation. Olie 
(1994) argued that the identification with a new organization often takes place through 
common experiences, and the management should therefore remove symbols of previous 
identities (in this case old overalls) and replace them by new identification symbols. In other 
words, the individual habits of the employees (including how they like to drive their bicycles) 
would not have to change in cases where integration is not required, but it would be beneficial 
for the firm to have employees share a sense of commitment to the company.
4.3 Revised Framework
The findings from the cross-case analysis were used to revise the original framework (Figure 
9 on page 39). The revised framework, presented in Figure 13 on page 127, will be discussed
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next, starting from the factors affecting the level of cultural conflicts (upper part of Figure 
13), followed by the management side of the figure (lower part of Figure 13). The section will 
finish off by discussing the links to and from the organizational performance. The aim is to 
briefly go over and recap the different factors presented in the framework to explain why they 
were included, as well as why some of the factors presented in the original framework were 
excluded. The differences in relation to the original framework are marked in bold.
The levels of cultural difference affecting mergers and acquisitions, and thereby their 
outcomes, are national, industry, business, and organizational culture. The different cultural 
levels are interconnected as illustrated in the framework, i.e. the national culture is manifested 
in all the other cultural levels, elements of the industry culture in the business and 
organizational culture and so forth. The level with the largest impact on the merger or 
acquisition depends on the case at hand, and every level may not come to play in every case 
despite the interconnectedness of the levels (e.g. national cultures in clear-cut domestic 
transactions).
Although acquisitions can be very challenging, mergers, and especially those between parties 
of relatively equal power, can be considered even more demanding. The merger type is 
therefore a relevant factor in the outcome of mergers and acquisitions. Language problems, 
which entail a wide array of issues ranging from problems caused by different cultural 
encoding and decoding to the use of professional languages, also add to the challenges.
The model of cultural fit (Cartwright & Cooper 1996) was excluded from the framework for 
two reasons: First of all, in the context of acquisitions, an increase in an individual’s freedom 
is not always a desired element, and the model may therefore predict ensuing troubles 
incorrectly. And secondly, the idea of ensuring an initial cultural fit, as proposed by the model 
concerning mergers, can be argued especially in the international context. However, the 
central idea of the model, i.e. the effect of the cultural distance between the parties on the 
outcome of mergers and acquisitions, is included in the framework in the form of the degree 
of cultural differences depicted in the different cultural levels on the top of Figure 13.
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The ‘us vs. them’ antagonism is a natural reaction when groups of people from different 
cultural backgrounds come in contact with each other. Although it is incorporated in the 
acculturation theory discussed next, its underlying nature and importance in mergers and 
acquisitions is highlighted by listing it separately in the framework.
The acculturative model of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) was excluded from the 
framework based on the ambiguity related to using the model (difficulties in determining the 
preferred modes of acculturation of the acquired and the acquirer, and the consequent 
congruence thereof in the embedded cases). The fact that the same variables are taken into 
consideration in the model of acculturative dynamics, which has been derived from the 
acculturative model, would also speak for excluding one of these models. However, it is 
acknowledged that the framework could benefit from further, and more elaborate, studies 
comparing the validity of the two acculturation models.
According to the Force-Field Analysis of Acculturation (Elsass & Veiga 1994), the forces of 
cultural differentiation (or the desire of the groups to maintain their separate cultural identity) 
depend on the structure of intergroup relations and the perception of differences. In other 
words, all the factors that can affect the relations between the merging parties (such as the 
attractiveness of the acquirer and the overall acceptance of the deal) and the level of perceived 
differences (e.g. the attitude towards the other party’s culture) will determine the strength of 
the forces of cultural differentiation. The forces of organizational integration (or the 
organizational need for cultural groups to work together), on the other hand, depend on the 
acquisition motive (the diversification strategy and the relatedness of the firms) and the 
implementation processes (e.g. how well communication is handled and how effective the 
transition processes are). The equilibrium between these two opposing forces gives an 
indication of the acculturation mode of the deal as well as predicts the degree of acculturative 
tension (low level of tension between weak forces and high level between strong forces).
The balancing side of the framework (lower part of Figure 13), i.e. the cultural management, 
lists the proposed measures to overcome the challenges presented by the cultural differences. 
The decision-making process, e.g. the screening for potential acquisition targets, should 
already include some cross-cultural analysis in order to assist in the partner choice as well as
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in obtaining an idea on the resources needed in the future integration. However, an actual 
culture audit can seldom be conducted at this stage of the process. The merger type and the 
level of difficulties indicated by the type in question should also be acknowledged from the 
start, again to assist in planning the future integration.
The due diligence process in the negotiation & agreement phase should include cultural 
questions to determine what the potential problems will be in integrating the two parties. In 
some cases, the cultural due diligence may even reveal such a serious problem in this area, 
that the deal may need to be abandoned or another type of partnership considered. Although 
an actual agreement on the acculturation mode may not be necessary, including even a brief 
discussion on acculturation in the negotiation process is proposed in order to show the 
negotiators’ intercultural awareness and to attain a mutual understanding in the cultural issues.
The integration efforts specifically highlighted in the framework consist of the following: a 
culture audit to allow for planning the succeeding integration efforts (thereby depicted as the 
first task in the figure), the development of, or introduction to, a common identity through e.g. 
mutual values and symbols (development referring to mergers, where a new identity is created 
and introduction to clear-cut acquisitions), consistent communication throughout the ordeal to 
keep everyone informed, cross-cultural training where needed and the employment of 
consultants, who possess the expertise needed and who can also emotionally distance 
themselves from the process. Strong leadership is required both in managing the process but 
also in setting an example. And finally, the process should be handled as speedily and swiftly 
as possible to avoid excessive feelings of uncertainty and frustration.
As could be deduced from the study, cultural issues can have a large impact on the post­
merger organizational performance. The study demonstrated that they may not be the single 
most important factor in determining whether the deal is a success or failure, and a sound 
cultural management may not save a deal that is fundamentally unsound, but cultural 
difficulties can spoil a promising deal if not managed effectively. The post-merger 
organizational performance will, in turn, influence the attitude towards subsequent mergers or 
acquisitions, and thereby affect the feelings of antagonism in terms of ‘us vs. them’ as well as 
both the forces of cultural differentiation (the better the performance, the weaker these 
restraining forces will become) and organizational integration (the better the performance, the
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stronger these driving forces will become). The organizational performance will also have an 
effect on the management of subsequent mergers or acquisitions through the experience 
gained and lessons learned (the learning effect depicted by dashed arrows in Figure 13).
5 Conclusions 
5.1 Summary
The aim of the first section of the study was to give the reader an overview of the literature on 
the cultural factors affecting the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions. The literature review 
first presented the types of cultural differences that had been identified to play a role in 
mergers and acquisitions, emphasizing Hofstede’s (1991) dimensions of national culture and 
Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) culture typology in illustrating organizational cultural 
differences.
The second part of the review comprised of the main theories and models explaining how 
cultural differences affect the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions. The main theories 
discussed were the merger type and the ‘us vs. them’ antagonism presented by Olie (1990 and 
1994 correspondingly), Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) model of cultural fit, Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh’s (1988) acculturation theories as well as Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) force-field 
perspective of acculturation. The distinctions between the impact of cultural differences on 
international versus domestic mergers were also discussed, mainly following the findings of 
Larsson and Risberg (1998), Weber et al. (1996) and Morosini et al. (1998). This discussion 
rendered the relevance of Cartwright and Cooper’s (1996) model of cultural fit specifically in 
international mergers and acquisitions questionable.
The last part of the review gave an overview of the managerial implications of the main 
theories presented previously as well as recommendations from recent articles on how to 
successfully manage cultural differences in mergers and acquisitions. A theoretical framework 
was constructed to synthesize the findings of the literature review.
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The Я1тп of the empirical part was to examine the relevance of the theoretical framework in a 
real-life setting by linking it to the context of Finnish firms. The methodological approach 
applied resembled the constructive approach introduced by Kasanen et al. (1993), the main 
distinction being the use of the term ‘solution’ in this study and the one referred to in the 
constructive approach, which was originally developed in the context of management 
accounting. The research method used was the multiple-case study, largely based on the 
propositions of Yin (1994). The case companies examined were Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda, 
Outokumpu, Nordea and Company A. Each of the cases included one or several embedded 
cases, i.e. the examination of specific mergers and/or acquisitions undertaken by that 
company.
The cases were first analyzed individually and the analyses were then synthesized by the 
means of a cross-case analysis. The cross-case analysis included the construction of a table 
synthesizing the findings of the embedded cases, which was used in further examining the 
framework. The original framework was then revised according to the findings. The main 
conclusions drawn from the empirical study, or the main differences between the original and 
the revised framework, were the following:
1. Contrary to the argument presented in the limitations of this study, industry and business 
cultures were perceived to be relevant in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
Moreover, the interconnected nature of the different cultural levels as well as the fact 
that, generally speaking, one level cannot be emphasized over another, became evident.
2. The model of cultural fit (Cartwright & Cooper 1996) was rendered questionable. The 
evidence indicated that, in the case of acquisitions, the increase in an individual’s 
freedom was not always perceived to be a desired element, and in the case of mergers, 
seeking an initial cultural fit between the two parties was not considered pertinent. 
However, the central assumption that the larger the cultural distance between the 
merging parties, the more difficult the integration will turn out to be, was confirmed.
3. The acculturative model (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh 1988) was perceived to be quite 
difficult to apply especially in the context of mergers, since the model requires that one 
of the parties is seen as the acquirer and the other as the acquired. In genuine mergers 
among equals (which for example the Stora Enso and Merita mergers could be 
concluded to be), this cannot always be done. Furthermore, it was difficult to determine
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the preferred modes in cases, where the analysis would have indicated something in- 
between the values of the dimensions used in the model. The model of acculturative 
dynamics (Elsass & Veiga 1994), on the other hand, was perceived to be more receptive 
to these in-between modes largely due to the dynamic nature of this model, and would 
thereby seem to be the more pertinent of the two acculturation theories. However, 
further, and more elaborate, studies comparing the validity of the two acculturation 
models would be needed to confirm this finding.
4. In the management side, it was concluded that an actual culture audit cannot be 
conducted in the early stages of the merger or acquisition, since the contacts with the 
other party at this stage are limited. The proposition made by the authors of the model of 
cultural fit (Cartwright & Cooper 1996) of conducting a culture audit in the search and 
screening phase of the process in order to ensure an initial cultural fit could be argued 
because of this limitation, as well as the fact that the need for such a fit was rendered 
questionable. The importance of conducting a culture audit in the integration phase for 
the purposes of planning the subsequent integration efforts, however, was highlighted by 
the cases (and is partly in accordance with Cartwright & Cooper 1996, who emphasized 
the need for a cultural fit, but also acknowledged the value of the culture audit in later 
stages of the process).
5. An agreement on the acculturation mode between the acquirer and acquired proposed by 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) relating to the acculturative model was not perceived 
to be essential (e.g. the mode in acquisitions is often self-evidently assimilation).
6. In addition to the culture audit, the integration efforts which were not included in the 
original framework, but were clearly highlighted in the cases, were the employment of 
consultants and speed. The development of a common identity was not perceived to 
apply to clear-cut acquisitions, and thereby the term ‘introduction to’ a common identity 
was added to emphasize acquisitions, where the acquired party is assimilated and the 
corporate identity of the acquirer is imposed on the acquired party, and therefore not 
necessarily developed in any way.
7. And finally, although the study confirmed the fact that cultural issues are just one set of 
factors affecting the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, and e.g. economic situations 
can ultimately make or break the deal, both the holistic and the embedded cases clearly 
indicated that a sound cultural management will help in overcoming difficulties, and 
will thereby contribute to making deals successful.
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5.2 Managerial Implications
The fact that mergers and acquisitions are nowadays increasingly motivated by the pursuit of 
synergies rather than diversification into entirely different industries has resulted in increased 
efforts to integrate the acquired companies. The need for a closer integration, in turn, has 
highlighted the importance of cultural management in mergers and acquisitions.
The essence of this study was to provide an overview of the cultural factors affecting mergers 
and acquisitions and to present propositions for managing these factors in order to increase 
the reader’s awareness and knowledge on these issues. In other words, the aim was to find a 
solution to the managerial problem presented in the beginning of the study. Therefore, the 
work as a whole can be considered to be a managerial implication. However, a couple of 
issues were specifically deemed to be in need of highlighting:
1) First of all, the fact that experience is the number one factor facilitating the cultural 
management of mergers and acquisitions was clearly manifested by the empirical study. The 
experience accumulated from earlier mergers and acquisitions should therefore be made 
available and utilized in subsequent transactions. In other words, companies should have 
some tool for storing the most important lessons learned in each transaction and presenting 
them in a concise manner. Documenting separate cases and maintaining a group of people 
with merger-specific knowledge may not suffice, and therefore a document (such as a 
documented process description), which efficiently synthesizes the lessons learned in previous 
transactions and which is available to all those about to engage in mergers and acquisitions, 
may be more useful.
2) Secondly, a note was made on the fact that the cultural management of mergers and 
acquisitions is traditionally thought to pertain to the integration phase of the M&A process. 
Although the cultural change process normally starts in this phase, incorporating cultural 
considerations into the earlier phases may be in place. For example, some cross-cultural 
analysis could be conducted, although at a very general level, already in the screening & 
selection of potential partners to assist in the partner choice as well as give an indication of 
the resources needed in the eventual integration.
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3) And finally, the negotiation & agreement phase should include a cultural due diligence to 
probe for potential cultural problems and to help in building an idea of the scope of cultural 
integration efforts needed. The negotiations could also include discussions on cultural issues 
outside the cultural due diligence, such as a discussion on the upcoming acculturation. This 
could be considered especially important in mergers between parties of relatively equal 
power, but also in absorptive acquisitions where the mode of assimilation seems self-evident. 
The discussion might result in agreements on the acculturation and prevent later 
misconceptions on the matter, but it would, at the least, demonstrate the cross-cultural 
awareness of the acquirer to the acquired party.
5.3 Future Research
The aim of this study was to explore the issues at hand, which meant that the research could 
not go very deep into specific details. Many suggestions for future research could therefore be 
derived from this study, since all of the different factors discussed here could be the object of 
further, and more elaborate, examination. Besides, all of the industries included in this study 
were found interesting enough to be specifically focused on in subsequent studies. However, 
the areas of future research suggested here have been chosen based on two criteria: first of all, 
they need to reflect the major research gaps identified from this work (either the empirical 
study or the literature review) and secondly, they have to be realizable in the context of a 
doctorate thesis seminar.
1) One of the issues specifically recognized in the empirical study to be in need of further 
corroboration was the comparison of the relevance of Nahavandi and Malekzadeh’s (1988) 
acculturative model and Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) model of acculturative dynamics. In this 
study, the latter was perceived to be more applicable, but more confirmation on the subject 
could be in order. The framework could also benefit from further studies on the effect of the 
management efforts used to counterbalance the cultural differences. However, such a study 
would require obtaining such a deep understanding of the efforts used that it may be difficult 
to realize even in the context of a doctorate thesis.
2) Subcultures, such as the cultures of different divisions inside an organization or cultures of 
people coming from different parts of one nation, were not studied in this study, as explained
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in the limitations. Although the authors of the theories presented in this study acknowledge 
that organizations often comprise of many subcultures, these have not been explicitly dealt 
with in other studies concerning mergers and acquisitions either. Yet, as was professed by the 
Stora Enso case, subcultures can be presumed to significantly influence the process of cultural 
integration and thereby affect the outcome of the merger or acquisition. One future area of 
research could therefore be on subcultures in general and the effect they have on the outcome 
of mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, in spite of being listed in the limitations, industry and 
business cultures were convincingly found to play a part in international mergers and 
acquisitions, and were thereby included in the framework. However, further studies focusing 
explicitly on these cultural levels could be in order to verify their importance.
3) It is a central assumption in most studies on cultural aspects of mergers and acquisitions 
that culture is an important factor in their success or failure. And although, as explained in the 
research problem of this study, there is a lot of evidence that culture does, indeed, play a 
major role in the outcome of mergers and acquisitions, a number of other factors affect the 
outcome as well. No studies, however, seem to have been carried out to find out what even 
the approximate ratio of the cultural determinants to other determinants of performance is, or 
in other words how important the cultural factors really are compared to the other factors. 
This would require different kinds of studies (e.g. quantitative surveys) on both successful as 
well as failed mergers and acquisitions. The difficulty would probably be in finding access to 
reliable information on failed mergers, as companies tend to prefer presenting their successes 
rather than failures. Another issue, which would make this study difficult, is the multitude of 
factors determining the success or failure of a merger or acquisition (which also became 
evident in the empirical study).
4) As was mentioned in the section on domestic versus international mergers, empirical 
studies on cross-border mergers and acquisitions are still relatively rare despite the fact that 
they have become the dominant mode of internationalization (e.g. Olie 1994, Weber et al. 
1996, and Cartwright 1998). Suggestions on future research therefore include empirical 
studies that would continue and confirm the findings of Larsson and Risberg’s (1998) work 
regarding the role of cultural awareness as well as Weber et al.’s (1996) work on national and 
corporate cultural fit. Although Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are probably known to all, and 
approved by many, researchers in the field, no studies have been performed with the mind of
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explicitly linking his work to international mergers and acquisitions. There are numerous 
possibilities of doing so. For example, Larsson and Risberg (1998, 52) suggest a study of the 
various degrees and types of national culture clashes based on Hofstede’s work.
An important observation regarding future research is provided by Cartwright (1998,13), who 
notes that the cultural background of the researchers on cultural issues can affect the study 
results. Researchers should therefore be aware of their own cultural assumptions and try to 
select culturally appropriate and unbiased methods of research. The utilization of multi­
disciplinary and multicultural teams of researchers could be a good way to overcome this 
dilemma.
Although the number of international acquisitions has decreased somewhat during the past 
few years, the level of financial investments involved has not. Research providing information 
for understanding and managing the cultural determinants of performance in these ventures 
therefore remains extremely important.
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APPENDIX A: Interview Questionnaire
Background
1. Name
2. Title
3. Position in organization
4. Length of employment
5. Experience in mergers and acquisitions
Mergers and Acquisitions
1 .Development in M&A activity (90’s - today)
2. Approx. number of deals in last few years
3. Approx, ratio of cross-border M&A to domestic M&A 
4-How important part is M&A of company’s business strategy
M&A Process
1 .Is there a specific process, if so, what does it include
2.Which department handles which phase
Cultural Differences
1. How important is the effect of cultural differences perceived to be on M&A performance
2. Have perceived cultural differences ever been the reason to abandon a deal
3. What levels of cultural differences have been identified to exist
4. What level of culture has been perceived to effect M&A the most and why
Cultural Conflicts
1 .Has there been any contemplation in the company on what actually causes cultural conflicts, 
if yes, please list possible reasons for cultural conflicts
Management of Cultural Factors
1. How are cultural differences managed (if an M&A process exists, what are the methods 
used in each phase discussed earlier)
2. Which department handles the management of cultural issues 
3-How is communication handled in M&A
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Effect of Management of cultural differences on Performance
1. What types of goals are set to evaluate success in M&A
2. Has the management of cultural factors been perceived to improve performance over time
3. Has it been proven to improve performance over time/is it really worth it
4. Have cross-border mergers succeeded better or worse than domestic mergers and why
CASE EXAMPLE 1-3 
Background
1 .What and when was the deal
2. What was the purpose of the deal
3. What was the merger type
4. Degree of relatedness of the companies
5. How keen was your firm on imposing its own culture in this case (on a scale from 1, not at 
all, to 5, very much.)
6-How important was it for the companies to work together (in terms of organizational 
integration)
The Other Party
1. WTiat were the anticipated cultural differences
2. Were their employees more/less/equally free to make decisions
3. What was the financial state of the acquired company compared to yours
4. What was their mindset on the acquisition (e.g. enthusiastic/hostile)
5. How attracted were they of the acquirer
ó.How keen were they on preserving their own culture (on a scale of 1, not at all, to 5, very 
much.
Implementation
1. Was a process followed
2. What was done (in each phase) to manage cultural differences and by whom
Performance
1 .What were the goals of the deal 
2. Were they met
4.Could the deal be considered a success
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APPENDIX В: Interviewees
Company Name Title Length of 
Employment in 
Case Company
Experience 
in M&A 
(approx.)
Stora Enso Aulis Ansaharju SVP Fine Papers, Stora 
Enso North America
28 years 6 years
Stora Enso Jukka Tolvanen VP Financial 
Consolidation
13 years 10 years
Nordea Eira Palin-Lehtinen Executive Vice
President, Head of
Nordic Private Banking
17 years 
(in banking)
13 years
Datex-Ohmeda Antti Ritvos President, Patient 
Monitoring
16 years 9 years
Instrumentarium Hannu Ahjopalo Executive Director, 
Corporate Development 
& New Strategic
Ventures
25 years 15 years
Outokumpu Kari Lassila SVP Corporate 
Development & Investor 
Relations
34 years 20 years
"Company A" "Interviewee" Manager, M&A 
Transitions
15 years >3 years
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APPENDIX C: Synthesis of the Embedded Cases
Table 10, which synthesizes the embedded cases, was compiled for the purpose of a closer 
examination of the theoretical framework. The cultural factors, which had been perceived by 
the interviewees to affect the merger or acquisition (the upper part of the table), were assigned 
values to according to the level of cultural conflicts perceived to predict by each. A low level 
was indicated by the letter L, a moderate by M and a high by H. The only exceptions were the 
variables, which were not perceived to have an effect on the issue (left empty) and the 
language variable, which was considered an on/off issue: (empty) if no effect, (Y) if perceived 
to have an effect. The purpose of assigning values was to ensure a closer analysis of the cases 
in relation to the theoretical framework. The mode of the values assigned to the different 
factors (or the most frequent value) was used as the value indicating the overall predicted 
level of cultural conflicts in each case. The lower part of the table consists of the management 
efforts undertaken in each case (as identified from the accounts of the interviewees), which 
were depicted with an x. The perceived level of difficulties in integration, as well as the 
financial and overall success of the merger or acquisition, were also assessed and presented.
The table should not be relied upon to provide highly reliable conclusions as it is not based on 
an exact science. The assigned values are arbitrary in the sense that they are not comparable 
between the different variables in the table. Furthermore, the values are extremely subjective, 
as they are based on the subjective accounts of the interviewees. The aim, however, was not to 
e.g. make comparisons between the values of each variable, but to provide a synthesis of the 
embedded cases in order to be able to draw conclusions from these cases for the cross-case 
analysis, to take a closer look at the theories included in the theoretical framework, and to 
provide some indication on the overall validity of the framework.
The upper part of the table, or the variables reflecting the cultural factors which were 
perceived to affect the cases, will shortly be explained first, followed by the synthesis of the 
cultural management efforts undertaken in each case (i.e. the lower part of the table). The 
section will finish off by explaining the variables concerning the perceived level of difficulties 
in cultural integration, and the financial and overall outcome of the deals.
145
Table 10: Synthesis of the Embedded Cases
Datex- Outo-
Stora Enso Nordea Ohmeda kumpu Company A
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National Culture M M M M M M L
Industry Culture
Business Culture M
Organizational Culture M M M H M M M M L H
Merger Type M H M H H M H M M M
Language Y Y
Cultural Fit H M H M M H H
Antagonism H M L H M M L M L H
Acculturation Mode H M M H L M H M L H
Force-Field Analysis H M M H M M H M M H
Predicted Level of Cultural 
Conflicts (Mo) H M M H M M M M L H
Merger Type X X X X X X X X X X
Cross-Cultural Analysis
Acculturation Mode
Cultural Due Diligence
Culture Audit X X X X * jio: x X
Common Identity X X X X X X X X X
Communication X X X X X X X X X X
Cross-Cultural Training X X X X X X X X
Strong Leadership X X
LT $•
X
Speed X X X
Consultants X X X X X
Perceived Level of 
Difficulties in Integration L M L H M M M 7 L H
Financial Outcome H H L H H M H ? M M
Overall Outcome H H M H ? M H ? M M
1. Cultural Factors
Levels of Cultural Differences
Eight of the ten cases were international and two domestic. National cultural differences were 
perceived as an issue in all but one of the international cases, Case Y. Industry culture was not 
explicitly seen to affect any of the cases, which could be attributed to the fact that 
diversification was not the motivation behind any of the deals, as discussed earlier. Business 
culture was identified as a factor in just 1 case, the merger between the Datex and Ohmeda
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units. Organizational cultural differences, on the other hand, were identified in all 10 cases. In 
Case X, the level of these differences was perceived to be low, as the organizational cultures 
of the acquirer and the acquired were found to be surprisingly similar. By contrast, the Merita 
case and Case Y ran into an especially high level of organizational cultural differences. In the 
Merita case, SYP and KOP had strong and distinct cultures, which stemmed from the long 
histories of the two parties. In Case Y, the difference mainly pertained to the size of the 
companies - the small acquired firm was used to a more liberal and quicker pace of 
implementing ideas. In the remaining 7 cases, the level of organizational cultural differences 
was perceived to be moderate, in other words although differences existed, they were not 
perceived significant.
Merger Type
None of the cases were of merger type 1 (conglomerate mergers, Olie 1990), in other words 
the only merger type predicting a low level of culture-related problems. Tampella Forest, 
Engström and Case Y were clear-cut absorptive acquisitions (type 3, predicting a moderate 
level of difficulties), since the intention was to achieve synergy and a clear power differential 
existed in each. Consolidated Papers was a redesign merger case (type 4, moderate level of 
difficulties), because a clear power differential existed, and although organizational 
integration was not the objective, Stora Enso exerted its influence and imposed some of its 
principles on the acquired company. Case X could initially also be classified as a redesign 
merger, referring to the initial, limited integration required by the acquiring company, 
Company A. In the long run, however, the deal could be considered an absorptive acquisition 
(reflecting the intended complete integration).
The initial deal behind Outokumpu’s Case One was a merger/marriage (type 2, high level of 
difficulties), since the two parties were of approximately equal power (profitability vs. size) 
and the idea was to obtain synergies. The more recent transaction, Outokumpu s acquisition 
of the full ownership of the company, however, could be classified as a redesign merger. The 
corporation is obviously more powerful than the acquired company, which is now one of its 
business units, and although the company will mostly be allowed to carry on as usual, some 
functions will be integrated. The redesign merger case was actually the one focused on m this 
study, although the initial merger was acknowledged to have an impact on it.
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Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda, Merita and Merita-Nordbanken could be classified as 
mergers/marriages (i.e. two partners of more or less equal strength, which have decided to 
blend their operational and managerial functions). Although Ohmeda was clearly the acquired 
party, the fact that it was merged with the Datex unit, which was half its size, made the 
transaction a merger/marriage by nature
Language Problems
Despite the fact that 8 of the cases were international, in only 2 of them were language 
problems specifically mentioned as an issue, namely Stora Enso and Merita-Nordbanken.
The Model of Cultural Fit
The assessment of the model of cultural fit (Cartwright & Cooper 1996) varied depending on 
the type of merger of the case, as was proposed by the model. In acquisitions (including 
redesign mergers), an (empty) was assigned to 3 cases where the level of individual freedom 
was perceived to increase or not change (referring to “things will go well” suggested by the 
theory), namely Consolidated Papers, Engström and Case X. An (H), indicating a predicted 
high level of difficulties, was given to those 3 in which it was perceived to decrease 
(“problems will occur”), in other words Tampella Forest, Case One and Case Y. In mergers, 
an attempt was made to determine whether the cultures of the two parties were adjoining 
types. This was perceived to be moderately so in Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda and Merita- 
Nordbanken (some cultural distance both organizationally and nationally) and not so in the 
Merita merger between SYP and KOP (which represented a rather large organizational 
cultural distance between the parties).
‘Us vs. Them’ Antagonism
The level of the ‘us vs. them’ antagonism (Sales & Mirvis 1984 and Olie 1994) could be 
assumed to have been low in 3 cases: Consolidated Papers, Datex-Ohmeda and Case X. This 
was so mainly due to the enthusiastic response towards the acquisition in all cases (in the 
Datex-Ohmeda case excluding the top management, whose power was reduced due to the 
company being split up).
A moderate level of antagonism could be associated with Stora Enso, Engström, Case One 
and Merita-Nordbanken. In Stora Enso, the antagonism was evident from the ‘national
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contests’ described earlier, as well as from the fact that the mindset towards the merger was 
not specifically enthusiastic. In Case One, the antagonism can be expected to have increased 
due to the loss in status from a company listed on the stock exchange to a business unit of a 
corporation. In Engström and Merita-Nordbanken, the mindset towards the deal was rather 
positive, but the cultural differences encountered (quality-culture in the former and national 
cultures, i.e. Swedes vs. Finns in the latter) may have increased the antagonism somewhat.
A high level of antagonism was apparent in the remaining 3 cases. In the Tampella Forest 
case, the antagonism could be attributed to the fact that the company was forced into the deal 
due to the poor financial state it was in. In Merita, the antagonism was exceptionally strong 
due to the long history of fierce competition, as mentioned earlier. And in Case Y, the initial 
unrealistic expectations turning into disappointments can be assumed to have been the cause 
behind the strengthened antagonistic feelings.
Acculturation Models
Congruence, and thereby a predicted low level of acculturative stress, was thought to be found 
in 2 cases (Merita-Nordbanken and Company A’s Case X), some congruence in 4 (i.e. 
moderate stress in Stora Enso, Consolidated Papers, Engström and Outokumpu’s Case One), 
and incongruence in 4 (high stress in Tampella Forest, Merita, Datex-Ohmeda and Company 
A’s Case Y). (See Appendix D: Preferred Modes of Acculturation for a table presenting the 
case-by-case analysis of the preferred acculturation modes based on the four dimensions listed 
above).
None of the cases were perceived to explicitly point to déculturation, i.e. to both weak forces 
of cultural differentiation as well as weak forces of organizational integration, which would 
have predicted a low tension system in the Force-Field Analysis of Acculturation (Elsass & 
Veiga 1994). A moderate level of tension was predicted by 6 of the cases, in other words 
cases purporting strong forces of cultural differentiation and weak forces of organizational 
integration (separation) or vice versa (assimilation), or a moderate level of either or both of 
the forces. A high level of tension could be predicted by 4 cases, where both of the forces 
were identified as being strong (i.e. Tampella Forest, Datex-Ohmeda, Merita and Case Y). 
(See Appendix E: Force-Field Analysis of Acculturation for a table on the force-field analysis 
concerning the embedded cases).
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2. Cultural Management Efforts
The first issue that comes across from the management side of Table 10 is the fact that none 
of the pre-integration phase management efforts have been checked in any of the cases (the 
understanding of the merger type is not thought of as an effort, but an underlying element).
A culture audit of sorts (such as a values and attitudes -survey in Stora Enso or a study on the 
perception of differences in Merita), was mentioned in 7 of the cases, the exceptions being 
Tampella Forest, Outokumpu’s Case One and Merita-Nordbanken. The results of the culture 
audit were utilized in the subsequent integration efforts in all of the 7 cases where one was 
conducted. The development of or introduction to a common identity, which was undertaken 
in all but the Tampella Forest case, consisted of the development of mutual values in all of the 
merger cases, and the introduction to the latter in the acquisition cases. Cross-cultural training 
was evident in all except Tampella Forest and Case One, but was for example utilized only to 
a modest extent in the Engström case, where the culture audit had revealed a relatively low 
level of cultural differences between the parties. The significance of strong leadership and 
speed was explicitly brought up in the Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda and Merita cases. Finally, 
consultants were mentioned as having taken part in the cultural management in 5 cases.
3. Overall Performance
Perceived Level of Difficulties in Integration
The integration in Tampella Forest, Consolidated Papers and Case X was perceived to be 
relatively straight-forward (depicted by an “L” in Table 10 in the perceived level of 
difficulties in cultural integration). Although many of the factors in the Tampella Forest case 
would have indicated a high level of problems in cultural integration, the high power 
differential between Enso and Tampella Forest can be assumed to have made the integration 
relatively uncomplicated. The culture of the acquiring party was imposed on the acquired 
without much discussion on the subject. The enthusiastic response towards the deal in 
Consolidated Papers, as well as the fact that complete integration was not intended, may have 
facilitated this acquisition. The positive mindset in Case X, as well as the surprising similarity 
in the cultures of the two parties, may have made the cultural integration in this case relatively 
easy.
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Stora Enso, Engström, Datex-Ohmeda and Merita-Nordbanken were seen to represent a 
moderate level of perceived difficulties. In addition to being relatively large mergers among 
equals, Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda and Merita-Nordbanken all faced a moderate level of 
cultural differences at both a national as well as an organizational level, which further 
complicated the transactions. Datex-Ohmeda was, furthermore, quite a complex acquisition, 
because it incorporated both several acquired units as well as several acquirers. The fact that 
Datex and Ohmeda shared a similar value base, Enso and Stora shared many similarities in 
their organizational cultures and the merger between Merita and Nordbanken involved a 
relatively low level of integration, can all be presumed to have made the cultural integrations 
somewhat easier in these cases.
The cultural integration in the Merita merger and Case Y were perceived to be very 
challenging. The strong and distinct organizational cultures of SYP and KOP, the 
exceptionally strong ‘us vs. them’ antagonism, and the fact that the transaction was a 
restructuring case involving a significant number of layoffs and, consequently, the strong 
emotions involved, all rendered the Merita case extremely difficult. Case Y, by contrast, was a 
great example of how a few people can hamper the integration of a relatively small 
acquisition, even if the power differential between the two parties is significant. Although the 
problem could be in part attributed to the personalities of these people, their desire to maintain 
a separate cultural identity played an important role in the proceedings. The integration efforts 
pertaining to the incorporation of Case One to Outokumpu have only recently begun, and the 
cultural integration difficulties have not yet been assessed (question mark in Table 10).
Perceived Level of Success
What comes to the perceived financial success of the cases, Consolidated Papers was clearly a 
financial failure (at least in the short run), whereas Engström, Case X and Case Y were not 
perceived to be particularly successful financially, but not financial failures either. In Case 
One, it was too early to say, while the remaining 5 cases were considered financial successes. 
As for the overall outcome, none of the cases were regarded as complete failures (which could 
be expected considering the fact that companies seldom like to present their failures). Four of 
the cases (Consolidated Papers, Engström, Case X and Case Y) were considered relatively 
successful and four (Tampella Forest, Stora Enso, Datex-Ohmeda and Merita) very 
successful. In Case One and Merita-Nordbanken, it was too early to say.
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APPENDIX D: Preferred Modes of Acculturation
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Legend: L - Low, M = Moderate, H = High, Y = Yes, N = No, P = Partial, (...) = Firm considered the
acquiring firm, if other than case company.
The table is based on the preferred types of adaptation process and the acculturative model of 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) (see pages 22-24). Taking Enso’s Tampella Forest 
acquisition as an example, it can be concluded that Enso was not perceived to be a specifically 
attractive acquirer (L) and the Tampella Forest party was keen on preserving their own culture 
(H), which would therefore point to their preferred adaptation process of separation. Enso’s 
preferred mode, on the other hand, was assimilation, since the firms were very related (H) and 
Enso did not tolerate multiculturalism in this case (L). The ensuing incongruence (N) would 
thereby predict a high level of acculturative stress according to the theory.
152
APPENDIX E: Force-Field Analysis of Acculturation
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The table is based on Elsass and Veiga’s (1994) force-field analysis of acculturation (see 
pages 24-27). Taking the Tampella Forest acquisition as an example, it can be concluded that 
both the forces of cultural differentiation and the forces of organizational integration were 
identified to have been strong. This would point to the acculturation mode of acculturative 
tension, which, according to the theory, predicts a state of high acculturative tension.
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